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Abstract
This dissertation examines the ethics of and reasons for casualty rhetoric in U.S.
congressional debates—both on the House floor and in TV media debates. Normatively,
it argues that casualty rhetoric is an obligation for elected politicians and that it enhances
the inclusionary and public reasoning mechanisms of wartime deliberations in
democracies. Empirically, it models Iraqi civilian and U.S. combat casualty rhetoric in
the U.S. House of Representatives. Robust effects are found for past voting behavior,
partisanship, veteran status, ideology, and gender variables. The dissertation further
explores wartime deaths as normative constructs, and assesses how politicians construed
the loss of life in Iraq during congressional debates. The meaning of casualties is found to
be contingent upon contextualized wartime information that is selectively and
strategically deployed by politicians. The dissertation also examines how members of the
U.S. Congress contextualize U.S. combat casualties in Iraq during appearances in the TV
news media. It finds that Democrats and Republicans uniformly discuss war casualties in
critical and supportive terms, respectively. This partisan uniformity in casualty rhetoric
has implications for the finding that cross-party criticism and support influences public
opinion on war. The dissertation concludes by considering the implications of this study
for U.S. drone warfare and for theorizing discourse ethics in International Relations (IR).
The arguments and findings speak to literatures on the role of congressional rhetoric
during war, casualty politics, and theories of discourse ethics in IR.
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Chapter 1
Exploring Congressional Casualty Rhetoric
Current estimates indicate that 6,648 killed U.S. soldiers and approximately 116,409 Iraqi
civilians have been killed in Iraq since the war began in March 2003 (O’Hanlon 2012).
In the International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature, there is a
tradition of treating wartime deaths as variables, and examining their effects on political
behavior. Scholarly interest in combat casualties1 continues to grow, primarily with a
focus on exploring the effects of combat deaths on voting behavior and public support for
war (Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi,
Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Karol and Miguel 2007; Kriner and Shen 2007).2
There is little research on casualty rhetoric, though experimental research
occasionally relies on mock casualty rhetoric to explore the framing effects of casualties
on support for war (e.g. Boettcher and Cobb 2006, 2009; Edy and Meirick 2007).
Framing studies suggest differential effects of casualties on the public depending on
exposure to different casualty frames. Beyond casualty frames, the significance and
implications of casualties are contingent on many other factors, such as partisanship and
the intensity of partisanship. Gaines et al. (2007: 967) find that “the meanings that people
[give] to their factual beliefs about troop losses, not the beliefs themselves, [drive] their
opinions toward the [Iraq] war.” Casualties are not simply facts; they are interpreted
through partisan lenses, beliefs about war, and modified by contextual information. This
point is echoed by Zehfuss (2002: 194), who argues that, “even when something as

1

The traditional definition of “casualties” includes those who suffer fatalities and wounds during war.
However, the (IR) literature generally uses the term “casualties” to refer to war death. This paper continues
this practice, and uses “casualties” and “death” interchangeably.
2
For an exception, see Kriner and Shen (2010), which examines the causes and consequences of a
“casualty gap.”
1

suggestively ‘real’ as death is concerned, interpretation is needed to assess how it matters
and indeed, I would argue, what it is.”
A different body of literature suggests that elite and congressional war rhetoric
impacts the public’s support for war (Berinsky 2007, 2009; Groeling and Baum 2008,
2009; Zaller 1992). For example, Berinsky’s (2009) elite cue theory proposes that the
public turns to elite political actors—often members of Congress—to guide their
positions on war. We might expect that congressional casualty rhetoric therefore plays a
role in shaping citizens’ perceptions of wartime losses and giving meaning to these
losses. Congressional war rhetoric, however, is also shaped by the local human costs of
war, with local combat casualties increasing congressional criticism of war (Kriner and
Shen n.d.). Together, these literatures—pertaining to (1) the impact of casualties on the
public and (2) congressional war rhetoric—suggest that combat casualties and
congressional war rhetoric are both interrelated and independently influential on U.S.
society. These literatures also suggest that, combined, these factors might impact the
public’s views on the conduct of war and war casualties.
This dissertation builds on these literatures by exploring congressional casualty
rhetoric. Though politicians’ rhetoric is considered vital to public opinion and voting
behavior, the issue of politicians’ casualty rhetoric remains opaque. Most scholars would
likely accept the argument that politicians’ casualty rhetoric influences public views on
war and wartime death, yet this issue has received very little consideration. In the
following chapters I examine the determinants of speaking about the 6,648 killed U.S.
soldiers and the 116,409 or so killed civilians in Iraq. I also evaluate how members of
Congress (MCs) interpret and speak about these losses. Empirically, I examine casualty
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rhetoric within the U.S. House of Representatives, as well as casualty rhetoric by
representatives and senators in TV news media.
The focus of the dissertation is how and why members of Congress speak about
killed U.S. soldiers and foreign civilians, and why it matters. I explore this theme by
considering four questions: What explains variation in speaking about wartime deaths
among U.S. politicians within Congress? How do politicians debate wartime death
within Congress? How do politicians debate these lost lives in the TV news media? Why
should it matter whether and how elected officials speak about these wartimes losses? I
grapple with these empirical and normative questions in three parts. The second and
third chapters address the analytical question of who speaks about dead U.S. soldiers and
dead Iraqi civilians, respectively. These chapters also provide an interpretive analysis of
how politicians debate wartime casualties. Each of these chapters also takes up the
question of why U.S. elected representatives should speak about these deaths. The fourth
chapter explores the rhetoric of wartime losses among members of Congress in TV news
media.
This dissertation is part of an emerging body of research that suggests Congress
plays a larger role than previously thought with regard to the conduct of war (Brulé,
Marshall, and Prins 2010; Howell and Pevehouse 2005, 2007; Kriner 2010; Marshall and
Prins 2011). Howell and Pevehouse (2007: 97) argue the following:
When they choose to do so, members of Congress can exert a great deal of influence over the
conduct of war. They can enact laws that dictate how long military campaigns may last, control
the purse strings that determine how well they are funded, and dictate how appropriations may be
spent. Moreover, they can call hearings and issue public pronouncements on foreign policy
matters. These powers allow members to cut funding for ill-advised military ventures, set
timetables for the withdrawal of troops, foreclose opportunities to expand a conflict into new
regions, and establish reporting requirements. Through legislation, appropriations, hearings, and
public appeals, members of Congress can substantially increase the political costs of military
action-sometimes forcing presidents to withdraw sooner than they would like or even preventing
any kind of military action whatsoever.

3

Thus, Congress may shape the conduct of war through a variety of mechanisms. Past
scholars are correct in asserting that the President is the most powerful actor with regard
to initiating and conducting war (Fisher 2000; Ostrom and Job 1986). As Kriner (2010:
11) posits, however, “this does not mean . . . that Congress exerts no influence over the
conduct of American military policy” (emphasis original). Kriner (2010) finds a number
of instances in which Congress shapes the commencement, scope, and length of the use
of military force abroad. Congressional influence is often indirect, manifesting through
the introduction of legislation challenging the use of force as well as through “engaging
the debate over military policymaking in the public sphere” (Kriner 2010: 12). This
dissertation builds on these studies by examining how combat casualties are part of
congressional debates in the public sphere.
A limitation of the dissertation is that it does not examine possible effects of
congressional casualty rhetoric. It takes at face value a number of related studies which
either suggest or contain an underlying logic indicating the likelihood of congressional
casualty rhetoric as influential on the public. This dissertation is therefore a contentanalytic approach to congressional rhetoric; it does not attempt to measure the effects of
casualty rhetoric on the public. The results of this dissertation would benefit greatly from
experimental studies including variants of congressional casualty rhetoric found in the
following chapters. Future studies might extend the findings here to determine detailed
effects of casualty rhetoric. I focus on content because questions of effects are not fully
significant without an understanding of how rhetoric unfolds among politicians. In
exploring how debates about U.S. and civilian war deaths actually occur, this dissertation
provides a path for future measurements of casualty effects.

4

There are, of course, important reasons for studying the content of casualty
rhetoric that have nothing to do with its effects. I argue that casualty rhetoric is
beneficial to the health of American democracy. Politicians have a responsibility to
speak about those who have been directly impacted by their decisions. In delegating
broad authority to President George W. Bush to use military force in Iraq, members of
Congress were partially responsible for the deaths of soldiers and civilians there. From
this responsibility stems an ethical obligation to speak of such deaths, in turn permitting
them to play a role in public debates. Providing a space for the dead in these debates
brings fallen soldiers and civilians into the consideration of wartime legislation and how
citizens should think and feel about these deaths in relation to their positions on war. In
this way, casualty rhetoric is beneficial to democracy because it ensures that the most
devastating cost of war becomes central to the public reasoning process. Casualty
rhetoric provides a normatively valuable quasi-agency to killed soldiers and civilians.
Because dead soldiers and civilians cannot speak and must therefore be spoken about and
spoken for in order to be represented, casualty rhetoric serves a valuable representative
function, extending representation to the deceased. By responding to and representing
dead soldiers and civilians in public democratic institutions, politicians accommodate a
virtual form of agency on behalf of the dead.
Casualty rhetoric thus enhances two important components of democratic
deliberations: public reasoning and inclusion. Speaking of the dead allows them to
become part of the public reasoning process regarding whether politicians should support
or criticize the war, as well as how to proceed with future combat operations. It also
includes them in the public conversation about what their deaths mean with respect to
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past and future U.S. foreign policy practices. While speaking about and for the dead is a
contestable and ethically complicated act, it is preferable to silence. This point will be
discussed further in the coming chapters.

Chapter Overviews
In the second chapter, “Playing Politics with the Dead? Fallen Soldiers and the Subaltern
Politics of Casualty Rhetoric,” the determinants and normative value of speaking about
killed U.S. soldiers is examined. This chapter is concerned with U.S. combat casualty
rhetoric for a number of reasons. Research suggests that local casualties impact the
public’s support for war (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000), but also that the public tends
to know little about aggregate casualty numbers (Berinsky 2007). Public views on the use
of force, however, are often linked to elite framing (Entman 2004), and fallen soldiers
may likewise emerge as “framed subjects” politicians use to their advantage to shape
public opinion on war. Gartner, Segura, and Barrat (2004) propose that local casualties
are the most important costs with regard to attitude formation about war among citizens,
and find that politicians are responsive to local casualties in terms of formulating and
expressing policy positions. Similarly, local casualties are related to increased
congressional criticism of war (Kriner and Shen n.d.). This chapter seeks to build on the
important insights generated by these studies. To my knowledge, there has been no
exploration of whether and how the articulation of casualties is constitutive of rhetorical
policy positions. This chapter therefore examines casualty rhetoric within the U.S. House
of Representatives, and explores how casualties were central to criticism and support of
the Iraq War.

6

To understand the determinants of U.S. combat casualty rhetoric, I examine
casualty rhetoric in two important years: 2004 and 2006. Both of these years were
election years for members of the House, and the Iraq War was a major concern in these
election years. To understand how representatives spoke about U.S. combat deaths, I
conduct an interpretive analysis of congressional rhetoric about these losses. I then
compare the different ways Democrats and Republicans spoke of these losses.
Normatively, I contend that one of the ways we may realize the value of casualty rhetoric
is by recognizing the subaltern characteristics of killed soldiers. I conceptualize killed
soldiers in subaltern terms because they are voiceless, and because many come from
marginalized contexts. The chapter observes that killed soldiers literally cannot speak and
consequently must be spoken about and spoken for in order to be represented.
The third chapter, “[Ac]counting [for] Their Dead: Congressional Rhetoric and
Lost Iraqi Civilian Lives,” explores Iraqi civilian casualty rhetoric among U.S. House
members. This chapter searches for the determinants of Iraqi civilian casualty rhetoric
using the same theoretical perspectives as chapter two: strategic ownership and personal
characteristics. I do not include constituent characteristics in this chapter. Studies on the
human costs of U.S. wars typically focus on American combat deaths; however, it
appears foreign civilian casualties might also matter. Studies on agenda setting in
campaigns demonstrate that whether candidates discuss or eschew certain issues impacts
the extent to which voters consider these issues (Simon 2002). Some scholars suggest that
knowledge of casualties (including civilian) may dampen public support for war
(Eichenberg 2005: 173). In recent research on how casualties impact public opinion on
war, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009: 256) ask, “at some level there is an unavoidable
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trade-off between their civilian casualties and our military casualties; how does the public
weigh that trade-off and what, to use an infelicitous metaphor from economics, is the
exchange rate?” Their study provides some clues indicating that the U.S. public is
sensitive to foreign civilian deaths. If civilian casualties matter in this way, it is germane
to inquire into politicians’ responsiveness to these deaths, as political elites play a role in
shaping public opinion on war (Berinsky 2007; Groeling and Baum 2008).
This chapter also considers the extent to which speaking about civilian casualties
might also be normatively important. Emmanuel Lévinas (1997: 100), a philosopher
noted for his contribution to the ethical study of Self-Other relations, argued that
consciousness of others’ suffering was central to any theory of ethics: “What is signified
by the advent of conscience . . . if not the discovery of corpses beside me and my horror
of existing by assassination? Attention to others and, consequently, the possibility of
counting myself among them, of judging myself—conscience is justice.” If attention to
the suffering and deaths of others is central to ethical relations among individuals and
groups, then attentiveness to these losses in legislative debates may promote a more
ethical conversation on war. To some extent, then, research on civilian casualty rhetoric
within war debates enables us to understand the justness of democratic deliberations on
war in the United States.
Chapter four, “Casualty Contextualization and Congressional Rhetoric in the TV
Media,” examines how representatives and senators contextualized war casualties in the
months leading up to the 2004 and 2006 elections. To my knowledge, there exists no
study that assesses how U.S. politicians contextualize U.S. combat casualties in the news
media. While numerous studies find that elite rhetoric—particularly by MCs—shapes the
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public’s perceptions of the justifiability and appropriateness of war (Berinsky 2007;
Groeling and Baum 2008; Gelpi et al. 2009), there has been virtually no research on how
MCs contextualize wartime death in the news media. If perceptions of future success and
justifiability are central to structuring the impact of casualties on the public, do MCs
contextualize their statements about casualties in these terms? Additionally, do MCs
contextualize casualties in ways that align with the findings of experimental studies? I
pursue these and other questions in this chapter.
In addition to questions concerning the contextualization of casualties, I seek to
determine the degree of issue convergence between partisan MCs and the valence of
casualty statements. Unlike on the House and Senate floors, MCs in TV interviews need
to respond to questions from journalists, which might include questions about casualties.
For politicians hoping to avoid speaking about the human costs of war, the media
environment should make issue avoidance difficult. Consequently, I expect issue
convergence on casualties, though I anticipate a difference in casualty statement valence
among members of opposite parties. Since past studies indicate, however, that the media
seeks out criticism of the president by members of his own party, I also expect to find a
high percentage of critical Republican casualty rhetoric (Groeling and Baum 2008; 2009).
In pursuing these questions, this chapter builds on a growing body of work on the
effects of U.S. combat casualties in American politics. Existing research has examined
the significant effects of congressional rhetoric, perceptions of success and justifiability
during war, and casualties on public views on war and voting behavior, but researchers
have yet to explore precisely how MCs debate wartime death in the media. Such debates
might impact the public’s perceptions of war success/failure, and could influence the
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impact of casualties on the public through structuring the meaning of these deaths.
Questions about the independent effects of variables on casualty sensitivity and support
for war among the public could include questions about how partisan elites actually
contextualize casualties during key periods. Because Americans are generally relatively
uninformed about foreign affairs (see, for example, Baum 2003), and because many
Americans get their information from TV news, the voices of congressional elites in the
TV news media are a central means of knowledge and accountability (Baum and
Groeling 2008).
There are a number of implications of this chapter for research on domestic
politics and the conduct of war. Congressional criticism affects the capacity of presidents
to rally the public to continue the use of force abroad (Kriner 2010). For example, if
MCs—particularly members of the president’s party—discuss combat casualties in
critical terms such as failure or inability to achieve a military victory during interviews on
TV, then perhaps congressional casualty rhetoric in the media serves as an important
mechanism of a “democratic brake on military adventurism” (Kriner and Shen 2007:
507). Alternately, if politicians are able to configure war casualties as part of a
successful war or as “noble sacrifices,” or contextualize these deaths with information
about killed insurgents, then combat casualties may provide less of a restraint on
sustaining aggressive military action abroad. In either case, this chapter provides an
empirical basis of casualty contextualization among MCs in the TV media to better
understand how the rhetoric of combat casualties serves as a restraining or supporting
mechanism for how casualties influence public opinion and voting behavior.

10

This chapter is therefore relevant to arguments about democratic leaders’ capacity
to continue waging war. Sensitivity to casualties among citizens in democracies is one of
the purported mechanisms for why it may be difficult not only for democratic leaders to
use force, but to sustain support for the use of force (Ray 1995; Smith 2005). Indeed,
scholars argue that leaders in democracies pick wars that preferably cost relatively few
lives (Reiter and Stam 2002). While it has been suggested that the public does not
comprise a formidable constraint on the use of force because, as Rosato (2003 594-595)
notes, “the costs of war typically fall on a small subset of the population that will likely
be unwilling to protest government policy,” recent research indicates that far more
Americans are connected in some way to combat casualties (Kriner and Shen 2010). It is
not only the dead and their immediate families that are impacted by the lethality of
combat; rather, broad segments of the American public are connected to the dead and
exhibit various degrees of sensitivity to the human toll of war (Kriner and Shen 2010).
Congressional statements about these human costs in the TV news media provide an
important component of public debates about war and the consequences of sending troops
to battle. MCs provide information and context about these consequences, and publicly
challenge or support the president’s narrative of wartime success.
In the fifth and final chapter, “Discourse Ethics, Drones, and the Future of U.S.
Military Adventurism,” I compare and synthesize the findings of chapters two through
four, and extend my findings and arguments from these chapters to other contemporary
and future combat contexts. In particular, I examine the role of congressional casualty
rhetoric with regard to future possibilities of U.S. wars, and argue for the importance of
congressional casualty rhetoric in the context of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan.

11
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Chapter 2
Playing Politics with the Dead? Fallen Soldiers and the Subaltern Politics of
Casualty Rhetoric
What happens when the unique death . . . . when all talk of death comes to be inflected by
a prescribed rhetoric? –Jacques Derrida (2003: 17)

Introduction
Most debates about the Iraq War revolved around costs, including economic,
reputational, and human costs. Floor speeches in the U.S. House of Representatives
provided crucial opportunities for legislators to discuss their views on Iraq and debate the
meaning and implications of these costs. Though each of these costs is important,
Gartner, Segura, and Barratt (2004: 467) suggest that “wartime deaths . . . represent a, if
not the, most visible cost of a nation’s involvement in war and serve to highlight both the
relative importance of the conflict to its citizenry, as well as the successfulness of the
effort” (emphasis original). This chapter examines speeches about U.S. combat casualties
within the U.S. House of Representatives, which I refer to as combat casualty rhetoric. In
particular, I examine why and how representatives engaged in this practice, and also
explore the normative value of this practice.
There are three main arguments and findings in this chapter. First, I argue that
casualty rhetoric is a normatively valuable democratic practice, as it provides the
conditions of agency for the dead, interjecting them into public deliberations, affording
them the possibility to affect political negotiations within democratic institutions and
affect individuals within the public sphere. I conceptualize dead soldiers as subaltern
subjects, killed subjects who were often from marginalized communities before death,
and unable to speak to the meaning of their deaths upon their demise. Related to this
argument is the contention that elected politicians are morally obligated to speak of
!
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deaths for which they hold partial responsibility. Second, I find that local combat deaths,
party affiliation, ideology, voting record on authorizing the Iraq War, Foreign Affairs
committee membership, combat military service, and, to a lesser extent, race, influence
the extent of representatives’ U.S. combat casualty rhetoric. Lastly, beyond the
determinants of casualty rhetoric, I find that politicians largely speak of U.S. combat
deaths in polarized terms, speaking of the dead in order to attack their opponents or to
support his or her own preferred policy in Iraq.
This chapter is concerned with U.S. combat casualty rhetoric for a number of
reasons. Research suggests that local casualties impact the public’s support for war
(Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000), but also that the public tends to know little about
aggregate casualty numbers (Berinsky 2007). Public views on the use of force, however,
are often linked to elite framing (Entman 2004), and fallen soldiers may likewise emerge
as “framed subjects” by politicians to use to their advantage to shape public opinion on
war. Gartner, Segura, and Barrat (2004) propose that local casualties are the most
important costs with regard to attitude formation about war among citizens, and find that
politicians are responsive to local casualties in terms of formulating and expressing
policy positions. Similarly, local casualties are related to increased congressional
criticism of war (Kriner and Shen n.d.). This chapter builds on important insights from
these studies. To my knowledge, there has been no exploration of whether and how the
articulation of casualties is constitutive of rhetorical policy positions. This chapter
therefore examines casualty rhetoric within the U.S. House of Representatives, and
explores how casualties were central to criticism of and support for the Iraq War.

!
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There are a number of possible explanations of variation in casualty rhetoric
among U.S. politicians. From one perspective, rhetorical behavior among politicians is
strategic (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1975). Accordingly, speaking about fallen soldiers
should be governed by strategic incentives such as increasing vote shares or damaging
partisan opponents’ reputations, for example. From a different strategic view, rhetoric
could be employed for “policy motives” rather than “electoral motives” (Maltzman and
Sigelman 1996; Sigelman, Deering, and Loomis 2001). That is, rhetoric on the House
floor is about winning policy battles within Congress, rather than winning votes or
garnering media attention. Of course, both policy and electoral motives are likely to be at
play simultaneously (Kingdon 1973).
Strategic factors may not fully explain differences in engaging in casualty rhetoric
among elected representatives. Personal characteristics, such as whether politicians are
women or combat veterans, may also affect the likelihood of speaking about fallen
soldiers. Constituency characteristics, such as the number of killed soldiers in
congressional districts, could also influence the extent of casualty rhetoric. This chapter
seeks to determine the extent to which these factors—strategic, personal, and
constituent—influence speaking about U.S. combat casualties in the U.S. House of
Representatives.
Apart from understanding how fallen soldiers causally impact political outcomes
and policy positions, there are non-causal, normative reasons for the study of casualty
rhetoric among U.S. politicians. Because Congress is connected to the fates of soldiers,
there is a normative obligation for legislators to recognize and acknowledge the deaths of
soldiers during congressional debates. In delegating broad authority to President George

!
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W. Bush to use military force, Congress was partially responsible for the fates of soldiers
in Iraq. Democrats and Republicans alike acknowledged this responsibility within the
U.S. House of Representatives. For example, during a debate about the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, a bill which would provide billions in funding for
operations in Iraq, Democratic Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) commented on the
deaths of “2,700 of our young men and women” and noted how “the [Iraq] war was
authorized by this body.”1 During a five-minute, non-legislative speech, Republican
Representative Mark Foley (R-FL) discussed how he “went to a funeral in [his] district of
a young man who was killed in Iraq two weeks before he was to return home and marry
his high school sweetheart. . . . When I approached his parents, I felt remorse, obviously,
because I had voted to send their child to that place.”2 Though Congress as an institution
is in part responsible for the fates of soldiers, there might be considerable variation in
casualty rhetoric among individual representatives. This chapter explores this variation
as well as ethical arguments pertaining to speaking of and for these fallen soldiers.
This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section conceptualizes the dead
soldier as a subaltern subject. Drawing from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s
conceptualization of subalternity as a rhetorical/representation problem, I assemble a
normative theory for speaking of/about or representing the dead within public democratic
institutions. Though speaking about and for dead soldiers is an ethically delicate
endeavor, I argue in favor of casualty rhetoric as a preferable practice to silence. This
preference stems from the relationship of speaking and responsibility, and also from the
conceptualization of rhetorical acknowledgment as a form of phenomenological concern
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

2

!

Representative Barbara Lee, Congressional Record, September 26, 2006, H7411.
Representative Mark Foley, Congressional Record, May 6, 2004, H2703.
15

!
for others, even dead others. The second section provides an empirical analysis of
casualty rhetoric using speech data from the Congressional Record. In this section I test
hypotheses derived from three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, theoretical
perspectives on casualty rhetoric. These perspectives are categorized as (1) strategic
ownership, (2) constituent interests, and (3) personal characteristics. The results provide
strong support for strategic ownership and mixed results for constituent and personal
characteristics. The third section examines the content of casualty rhetoric, and provides
an assessment of how politicians framed U.S. combat deaths in Iraq.
This chapter endeavors to rethink questions of ethical foreign policy discourse.
Many IR scholars have considered various questions pertaining to ethical discourse in
global politics (Linklater 1998, Risse 2000; Hutchings 2005). This chapter is focused on
the ethics and determinants of speaking about and for fallen American soldiers. Though
the focus here is on rhetoric among U.S. politicians, theorizing the ethics of death within
war rhetoric has implications for the politics of recognition and acknowledgment within
ethical discourse. Linklater (1998) and many other normative IR theorists argue for
Habermasian dialogic communities, prioritizing dialogue as the central condition for
moral reasoning. Indeed, a guiding principle in Jürgen Habermas’ (1999: 57) theory of
deliberative democracy is that, “real argument makes moral insight possible.” Yet “real
argument” and “moral insight” are contestable terms, and it is unclear whether the
former, however defined, yields the latter in practice.

Furthermore, the question of

power and strategy are often absent or seen in negative terms by discourse theorists. For
example, Andrew Linklater (2005:142) argues that speakers should try to reduce “overt
and subtle forms of power.” By looking at the determinants of rhetoric, however, we
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might need to modify theories of discourse ethics to more faithfully account for strategic
interests and power. Randall Schweller (1999: 147,150) argues, for example that,
“Whether Linklater, or Kant, or Marx, or Habermas, or other contemporary critical,
feminist, postmodern theorists believe that something will happen, must happen, can
happen, and should happen, does not make it so—or likely to be so—in the foreseeable
future” and suggests that “foreign policy is too serious a business to entertain utopian
ideas about dramatically reconstructed social relations.” Envisioning dialogic futures is
important, though evidence, strategic interests, and everyday politics need to be more
fully accounted for within these visions. Debating war and death in the United States
entails specific interests and actors, but approaching dialogue and debate from the
perspective in this chapter (accounting for interests and incentives along with theorizing
the normative politics of debate) suggests possibilities that extend beyond this context.
This chapter suggests a compromise between discourse ethics theorists and
Schweller’s critique of these theorists as engaging in “fantasy theory.” We should
theorize discourse ethics and understand the ethical implications of allowing for and
silencing voices in public debates; however, we should also closely consider empirical
evidence about actual debates among real politicians. Doing so enables interplay
between normative theory and empirical research, where ethical concerns and empirical
dynamics are explored concurrently, yielding more fruitful conversations about both.

Toward a Normative Argument for Casualty Rhetoric
Despite the expected and common occurrence of wartime fatalities, the deaths of soldiers
are understandably still significant, first and foremost in the very basic sense that every
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death is noteworthy and meaningful. To put it more eloquently, philosopher Jacques
Derrida (cited in Bennington 2010: 40), in his Béliers lecture, envisaged each death as the
disappearance of a world:
For each time, and each time singularly, each time irreplaceably, each time infinitely, death is
nothing less than an end of the world. Not only one end among others, the end of someone or
something in the world, the end of a life or a living being. Death . . . marks . . . the end of a
unique world, the end of the totality of what is or can present itself as the origin of the world for
such and such a unique living being . . . .

While Derrida’s consideration of death-as-world-disappearance applies to all,
soldiers are marched to death in order to achieve political outcomes chosen by
politicians; consequently, the loss of soldiers is humanly and politically significant. Their
political significance makes them likely subjects of political rhetoric, though no studies
examine the normative value or unscrupulousness of disclosing these losses in political
arguments. In what follows, I justify casualty rhetoric from a normative and subaltern
perspective, define different forms of casualty rhetoric, and consider ethical drawbacks of
the practice.
I contend that one of the ways we may realize the normative value of casualty
rhetoric is by recognizing subaltnern characteristics of killed soldiers. One of the central
works of postcolonial theory, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s (1994) “Can the Subaltern
Speak?” elaborates on the problematic practice of representing others, particularly those
in the “postcolonial world.” The difficulty of representation entails the dual issue of
speaking for and speaking about (Spivak 1994: 70). Speaking for others often
marginalizes them or runs the risk of appropriating them by imposing/inscribing interests,
motives, and desires onto them. Speaking for others, in terms of representing others
politically, may be accompanied by a false sense of knowing others’ interests and
ambitions, which might be imprecise, inaccurate, and could conflate or eclipse others’
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desires with the speaker’s desires. Speaking about others runs the risk of distorting and
essentializing complex and fluid identities, producing others in ways that may ultimately
serve the interests of the speaker.
Conceptualizing killed soldiers as subaltern subjects is an admittedly problematic
enterprise, first and foremost because there is no exact definition of subalternity or the
subaltern subject. In general usage, “subalterrn” is commonly employed to engage in
questions about marginalized groups. According to Beasley-Murray and Moreiras (2001:
2) “Subalternity . . . is a situation of relative inferiority within a social order, structured
according to the principle of hegemony, which defines and calibrates that relation of
inferiority.” The authors’ definition relies on Laclau and Mouffe’s usage of hegemony in
terms of hegemonic forms of articulation, which may produce an infinite number of
subaltern subjects. For example, “women” under conditions of social subordination are
often seen as subaltern “subjects” whose own interests and desires are subdued by
hegemonic, gendered discourses. Nancy Fraser (1992: 123) notes that such marginalized
subjects might form “subaltern counterpublics,” or “discursive arenas where members of
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.” Essential to any
understanding of subalternity is the issue of groups who struggle to speak, and are
challenged with externally instituted discourses of who they are and what they want.
It is from this understanding that we may shift the central problem of subalternity
from within the confines of postcolonial theory and the postcolonial world to broader
contexts involving circumstances of speaking for and about others who have difficulty
speaking or who have no voice. Indeed, Timothy Bewes (2006: 39) makes this very
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contention: “For Spivak, not being able to ‘speak’ is not a description but the definition
of the "subaltern" state. Subalternity is not an ‘identity,’ and the concept has no necessary
correlation with ethnicity, or race, or even gender” (emphasis added). With this
understanding, it is possible to imagine the issue of speaking for and about fallen soldiers
as a subaltern problem of speaking for and about those who cannot speak. Killed soldiers
literally cannot speak and consequently must be spoken about and spoken for in order to
be represented. Even the writings and recorded moments of speaking soldiers must be
taken up by others who are living.
There is another way we may imagine fallen soldiers within a subaltern
framework. While living soldiers are often valorized rather than marginalized in U.S.
society, those who die disproportionally come from poorer, often marginalized
communities. Douglas Kriner and Francis Shen (2010: 47) find that “since the
conclusion of World War II, socioeconomically disadvantaged communities have borne a
disproportionate share of America’s war casualties.” From this empirical evidence they
make the following claims:
The idea that poorer segments of the country are bearing a disproportionate share of the nation’s
sacrifice on the battlefield is antithetical to American democratic norms and political thought. . . .
Given this fundamental conflict between core values and the realities of contemporary military
conflict and policy, it is little wonder that most discussions of the casualty gap are deeply
submerged and kept far from the mainstream of political debate (Kriner and Shen 2010:103).3

If those who die during war tend to come from marginalized communities, and this
reality is precluded from entering mainstream political discourse, then we may consider
fallen soldiers as subaltern subjects from this perspective as well. From this view, many
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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While the casualty gap may be at odds with a particular conception of democratic norms in the United
States, this gap may also be seen as consistent with U.S. capitalist norms. I thank Jeremy Pressman for
bringing this to my attention. There are also related class norms at play, as Bacevich (2007: F9), in writing
about the connection between an all-voluntary army and military adventurism, notes that, “Cheering the
troops on did not imply any interest in joining their ranks. Especially among the affluent and well-educated,
the notion took hold that national defense was something ‘they’ did, just as ‘they’ bused tables, collected
trash, and mowed lawns.”
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dead soldiers came from rather marginalized contexts during their lives, and this
marginalization could be understood as “doubled” in death due to the exclusion of the
dead in political discourse.
Kriner and Shen (2010) also find that high numbers of combat casualties suffered
in communities has an independent and negative effect on civic and political participation
in these communities. They note that:
These communities were asked to bear disproportionate shares of wartime sacrifices. As a result,
those communities with the greatest stake in government military policy decisions and the greatest
need for government assistance paradoxically became increasingly disengaged from the political
process. In this way, the casualty gap may threaten the very fabric of representative democracy
(Kriner and Shen 2010: 212).

These findings provide added grounds for conceptualizing fallen soldiers in subaltern
terms. Dead soldiers tend to come from marginalized communities, and their deaths
produce increased estrangement in their communities from the political processes that
helped contribute to their deaths in the first place.
Before moving further in this discussion of subaltern politics of casualty rhetoric,
I wish to specify two broad forms of casualty rhetoric: Casualty recognition and casualty
acknowledgment. I consider casualty recognition as the discursive act of mentioning the
dead, and define casualty acknowledgment as the discursive act of responding to the
dead. The former refers to the practice of mere inclusion of the dead in a political speech.
This inclusion may take a variety of forms. First, casualty recognition may be abstract.
This means that dead soldiers are mentioned in a general way, as non-specific instances
of death. For example, a legislator may refer to the fact that “many soldiers have died in
Iraq.” This non-specific recognition of death neither identifies an individual’s death nor a
particular number of those who have died. Casualty recognition may also be referential,
of which there are two forms: Numerical and identifiable. Numerical recognition is a
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reference to a specific number of dead soldiers. Such recognition may refer to the
number of total casualties, state casualties, or district casualties. Identifiable recognition
means referencing the name of a specific soldier who has died in war.
Casualty acknowledgment is a more profound form of recognition. I define
casualty acknowledgment as a response to dead soldiers. It involves recognition, but
moves beyond recognition by engaging with the dead as an Other with agency. For
example, acknowledgment could include speaking about the impact of the dead on his or
her family or community, or could include discussing how the fallen soldiers understood
his or her role in the war. The soldier lived a life that was cut short due in part to the
decisions of politicians. By responding to dead soldiers in public democratic institutions,
politicians allow for them to have a public impact—a virtual form of agency.
Of course, politicians will frame these deaths in ways that suit their political
purposes. It might be rhetorically useful for war supporters to acknowledge fallen
soldiers in ways that frame their deaths as somehow beneficial to U.S. security or the
spread of democracy in the Middle East, for example. Likewise, war critics might find it
rhetorically desirable to frame these deaths as reasons to extricate the United States from
the Middle East. From a critic’s perspective, “playing politics” with the deceased may
seem like an objectionable practice rather than ethical behavior.
I argue that speaking of fallen soldiers, even for purely political reasons, is less
objectionable than remaining silent about these deaths, and is in fact normatively
beneficial to democratic deliberations. Again, one of the principal questions of Spivak’s
discussion of subaltern politics is the issue of voice. Who has a voice in political
processes? Who is silenced? How are groups spoken of and for? What are the ethical
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hazards associated with speaking of and speaking for? What are the ethics of silence and
silencing? Since the dead literally cannot speak, living speakers must engage in speaking
of and for them if the dead are to be represented in political processes.
I argue that speaking of and for fallen soldiers is necessary. Early in Mémoires:
For Paul de Man, Derrida (1989: xvi) observes that, “Speaking is impossible, but so too
would be silence or absence.” Elsewhere, Derrida (2003: 50) asks rhetorically about
remaining silent instead of speaking about the dead: “But then what, silence? Is this not
another wound, another insult?” Speaking of the dead, as will be discussed below, is
inherently complicated as the dead always exceed our memories and discursive
treatments of them, jeopardizing any faithful account of their identities. In terms of dead
soldiers, however, silence creates a more problematic absence in public discourse. It is,
perhaps an “insult,” to borrow from Derrida. Reticence forecloses any public memory of
fallen soldiers, which inhibits any entryway into public discourse for the dead. However
corrupted their memories and meanings are when they emerge, the dead’s presence in
war deliberations is superior to their absence. Since death is the most drastic cost of war,
debating this cost should play a central role in public deliberations on war.
Central to this argument is the claim that speaking of the dead creates the
conditions for the deceased to become agents in the public’s consciousness. The agency
to impact congressional governance of the conduct of war, however, is in part dependent
upon speaking of the dead during public debates on the congressional floor. Once, the
dead are spoken of or spoken for, they become part of the public conversation on how
policymakers should think about war and how they should orient themselves toward war
legislation. Creating the conditions for agency is one of Spivak’s goals in theorizing
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subalternity (Birla 2010). Rosalind O’Hanlon (2012: 80) sees that “recuperation of the
subaltern as a conscious human subject-agent” as one of the central aims of subaltern
studies.
Speaking of the dead is ethically complex, however. The dead are gone and
cannot speak for themselves. Derrida (1989: 34) contends that “Upon the death of the
other we are given to memory, and thus to interiorization, since the other, outside us, is
now nothing. And with the dark light of this nothing, we learn that the other resists the
closure of our interiorizing memory.” Speaking of and for the dead runs the risk of
structuring the meaning of their lives and deaths in ways that conform to one’s own
desires. The dead are ultimately and purely transformed memories within the mind and
public consciousness. The dead, no longer in bodily form with exterior presence, are
interiorized in ways that conform to the living’s desires to remember them as the living
see fit. This is what Jean-Paul Sartre (2001: 519) means when he suggests that the “very
existence of death alienates us wholly in our own life to the advantage of the Other. To be
dead is to be prey for the living.” Casualty rhetoric therefore is a form of rhetorical
behavior that reduces the dead to whatever object of memory politicians hope to
construct. Derrida (2003: 50) discusses this reduction in his theorization of mourning,
asking “are we going to make the dead our ally . . . to reduce him in any case to what can
still be contained by a literary or rhetorical performance, one that attempts to turn the
situation to its advantage by means of stratagems?” Yet even as objects of memory, the
dead become subjects with agency, however altered or transfigured these subjects
become within rhetorical practices permeated with strategies.
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Even though most forms of casualty rhetoric are fundamentally reductionist in
terms of shifting the meaning of the dead and death to align with political ideas of the
speaker, the normative value of enabling the dead to be present and enter into the public
consciousness within deliberative institutions with legislative power outweighs the
pitfalls of reductionism and political manipulative practices. The mere presence of the
dead within rhetorical space creates a demand to become accountable to the wishes of the
dead. These wishes, manifold and constructed for political purposes, are used to promote
broader interests of support or opposition to war. Absent causal consequences on
political outcomes, casualty rhetoric provides space for their desires, which are also
connected to the desires of the living, within the legislative agenda. The rhetorical
presence of the dead within deliberative bodies therefore “matters” in ways that are not
purely for the purposes of effects in democratic systems, but rather because their
manifestation constitutes an ethical practice of acknowledgment. Politicians send soldiers
to die, and should acknowledge their deaths publically within legislative debates.
A question remains, however, as to whether casualty recognition exclusive of
casualty acknowledgment may also be considered an ethical practice. Do mere
declarations of abstract death or numerical tallies of the dead also generate some
condition of agency for the dead? I argue that mere recognition is an anemic response to
a severe consequence of war, but it is a reply nonetheless. One could even contend that
recognizing the actuality of death within floor debates without moving beyond
recognition could be more ethical, since it opens congressional discourse to a severe fact
without reducing the dead to the desires and interests of the speaker.
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To conclude this section, I have argued that the normative obligation for elected
officials to publically speak about war death and dead soldiers stems from institutional
responsibility in creating the conditions of death. Soldiers do not die unless elected
officials authorize their deployment to the battlefield. When Congress authorized
President George W. Bush to use military force against Iraq (Public Law No: 107-243),
members of the U.S. House and Senate facilitated the possibility that soldiers would
serve and die in Iraq. When Congress continued to fund the war and provide rhetorical
support to the war, it sustained the possibility that soldiers would continue to die in Iraq.
Members of Congress were therefore indirectly responsible for the deaths of U.S. soldiers
in Iraq. This question of responsibility does not depend on whether or not a war is just.
Whether or not the war in Iraq was just or justified, Congress was indirectly responsible
for the deaths of soldiers in Iraq. The ethics of publically recognizing or acknowledging
the deaths of soldiers flows from this indirect responsibility.

Explaining Casualty Rhetoric
The previous section argued for the normative value in speaking about dead soldiers,
whether speaking of the dead emerges as a form of recognition or acknowledgment.
However, speaking of dead soldiers in an environment of electoral competition and
partisan politics means that there are strategic, personal, and constituent incentives that
govern the emergence of casualty recognition and acknowledgment in political debates.
This section moves us away from a normative theory for casualty rhetoric and toward an
empirical theory of this practice.
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There are three simple theoretical arguments that drive this chapter. If we
conceptualize U.S. combat casualties as a sub-issue of the larger issue of the Iraq War,
then we may approach casualty rhetoric in terms of “issue politics” (Sulkin 2005).4 The
fundamental premise is that the choice of rhetorical content is largely attributable to
issues politicians perceive as being beneficial to speak about. These benefits may be
perceived as rooted in strategic advantages, personal characteristics, or constituent
characteristics. These three incentive structures inform my assembly of three, nonmutually exclusive theories of casualty rhetoric: (1) strategic ownership, (2) constituent
characteristics, and (3) personal characteristics.5

Strategic Ownership
One way to understand variation in rhetorical behavior on issues is to focus on strategic
interests. The literature on “issue ownership” suggests that politicians should speak about
issues they “own,” which often means issues they are credibly known for (Petrocik 1996;
Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003). Related literature on rhetoric and heresthetics by
William Riker suggests that politicians should speak about issues that work to their
strategic advantage. Rhetorical behavior should be strategic in that the speaker should
perceive some benefit to publically engaging an issue. Riker’s (1996) “Dominance
Principle” of rhetoric suggests that when one group has an advantage on an issue, this
group should speak about it. Likewise, if one group has an advantage on the issue, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Sulkin (2005: 45) might identify this issue more as an “event,” since it is limited by space and time.
By “theory” I mean a weak version of the concept to signify a cohesive set of reasons for a particular
type of behavior from which we may derive testable hypotheses. Gabriel Abend (2008: 178) suggests
many different meanings of “theory,” one of which is “an explanation of a particular social phenomenon,”
which is how I conceptualize the meaning of theory here. This is in contradistinction to the meaning of
theory that seeks to establish general relationships among variables, independent of time and place.
5
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other group should avoid attending to it. The result is that politicians will diverge to
discuss orthogonal issues (Austen-Smith 1993). This expectation translates into
orthogonal rhetorical content by members of different political parties, since parties
rather than individuals tend to “own” issues. Strategic ownership expects party-based
rhetorical disparities to identical issues.
Perceptions of strategic ownership of U.S. casualties should be a critical factor in
affecting a legislator’s decision to speak about this issue. But who would perceive
ownership of U.S. combat casualties in Iraq? During the period of this study (2004 and
2006), it appears that neither Republicans nor Democrats owned the issue of the Iraq
War,!but Democrats may have perceived ownership of U.S. combat casualties. Because
the Republican Party was more associated with the decision to invade Iraq than
Democrats, they could be perceived to be more associated with the negative costs of the
war. Democrats could perceive ownership of this issue by mere virtue of this association,
and comment on casualties as a means to criticize the President and the Republican Party.
Indeed, relevant research suggests that U.S. combat casualties offer openings to publicly
attack the president’s conduct of war and to create distance from these costs (Kriner and
Shen n.d.: 5). From this perspective, ownership of this issue could enable casualty
rhetoric to be central to attack politics and negative campaigning (Lau and Pomper 2002).
The theoretical expectation regarding partisanship and strategic ownership of
combat casualties may be summarized in the following hypothesis:
H1: Democrats will give more casualty speeches than Republicans.

Note that this hypothesis is not deterministic but probabilistic, so we should still expect to
see Republicans engage in casualty rhetoric. Indeed, there may be some degree of issue
convergence, where politicians of different parties end up speaking about the same issues
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(Sigelman and Buell 2004). Republicans may feel compelled to speak about casualties for
strategic reasons. For example, they may be responsive to Democrats’ negative framing
of casualties by putting a positive spin on U.S. combat casualties, particularly if the
public perceives the war as successful.!6 For example, Republicans (and some
Democrats) could speak about casualties in the context of war support, perhaps engaging
in casualty rhetoric along the lines of not wanting soldiers to “die in vain” (Boettcher and
Cobb 2009). Republicans may also engage in casualty rhetoric so as not to be perceived
as indifferent to these costs.
Another expectation regarding strategic ownership pertains to voting records. I
expect that a Representative’s voting record on H.J. Res. 114, the Iraq War resolution
authorizing President George W. Bush to use force in Iraq, should affect rhetorical
behavior on combat casualties. Democrats who voted to authorize the Iraq War might be
less credible in speaking about casualties than Democrats (and Republicans) who voted
against the resolution authorizing the war (H.J. Res 114). Representatives who voted
against this resolution and those who were not in Congress to vote may be more credible
in speaking of U.S. combat casualties in Iraq. Politicians who voted against authorizing
the use of force in Iraq could more credibly attack the President about U.S. casualties in
Iraq since they voted against authorizing the President to send troops abroad.
Representatives who voted in favor of the resolution may be reluctant to speak about U.S.
casualties since they share responsibility for these deaths.
The following hypotheses stem from these expectations:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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When asked, “How well is the Iraq War going,” over 50% of the public saw the war going very well or
fairly well into 2006. http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq20032008/
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H2: Representatives who voted against H.J. Res.114 will give more casualty speeches
than Representatives who voted for H.J. Res.114.
H3: Representatives who did not vote on H.J. Res 114 will give more casualty speeches
than Representatives who voted for H.J. Res.114.

Constituent Characteristics
The second theory of casualty rhetoric is derived from the literature on constituent
characteristics and legislator responsiveness (Bartels 1991; Serra and Moon 1994;
Clinton 2006). Politicians should be strategically responsive to the opinions of their
constituents and the issues that matter to them (Bovitz and Carson 2006; Hayes, Hibbing,
and Sulkin 2010). Issue saliency within congressional districts should affect rhetorical
behavior in the House of Representatives. Differences in an issue’s saliency among
congressional districts should be associated with variation in the rhetorical
responsiveness to the issue among representatives.
Local casualties are a highly visible, important issue for citizens in the United
States (Gartner, Segura, Barratt 2004), and should be salient within congressional
districts. I expect that the number of casualty speeches by politicians should increase as
the number of casualties increases in his or her congressional district. Of course, the
number of casualties in a congressional district might not entirely match how important
these casualties are in each district. For instance, casualties may be very “important” in
some districts and only somewhat “important” in others. Each additional death, however,
may signal that the issue of combat casualties in Iraq is increasingly important. Many
politicians attend the funerals of dead soldiers, and even if not directly in contact with
families of the fallen, are generally aware of local combat casualties. Gartner, Segura and
Barratt (2004: 476) find that “citizens are well informed of local costs and sensitive to the
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positions of locally elected leaders.” It therefore seems likely that politicians will be more
aware of the human costs of Iraq as members of their districts are killed there. It follows
that they would more likely speak about combat casualties as their number increases:
H4: The number of casualty speeches that a representative gives will increase as the
casualties in his or her congressional district increase.

Another salient constituency characteristic that might affect casualty rhetoric is the
proportion of district residents who are military veterans. Representatives with significant
proportions of veterans in their districts may feel more obligated to discuss the human
costs of war, since veterans might be more concerned with these costs:
H5: The number of casualty speeches that a representative gives will increase as the
proportion of veterans in his or her congressional district increases.

Personal Characteristics
The third theoretical argument driving this chapter stems from the literature on politicians
and personal characteristics. Politicians should rhetorically respond to issues that matter
to them personally. The ideology of representatives should be an important factor in
affecting a legislator’s decision to speak about casualties. In particular, I expect liberal
representatives to make more casualty speeches than their conservative colleagues.
Patrick Cronin and Benjamin Fordham (1999) argue that liberals have generally been
opposed to internationalist foreign policy behavior, which includes supporting military
strength and enlarging American influence abroad, since the mid-1960s. Increasing
liberalism should be related to less support for war, and should increase the number of
casualty speeches a representative makes. Conversely, increasing conservatism should be
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related to higher support for war, and should decrease the number of casualty speeches a
Representative makes.7
H6: Conservative representatives will give fewer casualty speeches than liberal
representatives.

I also suspect that veterans and combat veterans will make more casualty speeches than
nonveteran representatives. Veterans, especially combat veterans, should be more
perceptive of the human costs of war since they have experienced these costs more
directly than nonveterans. Noncombat veterans, though having never been exposed to
combat death directly, are still socialized through military training which “teaches lessons
about the role of military force in American foreign policy and lessons about how
military force ought to be used” (Gelpi and Feaver 2002: 791-792). Because of this
training, I anticipate noncombat veteran politicians to be more sensitive to U.S casualties
in Iraq than nonveteran lawmakers.
H7: Representatives who are combat veterans will give more casualty speeches than
representatives who never served in the military.
H8: Representatives who are noncombat military veterans will give more casualty
speeches than representatives who never served in the military.

Race may also be an important personal characteristic affecting a legislator’s decision to
speak about casualties, as scholars have found that race impacts views on war (Nincic
and Nincic 2002). African Americans and Latinos have frequently expressed concern
with the possibility that members of their racial communities suffer a disproportionate
number of casualties (Barreto and Leal 2007; Kriner and Shen 2010). Though research
suggests that there is no “racial casualty gap,” legislators like Charlie Rangel (D-NY)
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Intuitively, ideology might be highly related to the ideological preferences of the constituency.
However, Brunell (2006) suggests that legislator ideology and constituency ideology are not always so
tightly linked.
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have argued for the reinstatement of the draft in order to address the perception of
unequal burdens of war (Kriner and Shen 2010). For this reason, I expect that African
American and Latino legislators may speak about war casualties more than other
legislators.
H9: African American representatives will give more casualty speeches than white
representatives.
H10: Latino representatives will give more casualty speeches than white representatives.

Many scholars also argue that sex and gender impact views on foreign policy and war
(Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996). In particular, a large body of research concludes that
women in the United States tend to be less supportive of war (Brooks and Valentino
2011). Concerns about U.S. combat deaths are one of the many reasons for this. Indeed,
sex differences in the support for war increase when men and women are faced with
questions about casualties (Eichenberg 2003; 2005). Women also tend to react more
negatively to war than men when presented with information about female U.S. combat
deaths (Gartner 2008). For these reasons, I expect female legislators to be more conscious
of civilian casualties than male legislators.
H11: Female representatives will give more casualty speeches than male representatives.

Methods and Caveats
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable indicates the level of casualty recognition and acknowledgment
by each representative in in the second sessions of the 108th Congress and the 109th
Congress (2004 and 2006). Due to prohibitive time costs, I limited the analysis to these
two years. Rather than model casualty recognition and acknowledgment separately, I
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coded either instance as a “casualty speech.” Hence, a casualty speech was defined as a
legislative speech, a one-minute speech, or a special-order speech, delivered orally, that
included remarks about [a] U.S. soldier death[s]. Multiple remarks about soldier death in
a single speech were counted as one civilian casualty speech. If a member made remarks
about U.S. soldier deaths during a legislative speech and, for example, a one-minute
speech in the same day, I counted each speech separately. Extensions of remarks were
excluded. Also excluded were nonlegislative memorializations of fallen soldier, which
were routine mentions of specific killed soldiers that were never included debates about
the Iraq War. To locate speeches, I searched the Daily Congressional Record in
ProQuest® Congressional. I searched the second sessions of the 108th and 109th
Congresses (2004 and 2006) for key words listed in Appendix A.
!

A limitation of this research design is that it focuses on U.S. House members but

not members of the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Senate is more influential, and the average
member of the U.S. Senate is more important than the average member of the U.S.
House. I am not exploring the influence of House members on policy; rather, I am
examining the determinants and content of rhetoric. The larger size of the U.S. House
increases the variance of the dependent variable, giving us a better estimate of
determinants on casualty rhetoric. It also seems likely that members of the House will be
more rhetorically responsive to local combat deaths, since their constituencies are
generally much smaller than those of U.S. senators. Since this chapter is limited to the
House, I caution extending implications of this study to members of the Senate.
There are of course important differences in speechmaking in the House and
Senate. Conventional wisdom suggests that floor speeches in the House are more
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constrained than in the Senate (Binder and Smith 1998). One reason is that during
legislative debates in the House, members’ speeches are strictly confined to the question
under consideration. Another reason is negative agenda control in the House (Cox and
McCubbins 2005). Legislative debate in the House is controlled by the majority party,
with the majority party able to block consideration of bills that are not supported by a
majority. Recent scholars, however, have challenged the idea that Senate debate is less
restrictive than the House (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011).
Gailmard and Jenkins (2007: 699) argue that, “in terms of keeping unwanted measures
from receiving floor consideration, the Senate majority party is no less successful than
the House majority party when it faces disagreement from some nonmajority party
actor.” Related research by Wirls (2007), who tested the hypothesis that the “golden age”
of pre-civil war Senate debate was more drawn-out and intense than House debate, found
House debates to be as long and forceful as Senate debates on the key concerns of the
time.
In the U.S. House of Representatives, members give legislative and nonlegislative speeches, with the former being more restrictive. Legislative speeches refer to
remarks given during pending legislative business about bills, resolutions, and
amendments. There are customary opportunities for unrestricted discussion of whatever
issues members may wish to speak on. At the beginning of legislative business days,
lawmakers in the House may give one-minute speeches. Since 1979, when cameras were
installed in the House, the use of one-minute speeches has expanded significantly
(Browning 1999; Mulvihill 1997). Members may also give special-order speeches at the
end of the day.
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Because of the differential access to speaking in the House, House speechmaking
may be seen as an important measure of members’ priorities. Schickler, Pearson, and
Feinstein (2010: 678-679) note that “Members’ opportunities to speak on the House ﬂoor
are constrained by the demands on their schedule and competition for time on the ﬂoor.
Floor speeches therefore provide some insight into members’ top priorities.” Assessing
House casualty rhetoric therefore offers an understanding of the importance of casualties
to House members.
!

Independent Variables
Strategic Ownership Variables
Dummy variables are used to measure the Party ID variable (1=Democrat,
0=Republican).8 Dummy variables are also used to measure the Iraq War Resolution vote
variable (1="Nay Vote," 2= "Did Note Vote," 0= “Yeah Vote”).

Constituency Characteristics Variables
Like Kriner and Shen (n.d.), I use the home city and county of record for fallen soldiers
to match Iraq casualties to districts. A problem exists, however, because there are
instances where two or more congressional districts cover the same city. For Kriner and
Shen, if a casualty matches multiple congressional districts, they assign the casualty to
each district. This overestimates the number of casualties in many congressional
districts, however. In this chapter, if a casualty corresponds to multiple congressional
districts, I divide the casualty by the number of districts, and assign the partial casualty to
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I coded Bernie Sanders, an independent, as a Democrat in these regressions. See note 4 in
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each corresponding district.9 In this way, I have chosen to potentially underestimate the
effects of district casualties rather than run the risk of overestimating their effects.
For veteran population, I measured the proportion of district residents who are
military veterans using the Geographic Distribution of Veteran Affairs Expenditures
(GDX) Report tables for 2006, which include the number of veterans in each
congressional district during 2004.10 I then divided the number of veterans in each
district by each district’s population (108th Congress).

Personal Characteristics Variables
Ideology is measured as the average DW-Nominate score for each member. I added each
member’s score from the 108th and 109th Congresses, and divided by two. DW-Nominate
scores range from -1 to 1, with -1 indicating the highest level of liberalism, and 1
indicating the highest level of conservatism.
The other personal characteristics were measured with dummy codes: Veteran
status (Veteran= 1, Combat veteran= 2, Nonveteran= 0), minority status (AfricanAmerican legislator= 1, Latino legislator= 2, White legislator= 0), and sex (female=1,
male= 0).

Institutional Control Variables
I also include three institutional control variables. I include seniority (number of years
served) because I suspect newer representatives will make more speeches if they have
served less years. I also include a variable that measures whether members served on a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I also ran regressions that used Kriner and Shen’s method of measuring district-level casualties. The
results did not substantively differ from the preferred method.
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http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Expenditures.asp
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House committee dealing with war legislation (0=No Committee Service, 1=Committee
Service). Legislators serving on these committees may have more opportunities to speak
about the Iraq War, and hence may have more opportunities to speak about casualties.
These committees are: Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Homeland Security, Select
Intelligence, and Veteran Affairs.11 I gathered this information from CQ Press’s Politics
in America. I also control for party leadership, since spokespersons for their party may
speak more and, by extension, may speak about U.S. casualties more frequently. Party
leaders in each congress are the following: The Speaker of the House, Majority Leader,
Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Minority Whip, and the heads of each party caucus or
party conference. This information comes from the Congressional Research Service.12
Party leaders are coded “1”, while all other members in each congress are coded “0.”!
!

Statistical Tests
The dependent variable is operationalized as the number of casualty speeches given
orally on the House floor during both legislative sessions. Because the dependent variable
is a count, I used negative binomial regression. The negative binomial regression allows
for the conditional variance of the dependent variable to exceed its mean value by
introducing an individual unobserved disturbance to the model (Hilbe 2011). For overdispersed data, the negative binomial regression is preferred over the Poisson regression.
An alpha likelihood test showed that the data were indeed over-dispersed.
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During the 108th and 109th congresses, the Committee on Foreign Affairs was named the Committee
on International Relations.
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Congressional Research Service, “Party Leaders in the United States Congress, 1789-2013,” March 4,
2013. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30567.pdf
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I include the results from three regression models in table 2.1. There was severe
collinearity between party ID and ideology (adjusted r2 =.9109), so I did not include them
in the same model. There was also strong collinearity between Party ID and voting on
H.J. Res 114 (Cramér's V = .6271), so I conducted two statistical tests, one that included
the Iraq War Resolution vote variable and another that excluded it. Hence, the first model
includes party ID and excludes Iraq War Resolution vote and ideology. The second
model includes both party ID and Iraq War Resolution vote but excludes ideology. The
third model excludes party ID and includes both Iraq War Resolution vote and ideology.
Because it is difficult to interpret the results of negative binomial regression,
coefficients from negative binomial regression models were transformed to marginal
effects in table 2.2. Marginal effects enable us to understand how independent variables
affect the expected mean counts of speeches while holding all other independent
variables at specified values.

Results
The results confirm some of the hypotheses but call into question others. Appendix B
provides selected descriptive statistics for the strategic ownership theory. Here we see
that Democrats accounted for approximately 80% of all casualty speeches, and
Republicans accounted for approximately 20%. Representatives who voted against the
Iraq War Resolution accounted for approximately 64% of all casualty speeches, while
those who voted in favor of the resolution accounted for approximately 27% of all
casualty speeches. These descriptive statistics are indicative of the possibility of strong
support for the strategic ownership theory of casualty rhetoric.

!

39

!
More importantly, when we examine coefficients from the strategic ownership
theory in models one through three, we see that “Party ID” and “Iraq War Resolution
Vote” each have a strong impact on casualty rhetoric. The coefficients for “Democrat,”
“War Resolution ‘Nay Vote’,” and “Iraq War Resolution ‘Did Note Vote’,” are in the
expected (positive) direction, though the latter fails to reach statistical significance.
When “Party ID” is included in the same model as “Iraq War Resolution Vote,” the
impact of “Party ID” loses strength, as members’ votes on giving President Bush
authorization to go to war in Iraq appears to explain much of the casualty rhetoric in the
House, and is in fact slightly more influential than “Party ID” on casualty speechmaking.
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The marginal effects provided in table 2.2 offer a more useful illustration of the
impact of “Party ID” and “Iraq War Resolution Vote” on casualty rhetoric. With regard
to “Party ID,” a change from Republican to Democrat leads to a 412.09% increase
(model 1) and a 170.41% increase (model 2) in casualty rhetoric, respectively.
Substantively, we see that an average Democrat, while holding all other variables at their
mean values, was predicted to give 2.92 casualty speeches in model 1, and 2.01 casualty
speeches in model 2. A change from voting in favor of H.J.Res.114 to voting against it
leads to a 202.96% increase (model 2) and 188.09% increase (model 3) in casualty
speeches, respectively. Substantively, this indicates that the average MC who voted
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against the “Iraq War Resolution,” while holding all other variable at their means, gave
2.54 (model 2) and 2.35 (model 3) casualty speeches.
Consistent with the strategic ownership perspective, Democratic Party affiliation
and voting against H.J. Res. 114 were highly influential on casualty speechmaking. These
results provide strong support for the strategic ownership hypotheses (hypotheses 1 and
2); Democrats and Representatives who voted against H.J.Res.114 spoke about casualties
much more than Republicans and MCs who voted in favor of H.J.Res.114. These results
are in line with what we would expect from the perspective of strategic ownership;
Democrats and MCs who voted against the Iraq War resolution credibly owned the issue
of U.S. combat deaths, and likely many of them did so to their strategic advantage.
Results from constituent characteristics theory are mixed. District casualties have
a very strong relationship to casualty rhetoric, while the proportion of veterans within a
district has no statistically significant impact. The coefficient for district casualties is
highly significant and in the expected direction. An increase in casualties in a
representative’s district is estimated to lead to an increase in their number of casualty
speeches. In table 2.2, we see the noticeable marginal effect of district casualties. While
holding all other factors at their mean values, representatives from districts with the
highest number of U.S. combat deaths are predicted to make between 163.01% (model 2)
and 193.48% (model 3) more casualty speeches than representatives from districts which
suffered the mean number of combat fatalities. The impact of district casualties on
rhetorical behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives is very strong, confirming
hypothesis 3.
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The results for hypotheses in the personal characteristics theory are mixed. As
expected, increased conservative ideology is related to less combat casualty rhetoric
(table 2.1, model 3). Model 3 in table 2.2 demonstrates the marginal effect of ideology
on casualty rhetoric. The most liberal representatives are predicted to give 106.84%
more casualty speeches than a perfectly moderate representative (DW-Nominate score of
zero), while holding all other variables at their means, including Iraq War Resolution
vote. Increasing the ideology score one standard deviation in the liberal direction leads to
a predicted percent difference increase of 64.28%. Hence, hypothesis 5 is confirmed.
There is a clear rhetorical divide between liberals and conservatives on the issue of
combat casualties.
Only one of the personal characteristics variables performed as expected. Combat
veteran status was positively associated with casualty rhetoric, reaching statistical
significance in each model. Veteran status, however, failed to reach statistical
significance in any model. These results speak to the importance of combat experience,
not simply military service, in shaping wartime rhetoric. While Gelpi and Feaver’s
(2002) study finds that military service has a strong impact on the use of force in
Congress, the findings here indicate that differences in military service may affect
whether politicians engage in debates about the human costs of combat operations.
Surprisingly, the coefficient for gender never reached statistical significance.
Female representatives do not speak about combat death any more than male
representatives. Though women in the general public may be more sensitive to combat
casualties than men, female politicians do not speak about combat deaths at higher levels
than male politicians.
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The impact of race yielded two surprises. First, African American representatives
did not speak about U.S combat deaths more than white representatives. Second, Latino
representatives are negatively and significantly associated with combat casualty rhetoric.
These results are summarized in table 2.3, where I present each hypothesis, the
expected and actual direction of the coefficient, and whether or not the hypothesis could
be supported. The findings of the first part of this study suggest that strategic ownership
variables, ideology, combat veteran status, and district-level casualties strongly influence
the number of casualty speeches representatives give. Perhaps the most intriguing
finding is the relationship between district-level casualties and casualty rhetoric. This
finding indicates rhetorical responsiveness to human costs at the district level, and
suggests the possibility that politicians take into account constituency losses during their
deliberations on war.
However, we still do not know whether district-level casualties prompt
representatives to speak about local losses or combat deaths in general.13 Another way to
explore the issue of district-level casualties and casualty rhetoric is by examining the
relationship between district-level casualties and speaking about these district-level
losses. In other words, are representatives more likely to speak about combat deaths from
their own congressional districts as the number of combat deaths from their districts
increases? To explore this question, I conducted a logit regression where the dependent
variable is “1” if the representative spoke about combat death[s] from their own district
one or more times, and “0” if the representative never spoke about combat death[s] from
their district.
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The results are presented in table 2.4, along with the predicted probabilities of
district-level casualty rhetoric at the mean-level of district casualties, at one standard
deviation increase in district-level casualties, and at the maximum district-level casualties
in the sample. The logit regression included all of the same variables used in table 2.1,
and included the three different models, though I only present the results for district-level
casualties. The findings clearly support a statistically significant relationship between
district-level casualties and constituent casualty rhetoric. An increase in combat deaths in
a congressional district increases the predicted probability of speaking about district-level
combat deaths. A one standard deviation increase from the mean in combat deaths
increases the likelihood of speaking about district deaths from 9.3% to ~13%. A member
with the maximum number of district deaths in the sample had between a 25.6% and
26.1% predicted probability of speaking about district deaths. These results demonstrate
an even stronger relationship between local losses and casualty rhetoric.

Acknowledgment, Recognition, and Framing Casualties
The study thus far is somewhat limited, since I have demonstrated why politicians are
inclined to speak of lost lives, but have not yet addressed how politicians speak about
these casualties. We know that Democrats, liberals, and those who voted against H. Res.
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114 spoke about fallen soldiers much more than Republicans, conservatives, and those
who voted in favor of H. Res. 114, and thus seemingly “owned” the issue of combat
casualties. Yet there were clearly instances of “trespassing,” meaning representatives
who did not “own” this issue still commented on U.S. combat casualties (Sides 2006). In
this section I explore how fallen U.S. soldiers were recognized and acknowledged
through different frames during legislative and non-legislative debate in the House. The
objective of this section is to illustrate the various ways in which fallen soldiers were part
of debates about the Iraq War. In particular, I examine the following framing strategies:
families, responsibility and indifference, profiteering, comparative casualties,
unnecessary losses, and the removal of Saddam Hussein.

Casualty Rhetoric and Framing
Families
Responding to family grief over the deaths of their sons, daughters, husbands, and wives
represented one of the central forms of acknowledgment of the dead. This form of
acknowledgment was a response to how their deaths impacted the deceased soldiers’
families. Republicans and Democrats diverged in their way of addressing families of the
deceased. Republicans framed family grief in somewhat positive terms, suggesting that
the families of fallen soldier could be proud of what their relative died for. In a specialorder speech, Phil Gingrey (R-GA), for instance, weaved together the importance of
supporting the troops and acknowledgment of the impact dead soldiers have on families:
I am a graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. The president of the student
body just a couple of years ago at Georgia Tech, my alma mater, a young first lieutenant, Tyler
Brown, was killed leading his troops in a firefight in Iraq. . . . I know that his mom and dad and his
older brother Brent are suffering deeply now, as much as a person could possibly suffer, over the
tragic loss of their son and brother. As the chairman says, Mr. Speaker, you cannot support the
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troops out of one side of your mouth and criticize them out of the other. This is the one thing that
this family, this Brown family, has to hold on to for the rest of their lives, to know that Tyler, their
son, who had such great potential, who gave his life for this country, killed in action, was not
killed in vain. I really appreciate the chairman, Mr. Speaker, bringing that out tonight, because you
cannot be for the troops and against them. You cannot have it both ways.14

Another form of acknowledgment of family bereavement came in the form of empathy
from personal experience. For instance, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) spoke of personal
understanding of the impact of death on families together with criticism of war:
My uncle was killed at the Battle of the Bulge, and for my father's entire life it was as if it had
happened yesterday. We know that experience has been repeated over and over again across our
country. In remembering those who died, and their families who mourn them, let us also salute all
of our men and women . . . 2,500 killed, 18,000 wounded, more than half of them permanently,
straining our military readiness and eroding our reputation in the world. The President of the
United States says, stay the course. Stay the course? I don't think so, Mr. President.15

Pelosi’s remarks also engage in a practice of using experience as a basis for authority to
speak about what others feel with regard to combat death. Contextualizing criticism of
the president with engagement of dead soldiers’ families orchestrates subaltern subjects
who apparently speak out against war.
Occasionally, representatives read statements from fallen soldiers’ family
members on the House floor. This practice permitted these bereaved family members to
have a voice and consequently a form of quasi-agency during legislative debates. This
complex form of casualty rhetoric acknowledged the dead by allowing family members
of the deceased to respond to the death through their representatives. During debates
about H. Res. 557, Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D-OH), for instance, quoted the father of a
fallen soldier from her district as a means to acknowledge war death and to
simultaneously construct the meaning of such death in negative terms:
I stand here representing the 11th Congressional District of Ohio. In the Iraqi war, I lost two of my
constituents. I read to my colleagues now the statements of the father of one of those constituents .
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Representative Phil Gingrey, Congressional Record, September 21, 2004, H7316.
Representative Nancy Pelosi, Congressional Record, June 16, 2006, H4143.
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. . . ‘I want the President to say that mistakes were made that cost lives' . . . . I stand here on behalf
of the parents of private Brandon Sloan and other young people killed across this country.16

Like Pelosi’s comments above, Jones’ form of casualty rhetoric positions the fallen
soldier against the president. However, the authoritative foundation for this positioning
emerges from the voice of the father. By allowing the father to speak for the dead
soldier, the soldier acts as a quasi-agent, speaking to conceptualize the war in negative
terms.
While many forms of acknowledging the grief of families were accompanied by
support or criticism of the war, this was not always the case. A special-order speech by
Artur Davis (D-AL) represents a form of acknowledgment that neither condemned nor
supported the war, but rather grappled with how to properly respond to the bereaved:
I spent Monday attending Memorial Day events. And on Monday morning in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, I had a chance to stand as close as I am to you right now in proximity to the widow of a
gentleman who died in Iraq. His whole family was there. And something occurred to me. What do
you say to a woman in that circumstance? She really did not want to hear from me about politics.
She really did not want to hear about Bush or Rumsfeld or Tenet. I do not know if she wanted to
hear anything about policy or matters of state at all. But I do know that she wanted a little bit of
comfort, a little bit of solace, a little bit of understanding. There are so many families like that.
That is what they want from us. They want some sense that we empathize with their pain. And we
do. There is not a one of us who sits in this institution who does not 100 percent support the men
and women who are fighting there. Because at this point they are not fighting for a policy. They
are fighting for survival. They do not pick up The New York Times to see if Bush is up or Kerry is
up. They are simply trying to stay alive for a few more hours. And a lot of them, by the way, are
younger than we are. We are three of the youngest people in this institution. A lot of these people
are far younger than we are. . . . We are close to the 60th anniversary of Normandy, and I do not
know how many of my colleagues know the story of the letter General Eisenhower wrote. General
Eisenhower, as he was contemplating sending thousands of young men to their fate, wrote a letter
that was meant to address a failure, a failure that he personally might not have survived. And the
letter said something to the effect that this is my responsibility alone. If there is an error that has
been made, it is my error. That seems like more than 60 years ago. It seems like light years ago,
sometimes, in this town. Because as you two know very well, sometimes we occupy a town where
"I am sorry" is the last thing people will say. "I am responsible" is the last thing people will say.
Or, at best, "I take responsibility" is what you say and not what you do. So I think as we move
deeper into this election year, as we contemplate the loss of life in Iraq, we all need to find some
way to appeal to the better angels in our nature and some way to be true to our spirit and our
values. And if we do that, we will find our way home, literally and figuratively. We will find our
way to a policy that works for our country, a policy that is oriented in the best of our instincts.17
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Representative Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Congressional Record, March 17, 2004, H1169.
Representative Artur Davis, Congressional Record, June 3, 2004, H3771.
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What is interesting about Representative Davis’ remarks is that he explicitly rejects
politics in favor of empathy, and sees these as mutually exclusive. He responds to the
pain of a widow by grappling with how to reply, and argues that he could not know
precisely what she wanted to hear so he chose to be empathetic.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the decisions of Congress impact the lives of
soldiers. Congressional acquiescence to Presidents’ plans to send troops abroad means
that soldiers might die that otherwise would not. Congressional decisions to continue
funding a war mean that soldiers will continue to be deployed, some of whom will die.
Regardless of whether a decision is just or justified, the role of Congress, while limited, is
partially responsible for the deaths of U.S. soldiers during war. In this section, I provide
some brief illustrations of how this acknowledgment of congressional responsibility
manifested among politicians in the House.

Responsibility and Indifference
Critics of the war often noted the responsibility of Congress for the deaths of U.S.
soldiers, but generally distanced themselves from personal responsibility. Two of the
central framing strategies of Democrats were to criticize President Bush for indifference
to fallen soldiers or blame President Bush for these deaths. During debates over H. Res.
557, Representative Pete Stark (D-CA) opposed the resolution, and accused the President
for being unaccountable and unconcerned with U.S. deaths in Iraq:
I rise today in opposition to this resolution. We ought to be honoring those who gave their lives,
their limbs and sacrificed their futures for our country. So far, 565 service members have lost their
lives, more than 3,000 have been wounded-many losing limbs-and now we are seeing American
civilians becoming targets. . . . On this anniversary of the war we ought to include in this
resolution the names of the heroes who gave their lives. We ought to be honoring and
commending these brave Americans for what they have given and sacrificed along with the troops
who continue to serve valiantly. But, the Bush administration doesn't want to talk about-or exposethe 565 Americans who've been killed and the 3,254 wounded. The omission of this remembrance
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demonstrates that President Bush and his Administration are good at taking credit, but terrible at
accepting responsibility. . . . President Bush won't attend any funerals or memorial services for
soldiers killed in action in Iraq. In fact, he's prohibited access to Dover Air Force Base to the
media altogether. The Department of Defense has broken a long tradition by prohibiting arrival
ceremonies because the images of these casualties are an embarrassment to President Bush. The
President knows that American troops were sent to Iraq ill prepared and without enough
equipment to keep them safe. Soldiers face daily threats there. They don't have sufficient body
armor or armored vehicles as rocket propelled grenades and roadside bombs take lives and limbs.
The President knows the troops wouldn't be there in the first place if he hadn't misled the
American people.18

Representative Stark’s casualty rhetoric is largely numerical recognition rather than a
particular acknowledgment. His rhetorical moves attempt to make visible the numbers of
soldiers lost while simultaneously reducing them to serve as figures to criticize the
president for rendering them invisible. Such a move provides some degree of agency to
the collective mass of killed soldiers to present themselves a perceivable force, though a
force constituted to ultimately serve anti-war interests.

Profiteering
Another Democratic strategy, though not very common, of speaking about casualties was
to connect these deaths to accusations of war profiteering. The slogan “No blood for oil”
was a common phrase used by anti-war protesters before and during the Iraq War
(Jhaveri 2004). Some representatives in the House also took up this argument, and
framed U.S. losses in Iraq by emphasizing questions of oil profits and oil profiteering. In
his criticism of the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation that Iraq allow for the
privatization of its oil, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) asked whether it was
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“possible that our troops are dying for the profits of oil?”19 Henry Waxman (D-CA)
made a related argument during debates over H. Res. 861,20 suggesting that:
The fiasco in Iraq was a windfall for some. Halliburton made more than $2 billion in profits last
year. Its total revenue has increased by 66 percent since 2002. Another beneficiary was David
Brooks. He is the CEO of a company that makes bulletproof vests. In 2001, Mr. Brooks reportedly
earned $525,000. In 2004, he earned $70 million. Last year, the U.S. Marines recalled more than
5,000 of the company's armored vests. But by that time Mr. Brooks had pocketed $186 million.
Well, the American people might think that Congress would rise up in the face of such
unconscionable profiteering. When our troops are willing to sacrifice so much, and they do
21
sacrifice so much, how can we let others create cynical fortunes off their blood?

Republicans did not engage the question of oil and war profiteering and casualties. There
was most likely little reason to respond to blood-for-oil rhetoric, since it was fairly
uncommon among Democrats.

Comparative Casualties
One casualty rhetoric theme for Republicans was to compare U.S. casualties in the Iraq
War to casualties from other U.S. wars. Representative Tom Cole (R-OK) noted how:
This war has the lowest casualty rate in American history, and the stakes are enormously high.
Were we to lose in this particular endeavor, there is no question that our enemies around the world
would gather strength. It would be seen as a victory for terrorists; it would be seen as a lack of will
on the part of the United States. I think the stakes here are worth it.22

This was indeed true of the Iraq War. Many previous wars took the lives of many more
U.S. soldiers. Emphasizing this presented fatalities in terms that favored a primarily
Republican narrative that envisioned the Iraq War as ultimately winnable at relatively
low costs. However, as we see in the above illustration, a more frequent and perhaps
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21
Representative Henry Waxman, Congressional Record, June 15, 2006, H4035.
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more relevant theme was the conceptualization of the Iraq War in terms of high stakes.
Similar to constructions of conflicts during the Cold War, we see Representative Cole
reminding his colleagues and Americans about the concerns of appearing weak
(Campbell 1998).
Democrats did not directly compare U.S. casualties in Iraq to other wars, though
they did bring them up in relation to deaths suffered during the Vietnam War.
Representative Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) argued that prolonging the war in Iraq would, like
Vietnam, lead to more deaths of U.S. soldiers:
All of the lies that were offered to justify sending our men and women to fight and die have
evaporated in the light of truth. All that we are left with is this argument that we're there now, so
we have to stay "as long as it takes." This is nonsense. This is the same illogical rhetoric that kept
our Nation in Vietnam, the rhetoric that doubled the cost of that conflict in American lives. More
than half the combat deaths in Vietnam occurred after Richard Nixon was elected on a promise to
bring the war to an end, and after the American people had already decided that they did not want
one more soldier to die in Vietnam. Our vital task today in this Congress is to prevent a repeat of
that tragedy in Iraq, to stop the bleeding, to make the will of the American people, which is to
bring our troops home, the policy of our government as soon as possible.23

Republicans often preemptively debated comparisons to Vietnam, or responded to these
comparisons, often engaging the question of casualties within this comparison.
Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL) argued that:
Every brave man and woman who sacrificed their lives, their limbs, or their blood and
sweat and tears to fight the Hussein regime did so for a righteous and just cause. This is
not like Vietnam. Vietnam is over. This war we fight now is a war against terrorists. It is a
war against those who have attacked and killed Americans abroad and on our own soil.
Saddam Hussein was a terrorist of the worst kind (emphasis added).24

Debating casualties in Iraq therefore sometimes entailed a debate over Vietnam and the
meaning of the over 58,000 American soldiers’ lives that were taken in the 1960s and
1970s. Because the United States withdrew from Vietnam without achieving victory, the
memory of this war has been continually contested. During the Iraq War, there were
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multiple and divergent “lessons” of Vietnam that were supposed to apply to the conduct
of the United States in Iraq. Critics of the war frequently brought up the cost of blood in
Vietnam as a lesson to withdraw sooner than later; supporters contested this depiction,
suggesting differences between the wars and the meanings of lost lives in these wars.

Unnecessary Losses
Related to the above theme was the Republican strategy of framing fallen soldiers in
terms of “dying in vain” in relation to the possibility of winding down involvement in
Iraq. This theme, however, was not a purely Republican strategy. For example,
Democratic Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD), after discussing a recent death of a
member of his district during the Iraq War, argued that “Our mission in Iraq has not been
accomplished. . . . we will not retreat from our objective to eliminate the source of
terrorism and those who perpetrate it. The legacy of the men and women who have
committed the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq demands that we do no less.25 Another poignant
illustration of this muscular rhetoric connecting withdrawal from Iraq with faintness and
injustice to the dead comes from Representative Jack Kingston (R-GA) who argued that
the United States “can't faint in the face of adversity. There are so many in America, the
Michael Moores, the Cindy Sheehans, the fringe branch of the liberals that want us to cut
and run. I think that would be such a huge disservice to all the troops who have died.”
Finally, a sample from Representative Terry Osborne (R-NE) carries forward this frame
by including the desires of soldiers and family members as a partial basis to continue
fighting for the memory of the deceased:
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I have traveled to Iraq multiple times, and I met on one of these visits a young captain from
Nebraska. . . . He said that if . . . we do not see this thing through . . . every soldier we have lost
will have died in vain. I think what he says is true. I called a mother this morning whose son had
just been killed. She was proud of her son. She was proud of the sense of mission he had. And I
really hate to tell her that we are leaving, that he died in vain.26

Democrats generally avoided saying that soldiers died in vain, though they often argued
that their deaths were avoidable and ultimately needless sacrifices. For example, Jim
McDermott (D-WA) noted that, “Another U.S. soldier died today in Iraq. The total
number of U.S. men and women serving this country in Iraq who have died has climbed
to 2,292. They have paid the ultimate sacrifice for Bush's folly.”27 Sam Farr (D-CA)
argued that, “Over 20,000 U.S. military personnel have been killed or wounded in Iraq.
The loss of American lives is tragic and unnecessary.”28 Others noted how the deaths of
soldiers did not make Iraq safer or more secure: “3 years after Saddam's fall, 2,500 U.S.
troops are dead, a number confirmed by the Pentagon just today, and insurgents appear
more active than ever.”29
!
The Removal of Saddam Hussein
Finally, we see some issue convergence between Democrats and Republicans on the
theme of the removal of Saddam Hussein. To illustrate, during debates over H. Res 557
there was clashing casualty rhetoric in relation to the removal of Hussein. This was
spurred on due to the language of the resolution. During Fox News’ “Special Report with
Brit Hume,” correspondent Brian Wilson noted:
With the one-year anniversary of the war in Iraq looming, a spirited debate Wednesday, on the
floor over House Resolution 557, a non-binding Republican measure designed to express that
Saddam was a bad guy. That the people of Iraq have exhibited courage, and that lauded the valiant
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Representative Terry Osborne, Congressional Record, June 15, 2006, H4080.
Representative Jim McDermott, Congressional Record, March 1, 2006, H474.
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Representative Sam Farr, Congressional Record, June 15, 2006, H4093.
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Representative Jane Harman, Congressional Record, June 15, 2006, H4042.
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service of U.S. and coalition troops. Most members had no problem with all of that, but there was
this other little phrase stating, "The United States and the world have been made safer with the
removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power..."30

The loss of U.S. lives in Iraq was often central to constructions of the meaning of
Hussein’s ouster. During the debate, Representative George Miller (D-CA) posited that
“Americans did not die in Iraq to punish Saddam Hussein for his reprehensible and vile
actions” and Representative Charlie Rangel (D-NY) contended that “they (U.S. soldiers)
did not sign up to get rid of Saddam Hussein. As evil as this guy may be, one day some of
us may be asked the question, was it worth 550 American lives?” 31 Democrats therefore
used the issue of combat casualties to strategically frame the potentially positive event of
the removal of Saddam Hussein in terms of the human costs needed to achieve his
removal.
Republicans did not shy away from the connection between casualties and the
removal of Hussein. Like Democratic Representatives Miller and Rangel, Republican
Representative David Dreier (R-CA) also spoke about Saddam Hussein and U.S.
casualties in Iraq. He stated that:
In the past year, we have lost over 550 of our best and brightest Americans, with another 3,190
wounded. That number, as it is in any conflict, is too high. Without question, we owe the soldiers
we have lost, the soldiers who remain, and their families, an enormous debt of gratitude. Mr.
Speaker, that is exactly what this resolution marking this first anniversary is designed to do. If
there is any solace, it is knowing that because of their actions, America and the world are safer
places today with Saddam Hussein's regime dismantled. Because of our military, the people of
Iraq have a bright future, where Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd alike can dream of being treated equally,
of electing their representatives, of owning a prosperous business, and being free to say, worship,
and read what they want.32

Hence, Representative Dreier argued in favor of H. Res. 557 in part because he saw the
loss of U.S. soldiers as a necessary consequence of achieving an important strategic
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“Fox Special Report with Brit Hume,” Fox News Network, March 18, 2004.
Representative George Miller, Congressional Record, March 17, 2004, H1166; Representative
Charlie Rangel, Congressional Record, March 17, 2004, H1174.
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Representative David Dreier, Congressional Record, March 17, 2004, H1122.
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objective—the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. He spoke of the loss of U.S.
lives as a means of enhancing U.S. security and fostering a democratic future in Iraq.
Hence, we see in these examples the possibility of dialogue with regard to the meaning of
death among U.S. politicians.

Conclusions
The starting point for this study was rooted in a normative argument about the value of
publically speaking about and for fallen soldiers in democratic institutions. Dead soldiers
were conceptualized within a framework of subalternity in order to highlight the question
of whether and how to represent those who cannot speak. Even with numerous ethical
concerns with speaking of and speaking for dead soldiers, I put forward an argument
suggesting casualty rhetoric is an important normative component to deliberations on
war. I then examined empirically who spoke about U.S. combat casualties among U.S.
politicians in the House.
One may question whether the empirical findings about who speaks of the dead
render the normative arguments hollow since strategic aims appear to trump any ethical
objective of casualty recognition and acknowledgment. The empirical results suggest
that there is little issue convergence between Democrats and Republicans, and that
casualty rhetoric does not appear to be attributable to ethical obligations but rather to
strategic and constituent factors. Again, I suggest that the inclusion of the dead during
public deliberations is beneficial as it provides the conditions of agency for the dead
soldiers, and allows political space for the meaning of fallen soldiers to be negotiated.
Consciousness of these lost lives in public rhetoric enables them to become audible
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quasi-agents rather than marginalized subjects absent in the rhetorical consciousness of
the public sphere.
Furthermore, there was some convergence on the issue of U.S. combat casualties,
and the discussion of the different framing techniques suggests that a limited form of
dialogue transpired between war critics and war supporters about the meaning of U.S.
combat casualties. Democrats and liberals ultimately owned this issue, but Republicans
did indeed trespass on the issue in order to resist claims that the loss of life in Iraq
implied a basis to withdraw from combat operations. Furthermore, discussions of family
bereavement and quoting families of dead soldiers indicate the centrality of affective
concerns and the allowance of marginalized voices to appear during war debates.
Framing death in ways that advance political interests still allows the dead to be present
during war deliberations. The manifestation of the dead during these deliberations is
central to an ethical debate, even if political desires and interests of the living are mapped
onto dead soldiers. It can be assumed that many fallen soldiers shared some of the
desires and interests of legislators in Congress. More importantly, soldiers died for the
interests of politicians, and even if the desires and interests of soldiers could not be
presented in fuller terms, the dead soldiers deserve to be spoken of and for.
This study, which narrowly focused on casualty rhetoric, has broader implications
for political theory and IR research. The question of speaking of and for the dead has
received little attention, even though the topic of representation is central to the broader
discipline of political science. Communities are comprised of not only the living but also
the dead, who persist through memories among the living (Wasinski 2008). How the
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dead should be discussed and represented deserves scholarly attention, particularly when
elected representatives enable and thus are responsible for the conditions of death.
Though foreign policy research has conducted a significant body of research on
the impact of casualties on public opinion, we have little knowledge of how these
casualties are debated by elected politicians (Gartner 1998; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
2009). This chapter moves us toward a fuller understanding of casualty politics by
exploring who speaks and how they speak about casualties. This chapter also has
implications for the presence or absence of dialogue in congressional foreign policy
rhetoric. I demonstrate that on the issue of combat casualties we see relatively little
convergence between parties. Some Republicans, however, were willing to “trespass” on
this issue, accounting for approximately 20% of all casualty speeches (Appendix B).
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APPENDICES

Appendix A Search Terms
blood

human

body bags

kill

body count

life

buried

loss

casket

lost

casualty

not coming back

coffin

men

cost

perish

death

soldier

die

toll

fatality

troops

funeral

ultimate price

greatest sacrifice

ultimate sacrifice

have not come home

women

NOTES: Search terms used in Daily Congressional Record in ProQuest® Congressional. The
above terms were searched in conjunction with the phrases "Iraq," or "Iraqi" or "War." For
simplicity, I have exluded plurals and variations of search terms.

Appendix B Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable:
Number of Casualty Speeches

Variables

% of Representatives

Mean (Median)

# of Casualty Speeches

% of Casualty Speeches

Republican (N=203)

51.79%

0.700 (0)

142

20.08%

Democrat (N=189)

48.21%

2.989 (1)

565

79.92%

Total (N=392)

100.00%

1.804 (0)

707

100%

Iraq War Resolution "Yeah Vote" (N=222)

56.63%

0.860 (0)

191

27.02%

Iraq War Resolution "Nay Vote" (N=118)

30.10%

3.839 (2)

453

64.07%

13.27%

1.212 (0)

63

08.91%

100.00%

1.804 (0)

707

100.00%

Iraq War Resolution "Did Note Vote" (N=52)

Total (N=392)
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Chapter 3
[Ac]counting [for] Their Dead: Rhetoric and Iraqi Civilian Casualties

Introduction
U.S. wars have had a devastating impact on civilian populations (Tirman 2011). In
Vietnam, Colin Kahl (2007: 14-15) notes how the United States “fought in ways that put
civilians directly in the crosshairs . . . a conservative estimate of civilian deaths from
violence in South Vietnam places the total at 522,000 (out of a total population of 16
million in 1966).” In Iraq, though most civilian deaths were not directly the result of U.S.
combat operations, the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index estimates that 116,409 Iraqi
civilians died between the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003 and June 2012 (O’Hanlon
and Livingston 2012). These dire statistics raise important questions about U.S. foreign
policy discourse: During times of war, do elected officials speak of these costs? If so,
which politicians are most likely to comment on them? How do politicians make sense of
and construct these distant costs of war during legislative debates?
Studies on the human costs of U.S. wars typically focus on American combat
deaths; though it appears foreign civilian casualties might also matter. Studies on agenda
setting in campaigns demonstrate that whether candidates’ discuss or eschew certain
issues impacts the extent to which voters consider these issues (Simon 2002). Some
scholars suggest that knowledge of casualties (including civilian) may somewhat dampen
public support for war (Eichenberg 2005: 173) In recent research on how casualties
impact public opinion on war, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009: 256) ask, “at some level
there is an unavoidable trade-off between their civilian casualties and our military
casualties; how does the public weigh that trade-off and what, to use an infelicitous
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metaphor from economics, is the exchange rate?” Their study provides some clues
indicating that the U.S. public is sensitive to foreign civilian deaths. If civilian casualties
matter in this way, it is germane to inquire into politicians’ responsiveness to these
deaths, as political elites play a role in shaping public opinion on war (Berinsky 2007;
Groeling and Baum 2008).
Speaking about civilian casualties might also be normatively important.
Emmanuel Lévinas (1997: 100), a philosopher noted for his contribution to the ethical
study of Self-Other relations, argued that consciousness of others’ suffering was central
to any theory of ethics: “What is signified by the advent of conscience . . . if not the
discovery of corpses beside me and my horror of existing by assassination? Attention to
others and, consequently, the possibility of counting myself among them, of judging
myself—conscience is justice.” If attention to the suffering and deaths of others is central
to ethical relations among individuals and groups, then attentiveness to these losses in
legislative debates may promote a more ethical conversation on war. To some extent,
then, research on civilian casualty rhetoric within war debates enables us to understand
the justness of democratic deliberations on war in the United States.
It could also be argued that because Congress is connected to the fates of civilians
during wartime, that there is a normative obligation for legislators to recognize and
acknowledge the deaths of civilians during congressional debates. In delegating broad
authority to President George W. Bush to use military force, Congress was partially
responsible for the fates of civilians in Iraq. Though thousands of Iraqi civilians were
killed in the Iraq War, these lost lives had no voice within the deliberative process in
Congress. Because Iraqi civilians were severely impacted by Congress’s decision to
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provide President George W. Bush authority to use force in Iraq, speaking about these
lost lives fulfills an important component to democratic deliberations, namely reasoning
and inclusion. The first section of the chapter outlines a normative argument for civilian
casualty rhetoric in democratic institutions.
If speaking about civilian deaths is normatively important, what explains it?
Who is most likely to express any concern with these costs? Like other forms of rhetoric,
is the manifestation of rhetorical behavior inclusive of these costs the result of partisan
and strategic incentives (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003, Riker 1996,
Sides 2006)? Does a pattern of civilian casualty rhetoric therefore emerge along party
lines? Or do both parties speak of these costs in order to strategically frame them on their
own terms? Is there a gender gap or a military service gap in civilian casualty rhetoric?
The second section of the chapter addresses these empirical questions in the context of
the U.S. House Representatives. I find that partisanship, representatives’ vote on the Iraq
War resolution of 2002 (H.J. Res. 114), and gender are strongly associated with civilian
casualty rhetoric in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Once we empirically establish why politicians speak about civilian deaths during
wartime, we still need to examine how politicians debate these deaths. In order to gain a
fuller understanding of civilian casualty rhetoric among elected officials during war
debates, I explore Iraqi civilian deaths as normative constructs, assessing how these
deaths emerge within the divergent interpretive frameworks of different groups of
politicians.
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Democratic Deliberation, Discourse, War, and Civilian Casualties
I argue that speaking about civilian casualties is normatively important in democratic
institutions. This claim is not connected to normatively beneficial outcomes; rather, it is
rooted in the ethics of inclusion and reasoning within political communication
(Habermas 1990). Inclusion and public reasoning are perhaps the two most central
components to ethical deliberation in democracies (Bohman 2000; Gutmann and
Thompson 2004; Schneiderhan and Khan 2008). Public reasoning is the condition for
public accountability and involves an exchange of ideas in the aim of providing the best
justification for proposed policies (Cooke 2000). Most normative discourse theorists
examine how groups within societal and state boundaries are able or unable to find a
voice in the deliberative process, but have little to say about groups who are outside of
these boundaries but nevertheless are affected by the decisions of deliberative democratic
bodies. Even though groups external to these boundaries are unable to participate in
deliberations, this does not mean that their interests and voices cannot be part of
deliberations. Elected officials may speak and should speak about how policies impact
these groups. When elected officials do comment on these externally affected groups,
they engage in a form of discursive representation (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).
Because deliberative participation excludes foreign groups in the collective decisionmaking process, elected officials who speak about excluded actors permit a form of
representation that is purely discursive but nonetheless important. Allowing external and
formally excluded groups to exist as relevant with regard to decisions within political
discourse improves the public reasoning and inclusionary foundations of ethical
deliberations in democracy. Affected groups should therefore be included by being
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spoken of, and should be part of the public reasoning in supporting/defending/rejecting
policies.
For the purpose of this chapter, if people are killed as a result of democratic
policies, democratically elected officials should publically address these deaths. Again,
this claim is disconnected from any normative policy outcomes that may be the result of
such inclusion and public reasoning with regard to killed civilians in democratic debates.
Such inclusion and public reasoning by no means guarantee that a particular or more
ethical outcome will occur. This account of speaking about civilian casualties therefore
leads to a focus on whether and how it occurs, not on the effects of this communication.
Despite the claim that speaking about civilian casualties is normatively beneficial
to democracy, research on political rhetoric suggests that politicians will frame these
deaths in ways that suit their political purposes (Sides 2006). For example, it might be
rhetorically useful for war supporters to acknowledge killed Iraqi civilians in ways that
link their deaths to beneficial outcomes such as freedom and democracy in Iraq.
Likewise, war critics might find it rhetorically desirable to frame these deaths as reasons
to extricate the United States from Iraq. From a critic’s perspective, “playing politics”
with the deceased may seem like an objectionable practice rather than ethical behavior.
As developed in chapter two, I argue that speaking of killed civilians, even for
simply political reasons, is less offensive than remaining silent about these deaths, and
has beneficial implications for democratic deliberations. Again, one of the principal
questions regarding deliberative politics in democracies is the issue of voice (Fishkin
2009; Young 2001). Who has a voice in political processes? Who is silenced? How are
groups spoken for (Alcoff 1991)? What are the ethical hazards associated with speaking
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speaking for? What are the ethics of silence and silencing? Since the dead literally
cannot speak, living speakers must engage in speaking of and for them if the dead are to
be represented in political processes. Silence bars the memory of killed civilians, from
entering into legislative debates about the Iraq War. This silence is perhaps even more
problematic than in the previous chapter on dead U.S. soldiers. Killed soldiers come
from congressional districts, and representatives often go their funerals. Killed soldiers
are therefore more public and recognized than killed Iraqi civilians, and are more
connected to elected representatives. Killed Iraqi civilians often have no impact on
communities in the United States, and may easily be ignored and forgotten. Bringing
them into legislative debates provides an important quasi-agency for killed civilians to
have a public impact on war deliberations.
As suggested in the previous chapter, speaking of the dead creates the conditions
for the dead to become agents in the public’s consciousness. The agency to impact
congressional governance of the conduct of war, however, is partially dependent upon
speaking of the dead during public debates in Congress. Once, the dead civilians are
spoken of or spoken for, they become part of the public conversation on how politicians
should think about war and how they should orient themselves toward war legislation.
Of course, speaking of dead civilians is just as ethically complex as speaking of
killed U.S. soldiers. Dead Iraqis are gone and cannot speak for themselves. Speaking of
and for the dead runs the risk of structuring the meaning of their lives and deaths in ways
that conform to one’s own wishes. The dead are ultimately and purely transformed
memory and memories within the mind and public consciousness. The dead become
whatever representatives make of them. However, even speaking of killed civilians in
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politicized rhetoric imbues them with quasi-agency, which is preferable to preventing
them from becoming part of the debate about the Iraq War.
The presence of killed civilians dead creates the possibility for political
accountability to them. The manifestation of the dead within democratic institutions
“matters” not solely for the purpose of impacting policy but also because the dead
civilians deserve some form of voice and representation with those who played a part in
their deaths. Politicians set in motion the condition for civilians to die, and should bring
public attention to these deaths during legislative debates.

Strategic Ownership Theory and Civilian Casualty Rhetoric
The previous section argued for the normative importance for speaking about killed
civilians, even for purely political reasons. Indeed, speaking of dead civilians in an
environment of electoral competition and partisan politics means that there are likely to
be strategic incentives that govern the emergence of civilian casualty rhetoric in political
debates. Indeed, as John Dryzek (2001: 653-654) notes, “Deliberation often has to be
subordinated to strategy in the interests of winning.” This section moves us away from a
normative theory for casualty rhetoric and toward an empirical theory of this practice.
There is a simple theoretical argument that drives this study. If we conceptualize
civilian casualties as a sub-issue of the larger issue of the Iraq War, then we may
approach casualty rhetoric from within a framework of “issue politics” (Sulkin 2005).1
The fundamental premise is that the choice of rhetorical content is largely attributable to
issues that politicians perceive a benefit from speaking about. These benefits may be

1

Though Sulkin (2005: 45) might identify this issue more as an “event”, since it is limited by space and
time.
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perceived as rooted in strategic advantages or personal characteristics. Unlike the
previous chapter, I do not explore any constituency-based theories of rhetoric;
constituents are most likely uninformed of or unconcerned with civilian deaths in Iraq.
Thus, two incentive structures inform my assembly of two, non-mutually exclusive
theories of casualty rhetoric: strategic ownership and personal characteristics. In this
section, I test hypotheses about civilian casualty rhetoric among House members.
Hypotheses relate to both members’ desire to speak about strategically owned issues and
how certain personal characteristics might affect speaking about civilian deaths in Iraq.

Strategic Ownership Perspective
Similar to the study in chapter two, one way to understand variation in rhetorical
behavior on issues is to focus on strategic interests. The literature on “issue ownership”
suggests that politicians should speak about issues they “own,” which often means issues
they are credibly known for (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003). Related
literature on rhetoric and heresthetics by William Riker suggests that politicians should
speak about issues that work to their strategic advantage. Rhetorical behavior should be
strategic in that the speaker should perceive some benefit to publically engaging an issue.
Riker’s (1996) “Dominance Principle” of rhetoric suggests that when one group has an
advantage on an issue, this group should speak about it. Likewise, if one group has an
advantage on the issue, the other group should avoid attending to it. The result is that
politicians will diverge to discuss opposite issues (Austen-Smith 1993). This expectation
translates into contrary rhetorical content by members of different political parties, since
parties, rather than individuals, tend to “own” issues.
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Perceptions of strategic ownership of Iraqi civilian casualties should guide
legislators’ decisions to speak about this issue. But who would perceive ownership of
civilian casualties in Iraq? It seems intuitive that negative costs of war are likely to be
attributed to the party most associated with the decision to use force abroad. As such, it
follows then that members of the party least associated with negative costs of war could
perceive ownership of these costs. Perception of ownership provides these members
with an incentive to speak on this issue. The pursuit to gain reelection and help their
party’s reputation gives incentives to speak about civilian casualties as a means to
criticize the President and the other party. Relevant research suggests that U.S. combat
casualties offer openings to publicly attack the president’s conduct of war and to create
distance from these costs (Kriner and Shen N.d.: 5). Iraqi civilian casualties might also
expose Republicans to additional criticism by Democrats. From this perspective, civilian
casualty rhetoric stems from incentives related to attack politics and negative
campaigning (Lau and Pomper 2002). Dummy variables are used to measure the Party
ID variable (1=Democrat, 0=Republican). The theoretical expectation regarding Party ID
may be summarized in the following hypothesis:
H1: Democrats will give more casualties speeches than Republicans.

Note that this hypothesis is not deterministic but probabilistic, so we should still expect to
see Republicans engage in casualty rhetoric. Indeed, there may be some degree of issue
convergence, where politicians of different parties end up speaking about the same issues
(Sigelman and Buell 2004). Republicans may feel compelled to speak about civilian
casualties for strategic reasons. For example, they may be responsive to Democrats’
negative framing of casualties by putting a positive spin on them, perhaps highlighting
when civilian casualty numbers decline, or linking them to positive aspects of the war,
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such as democratization in Iraq. Though it might be difficult to positively spin civilian
losses in Iraq, these deaths could be downplayed or considered necessary costs to
achieving victory. Republicans could also engage in civilian casualty rhetoric so as not to
be perceived as indifferent to these costs.
Another expectation regarding strategic ownership pertains to voting records. I
expect that a Representative’s voting record on H.J. Res. 114, the Iraq War resolution
authorizing President George W. Bush to use force in Iraq, should affect rhetorical
behavior on civilian casualties. Democrats who voted to authorize the Iraq War might be
less credible in speaking about casualties than Democrats (and Republicans) who voted
against the resolution authorizing the war (H.J. Res. 114). Representatives who voted
against this resolution and those who were not in Congress to vote might be more
convincing in speaking of civilian casualties in Iraq. Politicians who voted against
authorizing the use of force in Iraq could more believably attack the President about
civilian casualties in Iraq since they voted against authorizing the President to send troops
abroad. Representatives who voted in favor of the resolution may be reluctant to speak
about these civilian losses since they share responsibility for these deaths. Categorical
variables are also used to measure the Iraq War Resolution vote variable (0= “Yea Vote,”
1="Nay Vote," 2= "Did Note Vote"). The following hypotheses stems from the
expectation of voting record and strategic ownership of casualties:
H2: Representatives who voted against H.J. Res.114 will give more civilian casualty
speeches than representatives who voted for H.J. Res.114.
H3: Representatives who did not vote on H.J. Res 114 will give more civilian casualty
speeches than representatives who voted for H.J. Res.114.
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Personal Characteristics
The second theoretical argument driving this chapter stems from the idea the literature on
politicians and personal characteristics. Politicians should rhetorically respond to issues
that matter to them personally. The ideology of Representatives should be an important
factor in affecting a legislator’s decision to speak about casualties. In particular, I expect
liberal Representatives to make more casualty speeches than their conservative
colleagues. Patrick Cronin and Benjamin Fordham (1999) argue that liberals have
generally been opposed to internationalist foreign policy behavior, which includes
supporting military strength and enlarging American influence abroad, since the mid1960s. Increasing liberalism should be related to less support for war, and should increase
the number of casualty speeches a Representative makes. Conversely, increasing
conservatism should be related to higher support for war, and should decrease the number
of casualty speeches a Representative makes.2 Ideology is measured using DWNOMINATE scores.
H4: Conservative representatives will give fewer civilian casualty speeches than liberal
representatives.

Military Service
There were many speeches about the benefits and costs of the Iraq War during debates
over H.R. 4939 (2006), which focused on Iraq War appropriations, among other things.
Few politicians mentioned civilian casualties. Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), however, gave
a speech in which he said: “I am a Korean War veteran. I support our troops as much as
anyone in this body, but . . . . Mr. Chairman, the price for continuing this war is too high,
2

Intuitively, ideology might be highly related to the ideological preferences of the constituency. However,
Brunell (2006) suggests that legislator ideology and constituency ideology are not always so tightly linked.
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not only in budgetary terms, but in American lives, Iraqi civilian casualties . . .”3 Was
Rep. Conyers’ discussion of civilian casualties part of a pattern of combat veterans
speaking about civilian casualties? Though Rep. Conyers was firmly against the war, did
combat veterans in support of the war also speak about civilian casualties more than their
civilian counterparts? Does experience in combat produce greater consciousness of
civilian casualties than military service without involvement in combat?
Veterans, especially combat veterans, should be more perceptive of the human
costs of war, including civilian deaths. Ilona Pivar (2007: 76) finds that many combat
veterans suffer from traumatic grief, often because of “exposure to significant numbers of
civilian casualties . . . and concern about culpability for having caused death or harm to
civilians in cities.” Even if combat veterans were not exposed to civilian death, or did not
suffer from traumatic grief from such exposure, I expect that they will more likely to be
aware of these deaths and the grief they may cause than those who never served in
combat. I expect politicians who are combat veterans to be more conscious of civilian
casualties than noncombat veteran and nonveteran politicians. Noncombat veterans,
though having never been exposed to civilian death, are still socialized through military
training which “teaches lessons about the role of military force in American foreign
policy and lessons about how military force ought to be used” (Gelpi and Feaver 2002:
791-792). Because of this training, I anticipate noncombat veteran politicians to be more
conscious of civilian casualties than nonveteran lawmakers. Veteran status is coded as a
dummy variable. I used CQ Press Politics in America to determine whether members
were civilians (=0), veterans (=1) or combat veterans (=2).

3

Representative John Conyers, Congressional Record, March 16, 2006, H1110
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H5: Representatives who are combat veterans will give more civilian casualty speeches

than representatives who never served in the military.
H6: Representatives who are noncombat military veterans will give more civilian casualty
speeches than representatives who never served in the military.

Gender
Many scholars suggest that sex and gender impact views on foreign policy and war
(Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996). In particular, a large body of research concludes that
women in the United States tend to be less supportive of war (Brooks and Valentino
2011). Concerns about U.S. combat deaths and civilian casualties are one of the many
reasons for this. Gender differences in the support for war increase when men and
women are faced with questions about casualties (Eichenberg 2003). Pamela Johnston
Conover and Virginia Sapiro (1993) find that women and feminists are both less
supportive of war than men, and more opposed to the bombing of civilians. Feminists in
particular may see war as disproportionately impacting innocent civilians in war (Nincic
and Nincic 2002: 552). Though women and men may be feminists, most feminists tend to
be women (Conover and Sapiro 1993: 1081). Women also tend to react more negatively
to war than men when presented with information about female U.S. combat deaths
(Gartner 2008). Since women and children suffer disproportionately from war, women
may be more concerned with civilian casualties (Hynes 2004; Plümper and Neumayer
2006). For these reasons, I expect female legislators to be more conscious of civilian
casualties than male legislators. Gender is dummy coded (0=Male, 1=Female).
H7: Female representatives will give more civilian casualty speeches than male representatives.
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Race
I also expect race to affect a legislator’s decision to speak about casualties, as scholars
have found that race impacts views on war (Nincic and Nincic 2002). As mentioned in
the previous chapter, African-American and Latinos have frequently expressed concern
with the possibility that members of their racial communities suffer a disproportionate
number of casualties (Barreto and Leal; Kriner and Shen 2010). Though research
suggests that there is no “racial casualty gap,” legislators like Charlie Rangel (D-NY)
have argued for the reinstatement of the draft in order to address the perception of
unequal burdens of war (Kriner and Shen 2010). African American and Latino
legislators may therefore be more likely to speak out against the war, and may
consequently include other costs, such as civilian casualties, in their rhetoric against war.
Race is coded as follows: African American =1, Latino=2, White = 0.
H8: African American representatives will give more casualties speeches than white
representatives.
H9: Latino representatives will give more casualties speeches than white representatives.

I also include three institutional control variables. I include seniority (number of
years served) as previous research finds a negative relationship between the number of
years Representatives have served and the number of speeches they give (Morris 2001).
I also include a variable that measures whether members served on a House committee
dealing with war legislation (0=No Committee Service, 1=Committee Service).
Legislators serving on these committees may have more opportunities and incentives to
speak about the Iraq War, and therefore may also speak more about civilian casualties.
These committees are: Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Homeland Security, Select
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Intelligence, and Veteran Affairs.4 Committee membership data comes from CQ Press
Politics in America. Lastly, I control for party leadership, since spokespersons for their
party may speak more, and, by extension, may speak about civilian casualties more
frequently. Party leaders in each congress are the following: The Speaker of the House,
Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Minority Whip, and the heads of each
party caucus or party conference. Party leaders are coded “1”, while all other members in
each congress are coded “0.”
The dependent variable in this analysis is the number Iraqi civilian casualty
speeches by individual members of the House in the 108th (2003-2004), 109th (20052006), and 110th (2007-2008) Congresses.5

A civilian casualty speech is defined as

orally delivered remarks about Iraqi civilian death in a legislative speech, a one-minute
speech, or a special-order speech. Multiple remarks about Iraqi civilian death in a single
speech were counted as one civilian casualty speech. If a member made remarks about
Iraqi civilian death during a legislative speech and, for example, a one-minute speech in
the same day, I counted each speech separately. To locate these speeches, I searched the
Daily Congressional Record in ProQuest® Congressional. In conducting word searches,
I searched for variants of Iraq or Iraqi or civilian or citizen or people combined with
variants of the following words: blood, body count, innocent, casualty, cost, dead, death,
died, dying, fatality, human, kill, life, lives, loss, lost, perish. These terms are also
included in appendix A in chapter 1. For each congress, I included every member who

4

During the 108th and 109th congresses, the Committee on Foreign Affairs was named the Committee on
International Relations.
5
For the 108th Congress, coding of speeches began from the first day of the war, rather than the first day
of the Congress. Members who did not serve a full term in a Congress were excluded from the dataset in
that Congress.
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was present for each of the two sessions. Members were omitted from the analysis if
they were not present for both sessions for each congress.
I used negative binomial regression because the dependent variable is a count, and
the data were overdispersed. For over-dispersed data, the negative binomial regression is
preferred over the Poisson regression. The negative binomial regression model is useful
here as it allows for the conditional variance of the dependent variable to exceed its mean
value by introducing an individual unobserved disturbance to the model (Hilbe 2011).
Because it is difficult to interpret the results of negative binomial regression,
coefficients from negative binomial regression models were transformed to marginal
effects in table 3.3. Marginal effects enable us to understand how independent variables
affect the expected mean counts of speeches while holding all other independent
variables at their mean values. For statistically significant continuous independent
variables, I also include the percentage difference between the mean value and a one
standard deviation increase, and the percentage difference between the mean value and
the maximum value. For statistically significant dummy independent variables, I also
include the percentage difference between the baseline category and the other categories.
RESULTS
The key question addressed is simply how casualty rhetoric among U.S. House members
is influenced by strategic ownership variables and personal characteristics. Descriptive
statistics for key independent categorical variables are presented in table 3.1. Before
discussing regression results, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the descriptive
statistics.

77

Overall, members of the House did not speak very much about Iraqi civilian
deaths. The modal number is zero in each congress. The total number of civilian
casualty speeches in each congress never reaches the total number of members of
Congress analyzed in the study.
Table 3.1 provides the difference in proportion of civilian casualty speeches and
the proportion of membership in the U.S. House. This number indicates whether
categorical variables are associated with greater or fewer civilian casualties speeches than
their population in the sample would suggest. It is one indicator of issue convergence. In
a scenario of perfect issue convergence, we would see the proportion of civilian casualty
speeches associated with each category equal to the proportion of the members in each
category.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 suggest that there is little issue convergence,
indicating support for strategic ownership hypotheses. For example, the difference
between % of House membership and % of civilian casualty speeches for Republicans is
between approximately −25 (110th Congress) and −33 (108th Congress (2003-2004)). The
difference between % of House membership and % of civilian casualty speeches for
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members who voted against H.J. Res. 114 is between +33 (110th Congress) and +47
(108th Congress).
Table 3.1 also indicates that certain personal characteristics are associated with
civilian casualty rhetoric. Though females comprise between ~13% and ~15% of the
House, their share of civilian casualty speeches is between ~41% and ~64%. This
difference is most pronounced in the 110th Congress, where the difference in female
membership in the House and the share of civilian casualty speeches is approximately
+50. In addition, female legislators have the highest mean number of speeches in each
congress. African-American legislators also gave more speeches relative to their
membership in the House. The difference between % of House membership and % of
civilian casualty speeches for African-American representatives +16 (108th Congress) is
approximately +8 (109th and 110th Congresses).
The patterns in the descriptive statistics suggest that Democrats, members who
voted against the Iraq War resolution, women, and African Americans dominated debates
about Iraqi civilian deaths. To see whether these patterns are statistically significant
when other variables are includes, I now examine the variation in civilian casualty
rhetoric using negative binomial regression.
Table 3.2 presents results for the negative binomial regression of civilian casualty
rhetoric. Due to collinearity issues, the table contains the results for three models for each
congress (108th (2003-2004), 109th (2005-2006), 110th (2007-2008). The first model
includes the party ID and excludes the ideology and vote on H.J. Res. 114 variables. The
second model includes ideology and excludes Party ID and vote on H.J. Res. 114
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variables. The third model excludes party ID and includes ideology and vote on H.J. Res.
114 variables. Models are estimated with robust standard errors.
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Table 3.3 Continued

Negative binomial regression results suggest that strategic ownership variables
had a significant impact on the number civilian casualty speeches made by
Representatives. Table 3.2 shows that Party ID was statistically significant and in the
expected direction in model 1 in each congress. The marginal effect of Party ID in table
3.3 indicates that moving from a Republican to Democratic Representative is estimated to
lead to an increase between ~11% (108th Congress) and ~23% (109th Congress) of
civilian casualty speeches. These results support H1.
The results suggest that Representatives’ voting records on H.J. Res. 114 also
significantly affected civilian casualty speechmaking in the House, even more so than
Party ID. This variable was statistically significant in model 3 in each congress. Even
controlling for ideology, a Representative’s vote on H.J. Res. 114 was highly influential
on his or her number of civilian casualty speeches. The marginal effect of this vote in
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Table 3.3 reveals that moving from a Representative who voted in favor of the resolution
to a Representative who voted against the resolution is estimated to lead to an increase of
between ~19% (108th Congress) and ~50% (109th Congress) civilian casualty speeches.
These results support H2.
There is mixed support for the personal characteristics variables. Military service
is only statistically significant in the 109th Congress. Table 3.3 shows that moving from a
nonveteran Representative to a combat veteran Representative is estimated to lead to an
increase in ~17% (109th House model 1) to ~24% (109th House model 3). Table 3.3
reveals that moving from a nonveteran Representative to a veteran Representative is
estimated to lead to an increase in ~13% (109th House model 3) to ~30% (109th House
model 2). The effect of military service was therefore limited to the 109th Congress,
though the impact was relatively strong. For instance, in model 1 in the 109th Congress,
we see that a shift from civilian status to veteran status has a larger estimated increase on
civilian casualty speeches than the shift from Republican to Democrat Party ID (~28%
compared to 23%). Because military service reaches statistically significance only in the
109th Congress, there is only ambiguous support for Hypothesis 4.
Turning to the impact of gender, the results provide strong support for hypothesis
5. The results illustrate prominent and statistically significant differences among male
and female legislators in every model in each congress (Table 3.2). Table 3.3 shows that
switching from a male Representative to a female Representative is estimated to have
some of the largest marginal effects. For instance, if we compare the marginal effects
(Table 3.3) of gender with Party ID (model 1 for each congress), we see that the moving
from a female to male Representative is estimated to have a larger impact than switching

83

from a Republican to Democrat. A clear gender gap exists in civilian casualty rhetoric in
the House, indicating that the distinctive reactions to civilian casualties by men and
women in the general public also occur in public office.
There are mixed results for the impact of ideology on civilian casualty rhetoric.
In the second model in each congress, we see a strong and statistically significant impact
of ideology (table 3.2). If we explore the marginal effects of ideology in Table 3.3, the
results reveal in the second model for each congress that moving from the mean ideology
score to the maximum liberal ideology score is associated with an increase between a
~17% (108th Congress) and ~51% (109th Congress) in civilian casualty speeches.
However, when we include ideology and the vote on H.J. Res. 114 (model 3 in each
congress), the impact of ideology dramatically decreases, and is no longer statistically
significant.
When we examine the impact of race, the category of Latino was statistically
significant in every model in the 108th and 110th Congresses, but not in any of the models
in the 109th Congress. The direction of this coefficient, however, was in the opposite
direction than expected. Latino legislators and civilian casualty speeches are negatively
associated. These results are unsurprising when examining the descriptive data; Latino
legislators gave very few civilian casualty speeches. Though African-American
Representatives appeared to give a high number of civilian casualty speeches relative to
their presence in the House, this racial category never reached statistical significance in
any of the regression models.
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The controls perform somewhat as expected, though most fail to reach statistical
significance. With regard to the institutional controls, seniority is statistically significant,
though only in the first two models in the 109th Congress.
These results provide evidence that strategic ownership and some personal
characteristics help explain the civilian casualty rhetoric in the U.S. House of
Representatives. In particular, female legislators and representatives who voted against
authorizing the use of force are likely to give a higher number of civilian casualty
speeches. Because the chapter examines only the U.S. House and not the U.S. Senate, the
results cannot necessarily speak to all nationally elected U.S. politicians. Furthermore,
because the chapter examines only the Iraq War, it is unclear how these strategic
ownership variables and personal characteristics would affect civilian casualty
speechmaking in other wars. The statistical results, however, represent an important first
cut analysis of civilian casualty rhetoric.

CONSTRUCTING IRAQI CIVILIAN DEATH
Though I have established patterns of civilian casualty rhetoric among politicians in the
U.S. House, we still do not know how members spoke about fallen Iraqi citizens. In this
section I explore different interpretive frameworks though which Iraqi deaths emerged.
For interpretive purposes, I primarily examine differences between Democrats and
Republicans. The section explores civilian casualties as normative constructs. By this I
mean that the ontological status of the civilian dead is contingent upon interpretive
frameworks that allow for their emergence. They remain an invisible presence until the
living speak of them. This idea stems from Jacques Derrida’s (1995: 45) claim that,

85

“Every relation to death is an interpretative apprehension and a representative approach
to death.” As such, civilian dead remain unreal insofar as they are unable to speak
through the representative language of the living. Moreover, the emergence of the dead
in war narratives is generally tied up in normative expressions of war positions. Hence,
civilian casualties may be considered normative constructs.

REPUBLICANS AND CIVILIAN DEATH
Unsurprisingly, many Republicans brought up civilian casualties in relation to their
support for the president and the war in Iraq.6 Beyond this broader narrative of support
for the president’s war strategies and overall support for war, there were four common
interpretive frameworks in which Iraqi civilian death emerged. In the first framework,
which I refer to as the minimalist framework, civilian death was articulated as either as a
marginal ramification of war, or as a problem in decline. In minimalizing civilian deaths
in this way, the war would more easily be constituted as neatly executed or even
successful. The second framework juxtaposed Iraqi civilian death with killed insurgents,
killed Americans, and hypothetical killed Iraqis under a perpetual Hussein regime. I refer
to this framework as the juxtaposition framework. The third framework—the
democratization framework—envelops civilian death within a celebratory vision of
democratization. Here, civilian deaths are acceptable costs of a future democratic Iraq.
The fourth framework, the common enemy framework, attributes the loss of innocent
Iraqi lives to insurgents, jihadists, and terrorists. In this framework, the killers of Iraqi
civilians are the same as those seeking to harm and kill Americans and American

6

Exceptions were John Duncan (R-TN) and Ron Paul (R-TX). Duncan and Paul were critical of the
President’s conduct of war, and both discussed civilian casualties as reasons to withdraw from Iraq.
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soldiers. This framework draws attention away from direct connections between the U.S.
military and civilian death, and highlights how the United States should remain in Iraq to
defeat common enemies of the Iraqi and American people. To parsimoniously clarify
these interpretive frameworks, I will discuss each in turn and provide two or three
excerpts from speeches for each framework.
Minimalist Framework
Constructing civilian deaths as either minimal or in decline served to strengthen or
sustain a narrative of progress in Iraq, often locating the few or declining innocent
fatalities within the language of victory, progress, and success. For instance, toward the
end of 2007, the year of the Bush administration’s “surge” policy, Representative Duncan
Hunter (R-CA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, argued
that, “We are winning. We are going to leave Iraq in victory. . . . We have seen a drop in
attacks and a drop in American casualties and civilian casualties across Iraq. . . . To
everyone who cares about an American victory in Iraq, we will have victory in Iraq if we
maintain our strength.7 The suggestion that civilian casualties were dwindling helped to
define success in Iraq and provide a rationale for the continuation of funding the war.
Indeed, Representative Hunter’s comments were part of a debate about H.R. 1585, which
was about further appropriations for the war in Iraq in. Hunter equated “maintaining our
strength” with “continuing to fund this [Iraq War] operation.” If civilian casualties were
declining, then war supporters, which included many conservative legislators, had
incentives to speak about these deaths, and construct them as a reason to push forward in
the war.
7

Representative Duncan Hunter, Congressional Record, December 5, 2007, H14166-H14167.
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In the early stages of war some Republicans tended to suggest that victory had
been achieved in Iraq with very few civilian deaths. For instance, Michael Burgess (RTX) noted how “The American soldiers who fought in Iraq did so with skill,
determination and bravery in the face of grave dangers. Their conquest of Iraq was rapid,
overwhelming, and the victory was obtained with relatively limited civilian casualties.”8
This idea of limited casualties, however, became less common as casualties mounted.
Civilian deaths in Iraq did decline during the 110th Congress, which suggests one
possibility for why Republicans would be increasingly likely to deliver a civilian casualty
speech, and attempt to construct the Iraqi civilian casualty debate in more encouraging
terms.
Republicans also countered the practice of war critics citing raw civilian death
numbers by downplaying the meaning of these numbers. In response to Democratic
legislators’ discussions of civilian death in Iraq, Representative Steve King (R-IA) had “a
different opinion and . . . a different viewpoint on a number of the statistics.”
Representative King did not “take issue with the specificity of that number of 27,000
civilians killed” but rather contextualized that number with violent death rates from other
countries around the world and cities in the United States. King first used that 27,000
number of civilian deaths and transformed it into a rate of 27.51 innocent deaths per
100,000 per year. He then argued that Venezuela, Jamaica, South Africa, and Colombia
were more dangerous places than Iraq: “It is more than twice as dangerous to be a civilian
living supposedly in peace and harmony in Colombia than it is to be a civilian living in
the middle of this chaos in Iraq that I hear is intolerable.” Then, looking at cities in the
United States, he argued that, “it is far more dangerous for my wife to live here in
8

Representative Michael Burgess, Congressional Record, October 15, 2003, H9452.
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Washington, D.C.” King concluded, then, “that this [Iraq War civilian casualty rate] is a
manageable violence rate.”9 This example, while illustrating another way in which
civilian death emerged in a minimalist discursive framework, also highlights how
statistical data about casualties may be constructed in different ways for antithetical
purposes.

Juxtaposition Framework
Another framework of civilian death employed by Republicans was to contrast fallen
Iraqi citizens with insurgents killed, Americans killed, or hypothetical civilian deaths
under Saddam Hussein in a counterfactual scenario in which the United States did not go
to war. Again, remarks that followed this pattern were linked to ideas of progress,
success, and victory in Iraq. Representative Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), for instance, argued
that “There have been a lot more Iraqi troops, police and citizens that have been killed
over the last number of months than U.S. troops. . . . But it is clearly a war against radical
Islam that is moving forward, that needs to be completed.”10 Here, the loss of more Iraqi
citizens than U.S. soldiers was evidence that Iraqis were bearing the brunt of violence.
Representative Hoekstra interpreted this as progress in the U.S. war in Iraq, and saw it as
a reason to sustain combat operations.11
In another case of employing this framework, in early stages of the Iraq War,
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) argued that civilian lives were saved because
of U.S. intervention in Iraq:
9

Representative Steve King, Congressional Record, May 3, 2006, H2089-H2090
Representative Pete Hoekstra, Congressional Record, July 20, 2006, H5560.
11
This progress was often about Iraqis taking more responsibility. Indeed, a discursive theme not
discussed in this paper but relevant to this remark, is that there was contestation over whether Iraqis were
taking enough responsibility for curbing violence, and that it should be Iraqis dying for their country
instead of U.S. soldiers.
10
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We see that throughout the Islamic world that there is a possibility now because of America's
increase in prestige that we can actually step in and do some good and we can be proud that with
only a minor loss of civilian life we actually achieved our goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein's
monstrous regime. In fact, more civilians would be dead, Iraqi civilians would be dead today, had
we left Saddam Hussein in power and he killed the number of civilians that he was killing, that his
rate of massacre of his own people would have continued unabated by American troops.12

As initial justification for war in Iraq, and as a defense of the war throughout, members of
the House frequently discussed how Saddam Hussein’s regime was responsible for the
deaths of many Iraqis. Proponents of war therefore argued that regime change might
save future lives that Hussein’s regime would have otherwise claimed. And, as the
previous example illustrates, some Republican members of the House sought to construct
Iraqi civilian death as numerically less than if Hussein had remained in power. While
such speeches could also fall under the previous minimalist framework, the inclusion of
other types of death in relation to innocent Iraqi deaths under the U.S. occupation
suggests a distinct interpretive framework.

Common Enemy Framework
Many Republicans attributed the cause of civilian death in Iraq to terrorists, jihadists, and
insurgents. In doing so, they typically linked the killers of innocent Iraqis to those who
have already killed or wish to kill U.S. civilians and soldiers. For example, in a speech
on terrorism, Representative Geoff Davis (R-KY), argued that:
We are fighting an enemy who has proven it will use whatever violent means necessary to further
its cause. Indeed, we are not going to lose because of military strength, but we would lose only if
the people of the United States have a loss of resolve. My encouragement is to stay the course. . . .
We recoil in horror at the report of suicide bombers strolling into crowded markets or onto packed
buses and detonating themselves. Are they primarily focusing on our soldiers? No. The
preponderance of causalities are attacks on their own people. . . . this . . . insurgency . . . is led by
frankly a group of thugs, people filled with hatred, bitterness, criminals by any measure of merit,
killing innocent men, women and children.13

12
13

Representative Dana Rohrbacher, Congressional Record, October 15, 2003, H9468.
Representative Geoff Davis, Congressional Record, March 17, 2005, H1684.
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Similarly, Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX) argued that
These people who are bent on our destruction are so consumed with evil and hatred that they
would blow up sweet little innocent Iraqi children. They are not just killing Americans, they will
kill anybody that stands in their way. . . . they are so consumed with hatred they would blow those
innocent people up, Muslims themselves.14

In this framework, Iraqi civilian deaths and U.S. civilian and soldier deaths in the war on
terror result from the same or similar malevolent source. Iraqis are dying because
terrorists and insurgents are filled with hatred, which manifests in violence toward
innocent Americans and Iraqis.
Democratization Framework
Some Republicans constructed civilian deaths in Iraq as serving a greater good of
democratization. In such arguments, civilian deaths, much like U.S. combat deaths, were
construed as part of a shared sacrifice for a brighter, democratic future in Iraq. Such
discussions were part of a larger discourse of success and victory in the war on terrorism.
For instance, Representative Phil Gingrey (R-GA), while celebrating elections in Iraq,
concluded that civilian fatalities were not in vain but rather served to advance democracy
in Iraq:
It is the dawn of a new day in Iraq. . . and I raise my hand and my index finger in symbolic fashion
to salute the 10.5 million people who went to the polls in that historic election on December 15. . .
. This is also a great day for those 2,175 soldiers, men and women, who have given their lives . . .
and 30,000 or more innocent Iraqi people, many of them women and children, who have given
their lives for this cause. This is a great day.15

Similar discussions were intertwined with criticism of Democratic politicians and liberals
in the United States. Representative Tom Tancredo (R-CO) postulated that the political
left in the United States “cannot really get over the fact that the seeds of democracy were
planted in Iraq. They were even nourished by the blood of many wonderful American
14
15

Representative Louie Gohmert, Congressional Record, July 21, 2005, H6322.
Representative Phil Gingrey, Congressional Record, December 15, 2005, H11875.
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servicemen and women and certainly by the blood of thousands and thousands of Iraqi
citizens. They were hopeful that, in fact, we would fail, that the whole experiment would
fail.”16 Likewise, Representative Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) argued that “Liberals like to
say that Iraq was out of control and that the terrorists would destroy the election, and
America was losing and that we should postpone the elections. . . . They wanted us to tell
the world that the United States did not have the strength and the determination to defeat
terrorism, and they were wrong in every instance.”17 She then proceeded to quote Iraqi
women whom she had encountered in Iraq and had since been in correspondence with,
who thanked her for the United States’ perseverance in Iraq:
Dear American Friends, a warm hug of appreciation from Iraq to the good hearts in the United
States. Congratulations for us and for you on Iraqi Elections Day. Today we are not only free but
we have stood united in democracy. . . .Thank you on behalf of all Iraqi innocents who have given
their lives for the freedom price.18

Republicans therefore constructed a sharp nexus between the normative value of
democratization in Iraq and civilian deaths, suggesting the latter were either needed for
the former to materialize, or that these deaths should be celebrated as an unfortunate
though essential part of the establishment of Iraq’s new democratic future.

DEMOCRATS AND CIVILIAN DEATH
Just as many Republicans’ Iraqi casualty speeches were ultimately about support for the
President and the war in Iraq, Democrats often remarked on Iraqi death as a means to
criticize the president and the war. Beyond this intuitive finding, these deaths emerged in
four unique interpretive frameworks: Concern/lack of concern, destabilization, Soldier
sympathy, and democratization.
16

Representative Tom Tancredo, Congressional Record, February 1, 2005, H276.
Representative Marsha Blackburn, Congressional Record, February 1, 2005, H273.
18
Ibid., H274.
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Concern/Lack of Concern
Many Democrats discussed Iraqi civilians within a framework of concern about innocent
Iraqi deaths or, alternatively, the Bush administration’s lack of concern with these deaths.
With regard to the former, it was common for Democrats to talk about the tragic deaths
of Iraqis within a framework of criticism of war. For example, Representative Elijah
Cummings (D-MD) argued that, “There has been a tragic loss of life-both among our
American troops and among Iraq's civilian population. I knew the human losses would be
too great and I did not want our families-or the Iraqi people-to experience the
overwhelming grief and remorse that accompanies waging war unnecessarily.”19
Many Democrats commented on the estimated number of Iraqi deaths, and often
argued that the Bush administration (and people in general) tended not to care. For
example, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) argued that a supplemental vote on the
Iraq War was “Mass death on the installment plan,” and followed this critique by noting
how “Iraqi civilian casualties number well over 100,000. Iraqi civilian injuries could be
over 1 million, but who is keeping track? Some act as though the Iraqis are not real
people with real families, real hopes and real dreams and loves of their own.”20
Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) argued that the United States has “killed I do not
know how many thousand because no one will count the number of Iraqis. It is as though
they do not matter. Nor do we talk about the number of them that are injured. . . . how
much longer can we persist in staying there [Iraq]?”21
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Representative Elijah Cummings, Congressional Record, May 20, 2004, H3499.
Representative Dennis Kucinich, Congressional Record, June 12, 2006, H3769.
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Representative Jim McDermott, Congressional Record, September 22, 2005, H8332.
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Similarly, Representatives Jane Harman (D-CA) and Jim McDermott (D-WA)
argued that the Bush administration was constructing an overly optimistic image of Iraq
by refusing to announce civilian casualty numbers or by manipulating these figures.
Representative Harman argued that that the Bush administration was painting “a rosy
picture of the situation in Iraq” by inaccurately counting civilian deaths.22 She argued
that the only reason the administration could claim progress was by excluding “people
killed by bombs, mortars, rockets, and other mass attacks” in recent reports, and chastised
the administration by noting that “I do not think policymakers should engage in creative
accounting when it comes to the lives of our sons and daughters or the lives of innocent
Iraqis.”23 Relatedly, and in a twist to the juxtaposition interpretive framework employed
by Republicans, Representative McDermott suggested that:
The Rumsfeld command is happy to announce the number of insurgents killed or captured, but
they do not talk much about the innocent Iraqi civilians killed or wounded. They are not
announcing those numbers every day. Why not? If they killed or captured 80 insurgents, how
many civilians were injured or wounded in the process? Why do they not tell us the whole
story?”24

Destabilization Framework
Some Democrats discussed civilian casualties as evidence of the United States as a
destabilizing force. For instance, Representative Marty Meehan (D-MA) argued that:
Every time Iraqi bystanders are killed in coalition actions, it further erodes the goodwill we earned
by ridding them of Saddam Hussein. And even when innocent Iraqis are murdered by insurgents,
the United States is blamed for failing to provide security. If the world's most potent Army cannot
make the streets safe, Iraqis are asking, what is it that they are really here for? So the first step in
achieving stability in Iraq is recognizing that the United States presence there has become
inherently destabilizing.25
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Representative Jane Harman, Congressional Record, September 13, 2006, H6475.
Ibid., H6475
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Representative Jim McDermott, Congressional Record, November 16, 2005, H10361.
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Representative Marty Meehan, Congressional Record, January 25, 2005, H182.
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Similarly, another Massachusetts Democrat, Representative James McGovern (D-MA),
ultimately constructed the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as a failure because the
United States created the conditions of his emergence, creating an environment in which
an al-Zarqawi may materialize, slay Iraqis, and destabilize Iraq: “Certainly the death of
terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi is welcome news. We did not create Zarqawi, but it was
the war in Iraq that offered him the opportunity to kill American soldiers and innocent
Iraqi civilians and to inflame sectarian hatreds.”26 While many Democrats were quick to
praise the death of al-Zarqawi, and use his death to construe a vision of progress in Iraq,
many Democrats used al-Zarqawi’s death to bring light to civilian death and Iraqi
destabilization.

Soldier Sympathy Framework
Democrats also constructed lost Iraqi lives by bringing attention to the impact of civilian
death on the lives of U.S. soldiers. In particular, Democrats articulated the trauma that
may result from either the accidental killing of innocents or exposure to civilian death,
and employed this trauma to criticize the war. Maxine Waters (D-CA), for instance,
noted that:
We know that, yes, thousands of Iraqis have died because we have young people in these special
operations . . . who were told to shoot anything that moves. Many of them cannot live with the
psychological damage that is fostered upon them because they are shooting and they are killing
and they do not have all of the answers. So today we focus on our soldiers. . . . Our prayers go out
to them. We want them to be returned home. We want them to realize their dreams and their hopes
and their aspirations.27

Another California Democrat, Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) made a related point in her remarks
about the film “The Ground Truth.” She argued that:

26
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Representative James McGovern, Congressional Record, June 15, 2006, H4016.
Representative Maxine Waters, Congressional Record, June 21, 2005, H4880.
95

They [U.S. soldiers] found themselves killing children, running over them with their vehicles, on
command firing on children, burning children. And women, one Marine told the story of
mistakenly shooting a woman just before she waved a white handkerchief to show that they she
was not an enemy. And men, men who could have been, or not, part of the insurgency. Never clear
if they were killing innocents or if they were fighting the enemy. Their eyes became confused.
Their voices became uncertain. Their resolve questioning. And while they were moving through
these emotions from certainty to uncertainty, they and their buddies were being physically and
mentally wounded. Those who were not killed or injured were likely to become victims of PTSD,
posttraumatic stress disorder. But they did come home if they were not killed. They came home
with sad, sad eyes.28

Commenting on the lives and desires of U.S. combat soldiers appeared to be quite
common in House war debates, and Democrats attempted to critique the war by positing
that the war had traumatic effects on soldiers. Democratic members of the House
therefore highlighted how one aspect of this trauma was the result of U.S. soldiers killing
innocent Iraqis. Even though U.S. soldiers were rarely responsible for close-encounter
killing of Iraqis—most civilian death in Iraq that was directly the result of U.S. and
coalition troops was aerial bombing—Democrats posited civilian-death induced trauma
to U.S. soldiers as a means to configure the Iraq War as a tragedy that should be
terminated (Hicks et al. 2011).

Democratization Framework
Just as Iraqi civilian deaths emerged in Republican narratives of democratization, they
also manifested within Democrats’ speeches about democratization in Iraq. Democrats,
however, argued against the impulse to celebrate Iraqi elections, suggesting that the cost
to innocent lives was not worth the benefit of nascent democracy. For instance,
Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN) argued that, “In bringing democracy to these people
we have killed tens of thousands of Iraqis, we have destroyed their nation, and we have

28

Representative Lynn Woolsey, Congressional Record, July 26, 2006, H5941.
96

put casualties among tens of thousands of Iraqis. What a price to pay to bring democracy
to a country, to destroy the country.”29
Other Democrats argued that since the United States helped establish democracy
in Iraq, it would be unwise for U.S. troops to remain in Iraq as more American and Iraqi
lives were lost. Representative Tom Udall (D-NM), for example, noted how “We have
lost thousands of American and Iraqi lives,” and argued that violence has undermined the
success of Iraqi election: “Sectarian violence and civil strife have eclipsed the progress of
free elections . . . . We have helped sow the seeds of democracy, but now the people of
Iraq must take charge and bring about their own destiny.”30
The meaning of elections in Iraq, therefore, was quite fluid. Whereas many
Republicans saw elections as legitimating the war in Iraq, Democrats either sought to
dampen triumphal visions of a democratic Iraq by highlighting civilian deaths, or by
using civilian deaths to support the idea that the United States’ job in Iraq was complete
because Iraq had held free and fair democratic elections.

Spectral Security
This section moves beyond how civilian death manifested in the interpretive frameworks
of Democrats and Republicans, and asks how Iraqi civilian deaths informed House
members’ conception of U.S. security. While the previously discussed interpretive
frameworks of Iraqi civilian casualty speechmaking discussed some interesting and
common modes of constructing fallen Iraqi citizens, we have yet to examine one of the
most important components of wartime rhetoric: national security. In this section, I
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briefly sketch out ways in which members of the House linked Iraqi civilian deaths to
U.S. national security. This section focuses primarily on critics of the Iraq War, since
supporters tended not to link civilians deaths with U.S. security. I refer to the inclusion of
civilian dead in national security rhetoric as the spectralization of security. Spectral
security, therefore, refers to the ways in which the dead and death inform the
conceptualization of security.

War Critics and Spectral Security
One manner in which war critics spectralized U.S. national security was by connecting
the killing of innocent civilians with the creation of more terrorism. Representative
Charlie Rangel (D-NY), for instance, claimed that, “a life is a life, whether it is an
American, whether it is an Iraqi, in the tens of thousands and sometimes the hundreds of
thousands.”31 In this speech on Iraqi civilian death and terrorism, Representative Rangel,
a former Korean War combat veteran, commented on Donald Rumsfeld’s admission of
not knowing “whether we were creating more terrorists than we were killing.”
Representative Rangel then asked the public to:
Imagine how many terrorists we create when these cowardly people go to a school, go to a
hospital, go to a mosque and fire at our troops? And those who have served would know, you have
no option except to destroy where that fire is coming from. And if you destroy innocent people,
we no longer call that human life. You know what we call it? Collateral damage.32

During debates over H. Res. 63—a nonbinding resolution opposing the surge—
Representative Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH) argued that the war in Iraq was neither in the
“best interests of the United States” nor “essential to the security of the United States and
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the freedom of the world.”33 She continued that, given the costs to Americans, Iraqis,
and because the war has made the world less safe, the U.S. should begin to withdraw
troops from Iraq:
The Iraqis had no weapons of mass destruction. And they never asked us to come to their country.
They do ask us to leave, though. And yet we will not leave. What is this talk I have heard tonight
about freedom and liberty? This talk of glory that I heard on the floor. This romanticized language,
this talk about Davy Crockett. There is no Davy Crockett in Iraq. . . .Our brave soldiers have died
or they have been injured. The Iraqis have lost their lives. They have lost their society. They have
lost their infrastructure. They are losing their middle class who are moving to other countries to
keep their children safe. Their people are fleeing from their own country. We are wary, they are
wary, the world is now more dangerous.34

In this speech, Representative Shea-Porter (D-NH) takes the usual representation of
danger that is used to reproduce state identities and produces boundaries, and instead
employs a strategy implicating the United States in the production of vulnerability and
death in Iraq. Wartime rhetoric that includes remarks on freedom, liberty, and danger are
criticized directly in order to connect the war in Iraq with Iraqi and global insecurity.
Another war critic, Ron Paul (R-TX), argued that the killing of civilians in Iraq
increased animosity toward the United States, and left Israel and the Middle East in a
more precarious position:
We refuse to acknowledge the hatred generated by the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens
who are written off as collateral damage. Are the Middle East and Israel better off with the turmoil
our occupation has generated? Hardly! Honesty would have us conclude that conditions in the
Middle East are worse since the war started.35

The killing of innocent civilians for Representative Paul (R-TX) provided another means
in which to redefine a strategy of security for the United States that recommended a more
isolationist foreign policy. This strategy was in part based on the idea that the deaths of
foreign civilians decrease the security of the United States.

Hence, this form of spectral

security suggests that the insecurity and deaths of foreign civilians is closely linked to the
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U.S. security security, regardless of the value placed on others’ lives. Such rhetoric
reinforced Representative Paul’s longstanding desire to restrain the United States from
costly foreign involvements.
Other war critics constructed civilian casualties in Iraq as motivating resistance to
the U.S. occupation, and claimed that reputation of the United States in the world
suffered because of the deaths of civilians. Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
argued that, “We must be willing to acknowledge that the forces attacking our troops are
able to recruit suicide attackers because suicide attacks are largely motivated by revenge
for the loss of loved ones. And Iraqis have lost so many loved ones as a result of
America's two wars against Iraq.”36 She then asked:
What kind of an occupier have we been? . . . . A recent video documentary confirms that U.S.
forces used white phosphorous against civilian neighborhoods in the U.S. attack on Fallujah.
Civilians and insurgents were burned alive by these weapons. We also now know that U.S. forces
have used MK77, a napalm-like incendiary weapon, even though napalm has been outlawed by the
United Nations. With the images of tortured detainees, and the images of Iraqi civilians burned
alive by U.S. incendiary weapons now circulating the globe, our reputation on the world stage has
been severely damaged.37

Representative McKinney’s remarks did not only focus on how civilian deaths motivated
violent resistance to U.S. troops in Iraq, but also on these deaths’ reputational effects,
which might have security implications (Pape 2005). Representative McKinney’s
remarks on revenge, violence, and security also echo research on the role of revenge and
desires for violent behavior among groups and states in global affairs (Löwenheim and
Heimann 2008). This linkage between U.S. national security and civilian deaths also
marks a shift in concern with civilian death in Iraq from largely an emotional issue to the
realm of national security. By suggesting that these deaths negatively impacted U.S.
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national security, war critics—Republican and Democrat—hoped to persuade the other
politicians, the public, and the president to end U.S. involvement in Iraq.

War Supporters and Spectral Security
War supporters generally refrained from linking civilian deaths in Iraq to either U.S.
security or Iraqi security. Some war supporters did, however, suggest that civilian
casualties were simply part of war, and that an increase in U.S. troops, while leading to
more deaths, would offer Iraqis more security. Representative John Shimkus (R-IL)
noted that, “This is war . . . . The U.S. and Iraqi governments must expect civilian
casualties and collateral damage. It's unavoidable. The irony in this matter is that most
Iraqi people would welcome the increased security.”38 Representative Shimkus’
discussion of civilian casualties as improving Iraqis’ security echoed President Bush’s
announcement of the surge decision, during which the president acknowledged that the
surge would likely increase civilian casualties but would improve security in and around
Baghdad:
The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security. . . . The changes I have outlined tonight are
aimed at ensuring the survival of a young democracy that is fighting for its life in a part of the
world of enormous importance to American security. . . . Even if our new strategy works exactly
as planned, deadly acts of violence will continue -- and we must expect more Iraqi and American
casualties. The question is whether our new strategy will bring us closer to success. I believe that
it will.39

In a related fashion, Representative Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) weaved together the
war on terror, the war in Iraq, and civilian casualties:
Our success in Iraq is hugely important. Our enemies in Iraq . . . would like nothing better than to
see us withdraw prematurely. . . . Of course, the loss of any young soldier is heartbreaking; so are
the deaths of innocent civilians killed by roadside and vehicle-borne bombs, or suicide bombers.
We are dealing with Saddam loyalists, jihadists, imported terrorists, and domestic criminals who
38
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play by no rules and do not hesitate to bomb Iraqi weddings, mosques, funerals, and gatherings of
children, school children as a common tactic. . . . The global war on terror will not be short. It will
require deep and enduring commitment. . . . This appropriations bill will give us the resources to
do the job and to support our young men and women who do that job of liberty each and every
day.40

War supporters, while more limited in making connections between civilian death and
security, did occasionally posit that such deaths were part of an important war in which
failing to succeed would have national security implications.
We know a good deal about various narratives of U.S. security rhetoric leading up
to and during war, but very little about the deaths of U.S. soldiers and foreign civilians in
security rhetoric (Ivie and Giner 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007). This is an important
gap, because these deaths may be used to hinder the impulse to sustain combat operations
in the name of security—if these deaths are assembled as evidence of insecurity.
Numerous scholars have already discussed relationships among war, rhetoric, identity,
and security. Indeed, within any realm of violent security practices there are matters of
discourse, otherness, and securitization. What IR scholars have not weighed in on is the
matter of the deaths of Others—as they pertain to national security rhetoric. This section
offered a brief overview of what spectral security looks like. While wartime rhetoric
involves many layers of securitization of the living, this section hoped to shed light on
where the innocent dead victims of war fit into the language of security.

Conclusions
The impulse animating this chapter was a normative argument about the value of publicly
speaking about killed foreign civilians in democratic deliberations. Even with numerous
40
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ethical concerns with speaking about killed civilians, I argued that civilian casualty
rhetoric is an important normative component to deliberations on war. Even casualty
rhetoric used purely to advance political interests still allows the dead to be restrictively
present during war deliberations. Their presence fosters a more ethical debate, even if
political desires and interests of representatives are mapped onto dead civilians. The
inclusion of the dead during public deliberations is beneficial as it provides the conditions
of quasi-agency for dead civilians, providing opportunities for the meaning of these killed
civilians to be negotiated.
This chapter used statistical techniques to model civilian casualty speechmaking,
which is useful in interpreting the justness of Iraq War debates among U.S. politicians.
The results revealed that strategic ownership and some personal incentives structured the
emergence of civilian casualty rhetoric in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Partisanship afforded Democrats reasons to discuss civilian costs of war more than
Republicans, and Democrats did indeed speak of these innocent losses more than
Republicans. More important than partisanship was how representatives voted on
authorizing President Bush to wage war in Iraq. Voting against H.J. Res. 114 provided
credible opportunities to speak of civilian deaths in Iraq, since those who voted against
this legislation likely felt less responsible for deaths in Iraq. It is also likely that those
who voted against H.J. Res. 114 considered these human costs of war when casting their
votes, and felt compelled to bring civilian casualties into House war deliberations after
war commenced. Being a female representative was also strongly associated with
civilian casualty rhetoric, even while controlling for ideology, party affiliation, and war
resolution vote. One may conclude that Democrats, those who voted against authorizing
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the Iraq War, and women contributed more to an ethical debate about the Iraq War than
Republican, men, and H.J. 114 supporters.
I would caution against such an interpretation, however, since discussing civilian
casualties is only part of what could be considered an ethical debate. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that civilian casualty rhetoric was rooted in moral motivations. The findings
suggest strong partisan and strategic determinants of civilian casualty rhetoric. Still,
those who engaged the issue of civilian deaths, whether as part of supportive or critical
war rhetoric, for moral or strategic reasons, were involved in normatively beneficial
behavior within the U.S. House of Representatives. Even though certain categories of
representatives were more engaged in civilian casualty rhetoric, there was some
convergence on this issue, and the discussion of the different interpretive frameworks
show that a limited form of dialogue transpired between war critics and war supporters
about the meaning of these deaths. Republicans did indeed trespass on this issue in order
to resist claims that the loss of life in Iraq implied a basis to withdrawal from combat
operations.
Another reason for caution in interpreting the findings of this chapter is that the
statistical results show the substantive meaning of variation in civilian casualty
speechmaking is small, since these speeches were rather rare. A more acceptable
inference is that, overall, there was little debate over civilian casualties, which is
unfortunate given the massive loss of innocent life in Iraq. If the inclusion of civilian
casualties in congressional speeches contributes to a more just or ethical debate on war,
then it is difficult to say just how much House deliberations on war were “just” in this
regard. There are, of course, no standards that guide our understanding of how much
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elected officials should speak about civilian deaths. From the perspective of this
dissertation, increased inclusion of the dead in congressional debates is normatively
valuable.
U.S. wars have resulted in the losses of thousands of American soldiers and even
more innocent civilians. If speaking about these losses is important to war debates, then it
is useful for scholars to assess whether elected officials discuss these deaths, who speaks
about them, and how they do so. This chapter advances our understanding of the
determinants of civilian casualty speechmaking and the construction of Iraqi civilian
death in the U.S. House of Representatives.
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Chapter 4
Casualty Contextualization and Congressional Rhetoric in the Media
The economy always . . . takes precedence, except for when there's a war going on. You know,
people's children are being killed, people's husbands, people's wives. So that always takes
precedence.1
–Candy Crowley

Introduction
Since the United States initiated “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in order to remove Saddam
Hussein from power, 6,648 U.S. service members have died in in Iraq (Washington Post,
“Faces of the Fallen”). Throughout the war, politicians and the public disagreed about
the legitimacy of invading Iraq, and mounting human costs heightened the stakes of this
debate. Lost lives and the legitimacy of the Iraq War were central to war debates in the
years following initial combat operations, particularly in the months leading up to the
2004 presidential and 2006 midterm elections. Many of these debates played out among
politicians on TV news shows on CNN, Fox, and MSNBC.
While several studies indicate that U.S. combat casualties impact voting behavior
among the U.S. public and the fate of U.S. politicians (Karol and Miguel 2007; Kriner
and Shen 2007; Kriner and Shen 2010), other research suggests that other factors were
relatively more salient to the U.S. public. Gelpi (2005) and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
(2006; 2009) find that perceptions of eventual success in Iraq were relatively more
important than casualties to the public, and that perceptions of future victory modified the
impact of casualty sensitivity on the public’s support for war. While these findings have
been criticized on a number of grounds (see Mueller 2005; Berinsky and Druckman
2007), most studies seem to agree that the impact of casualties on wartime public opinion
is contingent on the perceived circumstances of war and the informational context of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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combat casualties (Boettcher and Cobb 2006; 2009). Gelpi (2010: 88), for example,
notes that citizens “must inevitably construct their attitudes toward war in response to
information provided by elite sources such as the news media and partisan politicians.”
To my knowledge, there exists no study that assesses how U.S. politicians
contextualize U.S. combat casualties in the news media. In this chapter I explore the
issue of casualties and contextual information from the perspective of elite casualty
rhetoric. In particular, I examine how members of the U.S. Congress (MCs)
contextualize U.S. combat casualties during appearances in the TV news media in the
months leading up to elections. While numerous studies find that elite rhetoric—
particularly by MCs—shape the public’s perceptions of the justifiability and
appropriateness of war (Berinsky 2007; Gelpi et al. 2009), there has been virtually no
research on how MCs contextualize wartime death in the news media. If perceptions of
future success and justifiability are central to structuring the impact of casualties on the
public, do MCs contextualize their statements about casualties in these terms? Do MCs
contextualize casualties in ways that align with the findings of experimental studies?
In addition to questions concerning the contextualization of casualties, I also seek
to determine the degree of issue convergence between partisan MCs and the valence of
casualty statements. Unlike on the House and Senate floors, MCs in TV interviews need
to respond to questions from journalists, which might include questions about casualties.
For politicians hoping to avoid speaking about the human costs of war, the media
environment should make issue avoidance difficult. Consequently, I expect issue
convergence on casualties, though I also anticipate a difference in casualty statement
valence among members of opposite parties. If the TV news media seeks out MCs from
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the president’s party who are critical of the president and MCs from the nonpresidential
party who are supportive, will we see extensive critical presidential-party casualty
rhetoric and widespread supportive nonpresidential party casualty rhetoric (Groeling and
Baum 2008)?
I find that Democrats and Republicans uniformly discuss war casualties in critical
and supportive terms, respectively. Contrary to the findings of Groeling and Baum
(2008), it is exceptionally rare for Democrats to support the Iraq War when discussing
war deaths, and unusual for Republicans to criticize the Iraq War when commenting on
the Iraq War. This partisan uniformity in casualty rhetoric has implications for the
finding that cross-party criticism and support influences public opinion on war. If
partisans are guided by congressional elites, they are unlikely to find intraparty
divergence in congressional casualty rhetoric, and are likely to be unchallenged in their
views. I also find that many measures of support for war and experimental casualty
frames rarely appear in elite rhetoric. I suggest that researchers measuring the effects of
casualty framing, congressional rhetoric, and casualties, should consider actual
congressional rhetoric about meanings of fallen soldiers.
These findings build on a growing body of work on the effects of U.S. combat
casualties in U.S. politics. Existing research has examined the significant effects of
congressional rhetoric, perceptions of success and justifiability during war, and casualties
on public views on war and voting behavior, but researchers have yet to explore precisely
how MCs debate wartime death in the media. Such debates might impact the public’s
perceptions of war success/failure, and could influence the impact of casualties on the
public through structuring the meaning of these deaths. Questions about the independent

!

108

effects of variables on casualty sensitivity and support for war among the public could
include questions about how trusted partisan elites actually contextualize casualties
during key periods. This chapter therefore explores the occurrence of casualty
contextualization by MCs during interviews in the TV news media in the months leading
up to elections in 2004 and 2006. Because Americans are generally relatively uninformed
about foreign affairs (see, for example, Baum 2003), and because many Americans get
their information from TV news, the voices of congressional elites in the TV news media
are a central means of knowledge and accountability (Baum and Groeling 2008).
Understanding congressional casualty rhetoric in the TV news media extends
casualty effects arguments developed in experimental and voting behavior research as
they relate to the relationship between perceptions of wartime information and the
meaning of U.S. losses in Iraq. Research on casualty effects on American public opinion
has been conducted largely with experimental studies and public opinion data. Such
research has made important progress, but fails to account for how casualties are
discussed by trusted elites in one of the central means of news information in U.S.
political culture—TV News. Though Gelpi et al. (2006) find that expectations of war
success, and to a lesser extent beliefs in the rightness of war, shape the public’s
sensitivity to combat deaths and support for war, we have little information about how
elites debate legitimacy, loss of life, and the likelihood of eventual success. In an
experimental study related to the findings of Gelpi et al. (2006), Boettcher and Cobb
(2006) found that individuals presented with information on American military deaths in
the context of Iraqi insurgent deaths were more likely to judge a military operation as
successful as well as to support war more than those presented only with information on
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American military deaths. Yet it is unclear how and the extent to which information
about killed insurgents is part of elite debates about the conduct of war. In order to better
understand casualty effects, it is important to possess an understanding of the range and
texture of casualty rhetoric in the public sphere.
There are a number of implications of this chapter for research on domestic
politics and the conduct of war. Congressional criticism affects the capacity of presidents
to rally the public to continue the use of force abroad (Kriner 2010). For example, if
MCs—particularly members of the president’s party—discuss combat casualties in
critical terms such as failure or inability to achieve a military victory during interviews on
TV, then perhaps congressional casualty rhetoric in the media serves as an important
mechanism of a “democratic brake on military adventurism” (Kriner and Shen 2007:
507). Alternately, if politicians are able to configure war casualties as part of a
successful war or as “noble sacrifices,” or contextualize these deaths with information
about killed insurgents, then combat casualties may be less of a restraint on sustaining
aggressive military action abroad. In either case, this chapter hopes to provide an
empirical basis of casualty contextualization among MCs in the TV media to better
understand how the rhetoric of combat casualties might serve as a restraining or
supporting mechanism for how casualties influence public opinion and voting behavior.
This chapter is therefore relevant to arguments about democratic leaders’ capacity
to continue waging war. Sensitivity to casualties among citizens in democracies is one of
the purported mechanisms for why it may be difficult not only for democratic leaders to
use force, but sustain support for the use of force (Ray 1995; Smith 2005). Indeed
scholars argue that leaders in democracies pick wars that preferably cost relatively few
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lives (Reiter and Stam 2002). While it has been suggested that the public does not
comprise a formidable constraint on the use of force because, as Rosato (2003 594-595)
notes, “the costs of war typically fall on a small subset of the population that will likely
be unwilling to protest government policy,” recent research indicates that far more
Americans are connected in some way to combat casualties (Kriner and Shen 2010). It is
not only the dead and their immediate families that are impacted by the lethality of
combat; rather, broad segments of the American public are connected to the dead and
exhibit various degrees of sensitivity to the human toll of war (Kriner and Shen 2010).
Congressional statements about these human costs in the TV news media is an important
part of public debates about war and the consequences of sending troops to battle. MCs
provide information and context about these consequences, and publicly challenge or
support the president’s narrative of wartime success.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section links my study of casualty
contextualization to relevant research on casualty framing effects and public perceptions
of war success/failure. The second section discusses the data and methods to be used in
this chapter. The third section examines the “valence” of U.S. death and Iraqi civilian
death statements. The fourth section examines the extent to which U.S. combat casualties
are contextualized in two “price” contexts: “consumer” and “investment.” In the fifth
section I explore the cost/benefit contextualization of casualties mentioned earlier,
conceptualized in terms of Iraqi and U.S. benefits. In the sixth section I assess the extent
to which MCs spoke about the legitimacy/illegitimacy of the Iraq War. The seventh and
final section concludes the chapter and suggests avenues for future research.
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Casualty Contextualization
The primary contribution of this chapter is to determine how MCs contextualize U.S.
combat casualties in Iraq. My exploration of congressional casualty rhetoric in the TV
media is informed by previous studies that indicate particular contextual information that
is relevant to individuals’ support for war and casualty sensitivity (Boettcher and Cobb
2006, 2009; Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Gelpi et al. 2006, 2009). These studies,
while largely experimental, suggest different types of casualty and other forms of war
contextualization that serve as a basis for the types of contextualization I will look for in
U.S. politicians’ rhetoric.
The forms of casualty contextualization in these studies are principally about
costs and benefits of war. Though not identified in their studies as such, they may be
understood in terms of Iraqi or American costs and benefits. These costs and benefits are
often conceptualized in terms of metrics of success or failure. Federico et al. (2005: 625),
for example, created an indexed measure of support for war that included several
questions pertaining to the perception of success in Iraq. These included whether the Iraq
War would stabilize or destabilize the Middle East, whether it would reduce or increase
the threat of terrorism, and whether it would further U.S. interests in the Middle East or
create more problems for the United States in the region (Federico et al.: 625). While not
directly testing the impact of casualty contextualization, the three measures of success
and failure, which Federico et al. (2005) use as part of a broader measure of support for
war, serve as a starting point for the type of rhetoric I should expect to see from MCs.
I also draw on the measures of success in Gelpi et al. (2006; 2009). While their
research distinguished the public’s definition of success from the public’s measurement
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of future success, I rely on both in my exploration of cost/benefit contextualization of
congressional casualty rhetoric. In their studies, Gelpi et al. sought to determine how
individuals understood success in Iraq as well as the meaning of future success. Their
findings suggest a modest divergence in the two. The top three definitions of success
include “An Iraqi government that is stable and democratic is established,” “Iraqis are
able to live peaceful, normal, everyday lives,” and “Iraqis provide for their own security
and maintain order” (Gelpi et al. 2009: 196). Their studies also found that the three most
important metrics of eventual success in Iraq to the U.S. public were whether “services,
such as education, health care, and utilities, [were] being provided to Iraqis,” whether
“Iraqis [were] cooperating with U.S. authorities and not protecting terrorists or
insurgents,” and “how soon Iraq [could] hold free elections” Gelpi et al. (2009: 198). It is
unclear why there is a slight divergence in the public’s definition of success and
measurement of future success. For example, it is hard to understand why Iraqis’ ability
to live peaceful, normal, everyday lives is not part of the measurement of future success
while the provision of public services is. Some authors have criticized the question
wording in their studies, suggesting that, among other problems, the order of questions
may have biased the results in favor of certain responses over others (Berinsky and
Druckman 2007). I take into account each of these measures, while combining some of
them into single measures.
Boettcher and Cobb (2006) suggest further means in which the contextualization
of casualties shapes individuals’ support for war. They find that information about killed
Iraqi insurgents increased support for the Iraq war in the context of U.S. combat
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casualties (Boettcher and Cobb 2006). 2 They refer to this contextualization of American
dead with enemy dead as a type of “casualty ratio.” They find that, particularly among
Republicans, the public saw the Iraq War as more successful when given information
about insurgent deaths alongside U.S. combat deaths. Additionally, they suggest that,
“casualty ratio data appear to soften (for everyone) the negative effect of information
about American casualties by placing those casualties in a larger context. . . . While body
counts of enemy dead remain a discredited metric for expert assessments of
success/failure, the public information value of casualty ratio data remains strong (if only
occasionally deployed).” If, however, this form of casualty contextualization is “only
occasionally deployed,” then their findings may not be fully relevant to non-experimental
settings. This chapter therefore hopes to build upon their study by exploring how
applicable their findings are to congressional rhetoric in the media.
In a subsequent study, Boettcher and Cobb (2009) analyze the impact of another
rhetorical context for casualties during wartime—the trope of “dying in vain” or
“honoring the dead.” The authors refer to such an argument as an “investment frame”
because the underlying logic is that the United States has “invested” soldiers in a war and
should seek a future return on their investment. In particular, their study included the
framing statement, “Some people say we need to stay and complete the mission in Iraq to
honor the dead and make sure they did not die in vain” (Boettcher and Cobb 2009: 685).
Their study finds that individuals who believed that the United States “did the right thing
in Iraq” are willing to tolerate increased casualties when presented with arguments calling
for escalating war in order to “honor the dead,” (i.e. an investment frame). For
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Interestingly, Gelpi et al. (2006; 2009) did not find that killing insurgents in Iraq mattered much for public
opinion. Given Boettcher and Cobb’s strong findings, however, I include it in this study.
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individuals who believed invading Iraq was wrong, the investment frame decreased
support for the escalation of war.
In the same study, Boettcher and Cobb (2009) also examine the opposite frame,
which they refer to as a “consumer frame.” For this frame, the authors’ study included
the statement, “staying will not bring them back and will only result in more loss of life”
(Boettcher and Cobb 2009: 685). This frame did not yield any statistically significant
results, though their testing of this frame was admittedly problematic (Boettcher and
Cobb 2009: 693, fn. 12).
In addition to the contextual information about success/failure surrounding U.S.
combat casualties, all of these studies suggest that beliefs in the legitimacy or “rightness”
of the Iraq War played a large factor in explaining individuals’ support for war. Thus,
the extent to which individuals and the public believed that the Bush administration had
good cause for invading Iraq, or that it was the right thing to do, structured the impact of
casualties on the public’s sensitivity to casualties and the public’s support for war.
Again, this chapter hopes to extend these and other related findings to real world
rhetoric by MCs in the television media. Though Boettcher and Cobb (2009: 692) call
for “subtle and sophisticated experiments” to “disentangle framing effects in the real
world,” it is important to determine the extent to which such framing occurs in the real
world. Additionally, subtle differences in casualty contextualization in the real world
may not be easily captured in experimental studies. For example, the authors refer to
investment frames as irrational because “Completing the mission in Iraq will not bring
U.S. troops back to life and will not restore limbs lost as a result of combat” (Boettcher
2009: 678). Yet they somehow neglect the logic of giving meaning to death through
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victory that is the basis of the investment argument. The investment claim is intended to
suggest that the United States should continue to pursue military action in order to win,
and through winning the United States imbues meaning to those who have fallen on the
path to victory. Eventual victory, according to this logic, links the fallen soldier as an
important sacrifice for the greater good of wartime success. The language used in their
framing experiment neglects the victory component to the investment frame. More
problematic, their study may therefore not capture the way in which politicians actually
employ the investment frame. Exploring how, and the extent to which, elites
contextualize casualties therefore improves our understanding of experimental research
findings on the effects of combat casualties.
The studies examined here all highlight the importance of contextual information
surrounding facts and arguments about U.S. combat casualties. It is not simply
knowledge of casualties that matters; rather, it is how casualties are contextualized that
imbues the human costs of war with information suggestive of different ways of
understanding war. In this chapter, I examine how contextual information which has
been suggestive of important effects on how individuals and the public view war are part
of the real-world debates among MCs in the TV news media. I present this contextual
information, which has been drawn from the previously mentioned studies, in table 4.1.
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Data and Methods
The primary objective of U.S. politicians is reelection (Mayhew 1974). Regular elections
allow citizens to hold their politicians accountable, and a healthy democracy provides
relevant information to citizens, often through news coverage, so that elected
representatives can be held accountable (Druckman 2005; Baker 2007). Because of the
importance of elections, I restrict my analysis to the five months preceding elections in
2004 and 2006. For politicians, there are added incentives to shape public evaluations in
favor of their party and policies in the months leading up to elections (Foster 2006).
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I collected data on every congressional statement during an interview that
included a comment on U.S. combat deaths or Iraqi civilian deaths in the five months
preceding elections in 2004 (1 June – 1 November) and 2006 (6 June – 7 November).
Interviews with multiple statements about casualties were considered as one statement.
Though it would be useful to also include interviews in which casualties were not part of
the dialogue in order to measure the relative importance of casualty rhetoric during
interviews, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this chapter. Focusing solely on
interviews during which casualties are discussed allows for a more direct approach to the
question pertaining to the contextualization of casualties.
I searched LexisNexis Academic to locate each appearance by a representative or
senator on ABC, CBS, CNN, MSNBC, NBC, and Fox News. Specific key words that I
searched for are the same as those in the previous chapters, found in appendix A. For
example, I searched for the words “Iraq” “Iraqi” or “War” along with “congressman”
“congresswoman,” “Senator,” “Sen.,” “Representative,” or “Rep.,” along with key words
such as “casualty,” “die,” “ultimate price,” etc. Unique methods of coding for each
component to the study in this chapter are detailed in each section.
There are a number of important limitations to this analysis. Many Americans get
their news from their local media outlets (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). Indeed, in 2006,
54% of Americans regularly watched their local TV news, while 34%, 28%, and 23%
regularly watched cable TV news, nightly network news, and network morning news,
respectively (Pew Research 2006).3 Ideally, one could examine how U.S. politicians
speak about war casualties on local TV news. Unfortunately, such a task is not possible.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

Pew Research Center. Available at:
http://www.people-press.org/2006/07/30/online-papers-modestly-boost-newspaper-readership/. See also
Project for Excellence in Journalism, http://stateofthemedia.org/2007/local-tv-intro/audience/
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There are no databases of local TV news transcripts or videos. National TV news
transcripts are available, however. Also, the study conducted in this chapter relates more
reliably to similar studies examining congressional rhetoric in the national TV news
media (Groeling and Baum 2008; Groeling and Baum 2009).

Casualty Rhetoric Valence
For each identified MC interview with [a] casualty statement[s], I assessed the “valence”
of each casualty remark. The valence of each statement refers to whether the statement
was unambiguously “supportive” or “critical” of the war in Iraq. A statement was
considered “ambiguous” if a position on the Iraq War was neither explicitly supportive
nor critical of the war.
Table 4.2 shows the results of the valence of Democratic and Republican
statements on U.S. combat and Iraqi civilian deaths in Iraq. There was a significant
difference in the valence of these statements. In a basic cross-tabulation of U.S. combat
death valence by party affiliation, the chi-square value was 119.563, and the p-value was
.000. While not controlling for other variables, this simple statistical test suggests a
statistically significant valence difference between Democrats and Republicans.
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Democratic rhetoric was overwhelmingly critical. In the five months preceding the 2004
and 2006 national elections, Democrats discussed U.S. combat deaths in Iraq 54 times
and 40 times respectively. During the run-up to each election, the vast majority of U.S.
combat casualty rhetoric among Democrats was critical of the Iraq War. Approximately
95% of their U.S. combat casualty statements were critical. The two supportive U.S.
combat casualty speeches were made by Evan Bayh (D-IN) in 2004 and Joseph
Lieberman (D-CT) in 2006.
Republicans discussed U.S. combat deaths less than Democrats, and their
statements were marginally more mixed in tone. In 2004, 84% of Republicans’ U.S.
combat casualty statements were supportive of the war. The percentage of supportive
U.S. casualty statements dipped to 58% in 2006; however, there were only 19 Republican
U.S. combat casualty statements in 2006, down from 37 in 2004. Republicans gave no
critical U.S. casualty statements in 2004, and gave three in 2006. The number of
ambiguous speeches slightly increased from 16% in 2004 to 19% in 2006.
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Iraqi civilian casualty statements followed a similar pattern to U.S. combat
casualty rhetoric. In a cross-tabulation of valence by party affiliation, the chi-square value
was 32.000, and the p-value was .000. This test reveals a statistically significant
difference in the way Democrats and Republicans speak about Iraqi civilian deaths.
Republicans include these deaths in their remarks to support the Iraq War, while
Democrats engage in civilian casualty rhetoric to criticize the war.
Somewhat unexpectedly, Democrats and Republicans each discussed Iraqi
civilian casualties sixteen times each. The timing of the statements, however, differed.
The vast majority of Republicans’ Iraqi casualty statements occurred in the months
leading up to the 2004 elections. 88% (14) of Republican Iraqi death statements were in
2004, and only 12% (2) occurred in 2006. 69% (11) of Democrats’ statements were in the
months leading up to the 2006 elections, while only 31% (5) were in 2004. Hence, while
Republicans largely ceased speaking about Iraqi civilian deaths in 2006, they spoke about
them more often than Democrats in 2004.
In exploring Republicans’ Iraqi civilian casualty statements in 2004, it appears
that they were attempting to acknowledge the unfortunate toll on Iraqis while advancing
the claim that these losses were simply part of war or part of the war on terrorism. For
example, Sen. George Allen (R-VA) argued that:
The terrorists and the Saddam loyalists who want him to come back into power are now resorting
to killing children, 34, 35 children were killed today in an attack. But Iraq is moving towards
elections. Is it going to be easy? No, it's not going to be easy. It's going to be a challenge. But, we
need to persevere, we need to adapt. (Allen 2004)

Sen. Allen’s argument also serves to justify the Iraq War by linking Saddam Hussein’s
regime to killed Iraqis. In a related statement, Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) suggested
that killed civilians were essentially indicators of U.S. military success in Iraq:
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We are having innocent civilians, Iraqis, as well as other contract workers, who are innocent
victims of this war. And the terrorists have no conscience about them. They don't care who they
kill. They just want to disrupt the country over there. And it also means that we are winning. If we
weren't winning, they wouldn't be carrying out attacks like this. They're horrible. They're
horrendous acts of violence on the part of the terrorists, but I think the president will -- will allude
to the fact that we are winning the war and we've got to continue the course. We've got to move
towards the elections. And we're going to continue to see that that happen because we're winning
(Chambliss 2004b).

By 2006, Republicans scarcely spoke about civilian deaths in Iraq. While more statistics
about the number of killed civilians became increasingly prominent in the news, it
appeared to be an issue Republicans preferred to avoid. In both years, Republicans never
gave any remarks about U.S. culpability in regard to civilians killed in Iraq.
Democrats increased their civilian casualty rhetoric in 2006, and the tone was
always highly critical of the war. Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), for instance, argued that the
U.S. should not “play referee” in Iraq, and remarked that:
It's awfully difficult to have much optimism about this situation. You're looking at 100 deaths a
day, violent deaths a day, in—in Iraq. You've had now some 10,000 people who have lost their
lives in Iraq in the last four months, 182,000 people have moved out of areas, moving out of Iraq,
and moving out of areas where the conflict is most severe and intense. This is a civil war. (Dodd
2006b)

Sen. Dodd’s comments implicitly contend that the U.S. war in Iraq has been a failure, and
the massive losses in Iraq are not random deaths but part of a systematic civil war.
Like their Republican counterparts, Democrats rarely engaged in the issue of U.S.
responsibility for Iraqi civilian deaths, even with events such as the Haditha massacre.
While it is true that the majority of civilian deaths were the result of sectarian violence, it
appears that accusing soldiers or the military of misdeeds, accidental or purposeful, was
generally off limits for members of both parties.
If we examine the ratio of speaking about killed U.S. combat soldiers to killed
Iraqi civilians, we see a much higher rate for both parties in favor of speaking about
American combat deaths. The Democratic ratio of U.S. combat deaths to Iraqi civilian
!

122

deaths rhetoric was 5.9:1, while the Republican ratio was 3.6:1. This imbalance is
unsurprising, though unfortunate. Using the conservative estimate from Burnham et al.
(2006), the Iraqi civilian dead outnumbered killed American soldiers 601,027 to 2,647 by
June 2006, or 227.1:1.
From a normative perspective, it would be valuable for elected officials to speak
in more equivalent rates about the U.S. dead and Iraqi civilian dead, regardless of the
valence of such rhetoric. Of course, there is no ideal ratio
In a recent public discussion, Tim O’Brien (2011) responded to a question about
dealing with wartime trauma by arguing for an acknowledgment of the suffering of the
other during war:
I feel that one of the ways to deal with trauma is to be traumatized, to acknowledge that I was hurt,
and am still hurting. And to acknowledge what I did to hurt other people. There’s three million
Vietnamese that we haven’t even mentioned tonight that suffered a little bit too, that aren’t part of
our discourse when we talk about our own veterans having their troubles. The Iraqis got their
troubles too . . . . and it feels so self-centered, and complacent, and egocentric to focus on only our
own concerns, that bothers me. At least widen it, beyond that discussion.

As I have argued elsewhere in the dissertation, speaking of the civilian dead could be
considered a responsibility for U.S. politicians who have participated in the process of
generating the conditions for the deaths of innocent Iraqis.

Price Contextualization
Having established the valence of war death rhetoric by Democrats and Republicans, I
now examine whether these deaths were contextualized in terms of consumer or
investment language. As previously discussed, Boettcher and Cobb (2009) define
investment language as statements about staying and completing a war in order to
“honor” the dead so that they did not “die in vain.” The authors understand consumer
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language to be remarks suggesting that continuing to fight will not bring back the dead
and will produce more deaths. Did U.S. politicians in the TV news media employ
consumer and investment language running up to elections in 2004 and 2006? This
question is important because experimental research suggests that these frames might
influence the public. Yet previous studies have not examined the extent to which elites
use consumer and investment language when speaking about U.S. combat deaths.
There is a difficulty, however in attempting to see precisely whether language
used in experimental research is used in the real world. More specifically, there is likely
much more variety in real world rhetoric. To account for this, I coded as “consumer”
statements those remarks claiming that U.S. deaths were “not worth it,” that U.S. soldiers
died for a “mistake” or because of “misleading” arguments by the Bush administration, or
that “too many” soldiers have unnecessarily died because of “poor strategy/planning.” I
included an additional coding category of “withdraw/redeploy” or “change
course/strategy” if statements argued for exiting Iraq or changing policy/strategy in Iraq.
I coded as “investment” statements those comments declaring that U.S. deaths were
“investments” in democracy, winning the war on terrorism, or some other beneficial
return. In coding these statements, I only included the direct context of the casualty
statement. The results for this section are in table 4.3.
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As expected, Democrats gave many more consumer statements than Republicans. As the
war continued into the 2006 elections, a higher proportion of Democratic statements
involved consumer language. Somewhat surprisingly, relatively few consumer
statements included the additional claim of needing to exit or change course in Iraq.
Most consumer statements among Democrats therefore suggested that lost U.S. lives in
Iraq were generally not worth the cost, but did not suggest leaving or specifically
changing the conduct of war. This speaks to the difficult position of Democratic
politicians who were critical of the war, but leery of pulling out troops or putting forth
ideas for a different strategy given the precarious situation in Iraq.
There were, however, still forceful advocates of pulling out of Iraq or beginning
to redeploy soon. Some, like Rep. Albert Wynn (D-MD) argued that the U.S. needed to
get out of Iraq to “stop the senseless death of American soldiers,” claiming that “we've
accomplished nothing, so it is senseless” (Wynn 2006). Others, like Sen. Carl Levin (DMI) argued for announcing to the Iraqis that the United States would begin redeploying at
the end of 2006:
We have been there now longer than the Korean War lasted. This is three years-plus. We don't
have to prove our credibility in Iraq any longer. We have lost 2,500-plus troops, 17,000 wounded.
They need to take responsibility for this. And this over-reliance on American troops, when there
are political decisions the Iraqis must be making to share power and to share resources, which is
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the only way they're going to end this insurgency, we have got to prod them to take this
responsibility. They either want a nation or they want a civil war. And we have given more than
enough, more than our share. Should we now just precipitously leave tomorrow? No. But should
we give them notice that, by the end of this year, we are going to begin phased redeployments?
Yes. (Levin 2006b).

Unlike the consumer frame employed in the study of Boettcher and Cobb (2009), there
was not a single case of an MC claiming that, “staying will not bring them [U.S. soldiers]
back.” Such a claim is obvious, and the fact no elected U.S. politician advanced this
claim suggests that Boettcher and Cobb’s frame could have excluded the statement.
Investment language was extremely rare in Democratic U.S. death statements
(only one statement), but somewhat common in Republican statements. About 33% of
all Republican U.S. death statements used investment language. What is interesting is
that Republican politicians were not arguing to stay the course in Iraq to “honor the
dead,” as was the investment frame employed by Boettcher and Cobb (2009). Rather,
Republican MCs suggested that the investment of U.S. lives in Iraq was meaningful,
noble, and serving to advance U.S. and Iraqi interests. Take, for example, this statement
by Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC):
This is not a factional war in Iraq. This is terrorism against democracy. Democracy will prevail, if
we send a strong signal to the terrorists that we're not going to cut and run, we're going to spend
the resources, the blood and treasure to win this. Losing is not an option for the world, not just the
United States. (Graham 2004d)

Similarly, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) argued that:
Our president and those of us who believe that the national security of this country is the numberone responsibility of those of us who are elected officials know that we have got to have the
courage to see things through, and -- and it`s not easy. National security is not easy. Our hearts go
out every time there is a casualty. But we know that, if we back away now, things are going to get
worse. Our country is going to be less secure. (Rohrabacher 2006)

As these statements illustrate, many Republicans argued that the expenditure of soldiers’
lives would provide a favorable return in the form of national security and democracy in
Iraq. Republicans did not engage in what Boettcher and Cobb (2009) argued was a

!

126

flawed logic of the investment claim, namely, that it is illogical to invest more lives
because others have died. What is interesting is that the investment frame employed in
Boettcher and Cobb’s 2009 study had the greatest impact, but the investment language
used in real world politics differs from that used in the study. Politicians never argued
that more lives had to be lost to bring honor to those already dead; rather, they argued
that the investment of American lives would yield necessary returns.

Combat Deaths and Cost/Benefit Contextualization
This section examines how discussions of U.S. combat deaths by MCs during TV News
interviews were contextualized with certain costs and benefits of war. Again, a list of
these costs and benefits are provided in table 4.1
Each interview including U.S. combat casualties was examined in two levels for
cost/benefit information. First, I examined the “direct” context, which refers specifically
to the paragraph including [the] casualty statement[s].

I also examined the entire

interview to see which cost/benefit information was mentioned by the MC not in the
immediate paragraph[s] where the casualty statement occurs. I refer to the nonimmediate paragraphs of the interview as the “full” context. I conceptualize these two
contexts because it might be that the direct context is most relevant, seeing that it
provides the immediate context of MC death rhetoric. However, the full context is
undoubtedly appropriate to include, since MCs might discuss relevant cost/benefit
information shortly before or after they discuss U.S. deaths in Iraq. The full context of
casualty rhetoric is dramatically different than experimental research on casualty
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contextualization, since respondents generally are not subjected to multiple paragraphs of
information.
I begin this section by examining how discussions of U.S. combat deaths by MCs
during TV News interviews were contextualized with costs of war information. I then
proceed to explore the benefit contextualization of U.S. deaths in Iraq. !
!
U.S. Combat Deaths and War Cost Contextualization
Iraqi Costs
In examining speeches where MCs discussed U.S. combat deaths, the data suggests that
only certain types of Iraqi costs were used to contextualize these deaths. In this section I
will first discuss Democratic contextualization of U.S. deaths in Iraq and then assess
Republican contextualization of these deaths.
Democratic Contextualization
The data reveals that Democratic contextualization of U.S. combat deaths with Iraqi costs
differed dramatically in 2004 and 2006. There was very little contextualization of U.S.
deaths in Iraq with Iraqi costs in 2004 compared to 2006. Most remarks in 2004 were not
accompanied by any mention of Iraqi costs. Only 8% of Democratic statements included
comments on violence in Iraq, and only 6% included observations on killed Iraqi
civilians. These were the most frequent Iraqi costs mentioned by Democrats in 2004.
Contextualizing U.S. death in Iraq with Iraqi costs of war rose sharply in 2006.
Table 4.4 shows that commentary on violence in Iraq increased from 8% to 63% of all
statements. The second highest Iraqi cost mentioned was lack of political reconciliation,
which was never mentioned in any statement in 2004, and increased to 20% of all
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statements in 2006. The third most repeated Iraqi cost of war among Democratic
statements was killed Iraqi civilians. This cost increased from 6% of all speeches to
15%. The fourth and fifth most mentioned Iraqi costs in 2006 were lack of
police/military/security and lack of public services, respectively.
Remarks on U.S. costs of war were generally more common among Democrats.
The top three most frequent U.S. costs in 2004 were “war on terrorism distraction”
(30%), “wounded soldiers” (30%), and “treasure” (28%). In 2006, they were “treasure”
(50%), war on terrorism distraction” (33%), and “wounded soldiers” (30%). In 2006,
“increased terrorism threat” was a close fourth, appearing in 28% of all U.S. combat
casualty statements. Though U.S. costs of war appeared in more Democratic statements,
the most frequent overall cost of war in any year was “violence in Iraq” in 2006. This
cost could also be conceptualized as a cost to the United States, however. Violence in
Iraq meant risks to soldiers and U.S. success in Iraq.
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Many of the changes in casualty rhetoric from 2004 to 2006 make common sense.
The longer the United States was involved in Iraq, the greater the financial costs to U.S.
taxpayers. Hence, the increase of “treasure” in U.S. combat casualty statements in 2006,
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from 28% to 50%, appears to be a logical rhetorical move by Democrats. Rep. Barney
Frank (D-MA), for instance, argued that “If you look now as to this great disaster that
Iraq has been for the American people in terms of lives lost, destabilization politically in
the Middle East, the opposite of what the administration predicted, hundreds of billions
of dollars spent, that it has simply not been worth what it has cost us.” (Frank 2006).
Some Democrats, like Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), were more specific in estimating the
cost of the war and alternative projects that could be funded with that money:
We have to stop wasting the money that we are wasting right now, over $300 billion dollars on the
war in Iraq. We`re approaching very high numbers of dead, 2,600, we`ve passed that number,
20,000 wounded. The Treasury is just an open book, and we`re going broke here at home. It`s a
wrong policy. Let`s bring that to a close, concentrate on the war on terror. There`s one more point
I would make. I heard an expert say that just one or two days of the cost of Iraq, we could inspect
all the cargo coming into our ports.” (Boxer 2006c)

Republican Contextualization
Overall, the data reveals that Republicans rarely contextualized U.S. combat deaths in
Iraq with Iraqi or U.S. costs. The most commonly cited U.S. cost was “wounded
soldiers” in 2004 (16%), and Republicans did not mention this cost again in 2006. The
most common cost Republicans mentioned alongside U.S. combat deaths was “violence
in Iraq,” which appeared in 16% and 26% of Republican U.S. combat casualty statements
in 2004 and 2006, respectively.
If we look closely at Republican “violence in Iraq” comments, however, most are
not necessarily critical of the war in Iraq. For example, Sen. Bill Frist (R-TN), when
prompted in an interview, acknowledged an increase in violence, but also suggested that
such violence did not define failure or lack of progress in Iraq: “Yes, violence has
increased there on the ground against Iraqis, but at the same time, the Iraqi security forces
are being increased by the hundreds, indeed, every week, and we've seen progress
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represented by the fact that we have Prime Minister Maliki here today” (Frist 2006). In
the same paragraph, he prefaced his remark with beliefs about success in Iraq:
You know, you can't say they're not improving when today in about 15 minutes I'm going to be
welcoming to the United States Capitol where I am meeting a leader from a sovereign country
today that was democratically elected for first time in decades, that we are moving towards a more
prosperous, a more open, a more transparent government there, now just –now I guess about two
or three months –two months ago, for the first time a fully appointed cabinet. So you can't say
we're not making progress (Frist 2006).

Implications
A number of experimental studies have shown which costs and benefits of war matter to
the U.S. public. With regard to the costs of war, this section is particularly relevant to
studies on perceptions of success/failure in the context of mounting U.S. combat
casualties. Experimental studies by Gelpi et al. (2006; 2009) argue that the U.S. public
was relatively unmoved by U.S. deaths in Iraq as long as the war was seen as
“successful.” If the public begins to lose hope in a war’s success, combat deaths shift the
public against involvement in war. However, the public relies on elite cues, and
generally bank on their fellow partisan elected leaders to offer them with trustworthy
commentary (Berinsky 2009; Groeling 2001; Groeling and Baum 2008). But what if their
fellow partisan elected officials provide them with only a modicum of commentary on the
costs of war when speaking about U.S. deaths? While individuals in experimental studies
may be moved by remarks on the costs of war by their fellow partisan politicians, if their
fellow partisan politicians are not actually remarking on these costs, then effects on
respondents in such studies may not easily translate into the real world.
While this issue is more acute for Republicans than Democrats, at least with
regard to the Iraq War, there are undesirable implications for Democratic partisans within
the public too. Democratic MCs rarely contextualized U.S. combat casualties with Iraqi
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costs of war in 2004, and U.S. costs never exceeded 30% of statements in 2004 and 50%
in 2006. In the study by Federico et al. (2005), support and opposition to involvement in
the Iraq War was measured with answers to questions pertaining to whether the war was
stabilizing or destabilizing the Middle East, whether it was reducing or increasing the
threat of terrorism, and whether it was furthering U.S. interests in the Middle East or
creating more problems for the United States in the region. Central to answering these
questions in the general public is partisan affiliation and how partisan elected leaders
discuss such benefits and costs. When speaking about U.S. combat casualties, Democrats
gave zero statements suggesting the war was destabilizing the Middle East and only one
statement in 2006. Respectively, in 2004 and 2006, U.S. combat death statements by
Democrats included the argument that the war was hurting U.S. interests in the Middle
East 4% and 8% of the time.
If, for instance, perceptions of such issues comprise the meaning of support for
war, and may impact the effects of combat casualties on the public, then Democratic
politicians did not always contextualize U.S. combat casualties with important reasons to
support or oppose the Iraq War. Though I do not mean to suggest that doing so would
create large effects among the public, it is worth noting that many academic ways of
measuring support for war are not used rhetorically by elected officials during public
interviews on national TV news outlets.

U.S. Combat Deaths and War Benefit Contextualization
Democratic Contextualization
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As shown in table 4.5, Democrats almost never contextualized U.S. combat deaths with
benefits—either Iraqi or American—from war. To some extent, the result is expected, but
the near absence of benefits contextualization is somewhat surprising. Particularly, some
studies suggest that journalists in the media seek out not only same-party criticism of the
president, but also opposite party support of the president (Groeling and Baum 2008).
The result in this study may indicate the reality of increased party polarization; even if
journalists seek out opposite party support because of its newsworthiness, they might not
find much of it (Garand 2010). In interviews where Democrats spoke about casualties,
they rarely admitted or acknowledged any positive benefits for the United States or Iraq.
This is not to say that benefits not examined in this study were not present. For
instance many Democrats did concede the benefit of Saddam Hussein’s removal from
power. Such benefits, while not included in this chapter or previous experimental
studies, might be incorporated in future studies. At the same time, such admissions of
benefits were generally immediately followed by criticisms of the war. Take for example,
the following exchange between Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) and CNN’s Robert Novak:
Robert Novak: Ed Markey, since you think it was such a bad idea to invade Iraq, do you think the
world would be better off if we still had Saddam Hussein as a brutal dictator in Baghdad?
Rep. Ed Markey: Well, the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein. But if Saddam
Hussein did not have a nuclear weapons program, then we could have contained him and we
would not have to have lost a single. . .
Robert Novak: You would rather have him in Baghdad, contained?
Rep. Ed Markey: He was not a threat to the United States without nuclear weapons. And that's the
only reason that we went in to fight. (Markey 2004).

It is also surprising to see that more Democrats did not discuss the positive benefits of
Iraqi democracy. Though it was discussed, it was generally done so in vague terms such
as hoping that elections would occur or that democracy would take hold in Iraq.
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Republican Contextualization: Iraqi Benefits
The most common Iraqi benefits contextualization of U.S. deaths in Iraq by Republicans
was “elections/democracy” in Iraq. 30% of 2004 statements included positive
descriptions of democracy or elections in Iraq, and this number increased to 37% in 2006.
In 2004, Republicans linked U.S. deaths to the prospect of successful democracy. For
example, Lindsay Graham (R-SC) argued that, “optimism has to be defined in terms of
what is your goal? If your goal is to have 140,000 Americans out by next year, no, I'm
not optimistic. If your goal is eventually working hard, spending money and more blood

!

135

and treasure from America and the world, the Iraqi people can live free” (Graham 2004a).
In 2006, elections in Iraq enabled Republicans to contextualize U.S. losses in Iraq with
the benefits of democratization. For example, in 2006 Bill Frist (R-TN) suggested that
U.S. “lives that have been lost and sacrificed in support of a safe, and prosperous and a
democratic Iraq” (Frist 2006).
The second most common Iraqi benefits contextualization was
“police/military/security.” Though Republicans never contextualized U.S. deaths with
this benefit in 2004, 21% of Republican speeches in 2006 included this context. For
instance, shortly after discussing a funeral for a Private killed in Iraq in which the killed
soldier’s mother told him that, “We can't quit, we can't give up,” Sen. George Allen (RVA) argued that Iraqis were increasingly able to provide for their own security:
Every single week you see more and more Iraqis and their military taking control. And many of
the--now it's probably about a third of the military options are being--military operations--are
being led by Iraqis with the U.S. in a supportive role. And as more and more Iraqis take over those
military operations, it'll be ultimately up to them, their backbone, their minds, and their hands to
build that free and just society that is safe and an ally in the war on terror rather than, than an
enemy. . . . there's two or three key issues of matrixes of, of where you can see advances in Iraq.
Number one is the training of Iraqis, their military forces and their police forces. The military
forces are getting stronger every single day. And in fact the Iraqis, again, are leading those forces,
not the U.S., and leading operational endeavors. (Allen 2006c)

It is somewhat surprising to note that Republicans did not contextualize U.S. deaths in
Iraq with other Iraqi benefits. As previously mentioned, in research by Gelpi et al. (2006:
2009), respondents noted how Iraqis’ ability to live normal, peaceful lives was central to
their understanding of success in Iraq. The provision of public services such as education
and healthcare was the most important indicator of eventual success in Iraq among
respondents in their studies. Yet we see very little mention of these indicators, at least in
statements where Republicans discussed U.S. combat casualties. For instance, Orrin
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Hatch (R-UT), after discussing Americans killed in Iraq by terrorists, proceeded to note
that:
There's 2,200 schools that have been rehabilitated; 120 hospitals up and running; 1,200 medical
centers going. The Iraqi currency is the most widely traded currency in the Middle East. The oil
wells are up and running, except for some of the sabotage that's occurring. The country has
potable water in places they never had it before. There are so many changes for the better. (Hatch
2004)

Though such indicators of success were important to the public, Republicans generally
failed to contextualize U.S. deaths with such metrics. Perhaps Republican politicians
spoke about these indicators of success more regularly when not discussing U.S. combat
deaths, though it would seem even more rhetorically advantageous to include these
benefits in discussions of human losses.

Republican Contextualization: U.S. Benefits
Republicans generally did not contextualize U.S. deaths in Iraq with the U.S. benefits
examined in this chapter. The most common U.S. benefit was the “reduction of terrorism
threat.” To illustrate this contextualization, take, for example, this statement from Sen.
Mitch McConnell (R-KY):
I think most Americans are grateful that we haven't been attacked again here at home. Sure, they
would love for our troops to come home. We all would. But by staying on offense and cleaning
out Afghanistan and cleaning out Iraq, we've protected ourselves here at home. And we've done it
with a minuscule number of casualties compared to any war in American history that's lasted this
long. (McConnell 2006)

This metric of success was only used to contextualize U.S. deaths in 8% of statements in
2004 and 16% in 2006.
Interestingly, Republicans only contextualized U.S. combat casualties with killed
insurgents once. Again, Boettcher and Cobb’s 2006 study found that contextualizing
U.S. deaths with a casualty ratio inclusive of killed insurgents boosted respondents’
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support for war in Iraq. While perhaps different types of elites employed this contextual
frame, it was extremely rare among Republicans. The finding here suggests that the
experimental research may be utilizing frames rarely employed in the real world.
It was also surprising to find that Republicans rarely contextualized U.S. deaths in
Iraq with claims that the war was furthering U.S. interests in the Middle East or
stabilizing the region. This also suggests that measures of war support employed in
previous studies may fail to capture how politicians discuss the meaning of war success.

Legitimacy Contextualization
For this final section, I examined whether U.S. deaths were contextualized with
arguments suggesting that the war in Iraq was “legitimate” or the “right thing to do.” The
results are presented in table 4.6

For Democrats, we see somewhat of a decline from 2004 to 2006 in contextualizing U.S.
deaths in Iraq with claims that the war was “illegitimate” or the “right thing to do.” In
2004, 48% of Democratic casualty statements included assertions of the war’s
!
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illegitimacy, while only 25% did so in 2006. We see a similar trend among Republicans;
30% of Republican interviews included arguments about the legitimacy of the Iraq War
in 2004, and only 5% of these interviews included these arguments in 2006. This suggests
the possibility that this question became less relevant to the Iraq War debates leading up
to the 2006 elections. For example, Rep. Fattah (D-PA), in discussing anti-war protesters
remarked on how citizens were misinformed by the president, linking perceived
deception by the Bush administration with the human costs of war:
Part of the reason why you see people protesting is they disagree with the policies. They are tired
of seeing Americans die in Iraq or in Afghanistan. They're concerned about some of the questions
about why we went off to war in Iraq in the first place and being misled. (Fattah 2004b)

While Democrats could have continued making the same critique to the same extent in
2006, it seems plausible that arguments over Iraq turned more to questions about how to
proceed or progress in Iraq rather than how the United States became involved in the war
to begin with.
Conclusions
This study has a number of implications for studies on Congress and the public’s support
for war, as well as normative studies on the role of rhetoric and dialogue in U.S.
democracy.
A significant implication emerges for studies on biased congressional war
rhetoric. Groeling and Baum (2008; 2009) argue that TV news exhibits a biased sample
of congressional rhetoric. In their 2008 study, the authors argue that during “rally
periods” (the month following a major use of military force by the United States),
criticism by MCs of the president’s party increases while their praise decreases during
appearances in the evening news. They also find that the presence of casualties is
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associated with a significant decline in praise by members of either party. They find that
presidential party criticism decreases approval of the president among the public that
identifies with the president’s party. They also find that increased presidential party
criticism during casualty periods is associated with larger negative effects on presidential
approval among presidential party identifiers during casualty periods. Their study also
suggests that among independents, increases in criticism by presidential party MCs or
praise by nonpresidential party MCs leads to equivalent decreases and increases in
presidential approval.
While this chapter is not comparable in many respects, it does suggest that
members of the president’s party are unlikely to contextualize U.S. combat deaths with
criticism of the war. At least in the months leading up to elections in 2004 and 2006,
Republicans rarely contextualized their discussions of fallen U.S. soldiers in Iraq with
criticism. With regard to Iraq, the TV news media, and elections in the United States, it
would be somewhat improbable for Republican identifiers to observe critical war
commentary about Iraq war casualties by their Republican elected officials in the TV
news. It is unclear whether these findings would hold if extended to other uses of
military force by the United States overseas.
By examining congressional casualty rhetoric in the TV news media, this chapter
provides useful evidence about the informational context of casualty rhetoric by elites
during critical election months. As I have noted, some of the most-cited literature on
U.S. combat casualties largely deals with effects of broader rhetoric, effects of casualties
on voting, and experimental effects of framing rather than the content of real elite
casualty rhetoric. Many of the measures of support for war and experimental frames in
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such studies often do not appear in elite rhetoric, while other forms of rhetoric may be
more common. Researchers hoping to understand the effects of casualty framing,
congressional rhetoric, and casualties may wish to consider how actual congressional
rhetoric emerges to structure the meanings of fallen soldiers in the public sphere. Future
experimental research could explore different forms of casualty contextualization that
transpire among elites in media. For instance, researchers study the effects of casualty
rhetoric pertaining to responsibility, indifference, or familial impacts discussed in
previous chapters.
Future studies could also broaden the sphere of elite casualty rhetoric in the TV
news media. For example, former politicians, military officers, party strategists, and
foreign politicians in occupied countries also appear in the news, and attempt to provide
meaning to the loss of life during war. How do different types of elites debate about war
death? And are such persons more trustworthy and influential for the U.S. public than
elected officials? Experimental research could compare different types of casualty
contextualization with a broader array of elite rhetoric to explore possible framing effects
on casualty sensitivity and support for war. Some progress has been made in this area
(see Boettcher and Cobb 2009), but future research could enable a deeper understanding
of who speaks about combat deaths and how different types of elites influence public
perceptions differently.
Future studies might also explore in greater depth how the dynamics of debates in
the media impacts citizens’ views on casualties and war. Experimental studies often
apply different frames to see how they produce different effects. Quite often, however,
there are multiple and likely contradictory frames within a few seconds or minutes during
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actual debates in the TV news media. How do overlapping frames and excitable partisan
contestation about these frames impact citizens’ attitudes about war, death, and the
relationship between war and death?
The informational context of combat casualties raises concerns because these
deaths may take on a variety of meanings within the public sphere. No meanings are
“true” in the sense that these deaths are highly interpretable events, though certain truths
may prevail over others. I have argued elsewhere in the dissertation for the normative
value of elected officials speaking about war death. The normative stakes are higher for
politicians’ death rhetoric in the media, since the public is much more in tune with what
politicians say in the TV news compared with what they argue on the House or Senate
floor.4 Leading up to elections, the numerous truths about casualties and war that emerge
within elite rhetoric in the TV news have consequences for voters’ knowledge, the
meaning of that knowledge, and electoral accountability for politicians who send or
attempt to bring back troops from combat operations abroad.
This chapter likely raises as many questions as it resolves, though it does offer
certain conclusions about congressional casualty rhetoric in the TV news media. Much
work remains to be done in examining the myriad ways in which the deaths of soldiers
and foreign civilians enter into political conversations in the public sphere, and how their
emergence in political discourse may or may not impact citizens’ views on war. This
chapter hopes to provide an additional step toward a better grasp of the functions of lost
lives during wartime in the United States.
!
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It should be noted, however, that video clips from congressional speeches are regularly played during
TV news shows.
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Chapter 5
Discourse Ethics, Drones, and the Future of U.S. Military Adventurism
The casualties in Iraq are a bitter reminder of the truth and consequences of war whether you
oppose it, as I do, or wage it, as the President has. –Jim McDermott (D-WA)1

Introduction
Buddhist scholar Stephen Batchelor (1984: 7) writes that, “Death is a constantly present
possibility. Our life is inescapably a movement towards death.” For soldiers and civilians
in combat zones, this inevitable advancement toward death is often accelerated.
Thousands of U.S. soldiers were killed in Iraq. They were killed in Baghdad, Basra,
Mosul, Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq fulfilling the strategic objectives of generals
implementing the ideas of politicians. Many more thousands of innocent Iraqis were
killed in and around these cities, many slain by stray U.S. bullets and mortar rounds. Iraqi
militants seeking to gain power in a chaotic, post-Saddam Hussein environment killed
countless more innocent Iraqis. The circumstances of these soldiers and Iraqis’ deaths
were partly set in motion by politicians supporting, or opting not to challenge, the idea of
waging war in Iraq. Regardless of whether the Iraq War was justified or ultimately the
right thing to do, the movement toward death for many U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians
was quickened by political choices.
War death is but one cost of war, though perhaps the most devastating cost. This
project was dedicated to exploring empirically why and how politicians spoke about war
death, and the normative value of speaking about this cost. I conducted studies on (1)
U.S. combat and (2) Iraqi civilian death rhetoric within the U.S. House of
Representatives, as well as (3) casualty rhetoric among members of Congress (MCs) in
1

Rep. Jim McDermott, Congressional Record, April 21, 2004, H2234.
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the TV news media. In this final chapter, I compare and tie together the findings of these
three studies, and consider extensions of my results and arguments to other contemporary
and future combat contexts. Thus, the dissertation concludes in two steps: First, I provide
a comparative overview of the findings of the previous chapters. Second, I explore the
implications of my results and arguments for recent and future U.S. combat operations,
civil wars, mass killings, and drone strikes.

Main Findings and Arguments
The second and third chapters examined the issue of U.S. combat and Iraqi civilian
casualty rhetoric, respectively, within the U.S. House of Representatives. The dependent
variable in these chapters was the number of U.S. combat death and Iraqi civilian death
speeches, respectively. I used negative binomial regression to estimate the effects of
independent variables on the number of casualty speeches by members in the U.S. House.
For both chapters, I tested hypotheses derived from strategic ownership and personal
characteristics theoretical perspectives. Chapter two also included hypotheses concerning
constituency characteristics.
Table 5.1 shows how well hypotheses from these theoretical perspectives fared,
for both combat casualty rhetoric and Iraqi civilian casualty rhetoric. The results reveal a
number of similarities and a few differences between combat casualty rhetoric and
civilian casualty rhetoric.

144

The strategic ownership perspective suggests that legislators should speak about issues
that they credibly own or issues that are perceived to be strategically beneficial. In both
chapters, strategic ownership variables were highly predictive of casualty rhetoric. For
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both combat and civilian casualty rhetoric, I hypothesized that Democrats, those who
voted against the Iraq War Resolution (H.J. 114), and those who did not vote on H.J. 114
would give more casualty speeches than Republicans and those who supported H.J. 114.
The results reveal that Democrats gave more casualty speeches than Republicans, and a
vote against H.J. Res. 114 was strongly associated with more casualty speeches. Not
voting on the resolution was positively related to civilian casualty rhetoric but not U.S.
combat casualty rhetoric.
These findings confirm that congressional casualty rhetoric is rooted in strategic
and credibility incentives. Yet “trespassing,” which refers to the practice of speaking
about issues that may not necessarily be strategically advantageous, repeatedly occurred.
Chapters two and three demonstrated how many Republicans and legislators who voted
in favor of H.J. 114 framed war deaths in ways that justified support for combat
operations in Iraq. Still, congressional conversations about death in Iraq were mostly
one-sided. Democrats used floor speeches to attack the president and his policies in Iraq
by speaking about killed soldiers in their districts and in their states, as well as the
climbing total tally of war dead. Republicans occasionally spoke of war deaths in order
to support war.
Constituency characteristic hypotheses were only tested in chapter two. District
casualties had a very strong relationship to casualty rhetoric, while the proportion of
veterans within a district had no statistically significant impact. I also tested for the
impact of district-level casualties on speeches about district-level combat deaths, seeking
to determine if representatives were more likely to speak about combat deaths from their
own congressional districts as the number of combat deaths from their districts increased.
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I therefore conducted a logit regression where the dependent variable was “1” if the
representative spoke about combat death[s] from their own district one or more times,
and “0” if the representative never spoke about combat death[s] from their district. The
logit regression indicated a strong statistically significant relationship between districtlevel casualties and constituent casualty rhetoric. Hence, district deaths increased
casualty rhetoric in general as well as district-level casualty rhetoric. Holding all other
factors constant, representatives were rhetorically responsive to deaths in their districts.
Table 5.1 also reveals similarities and differences in the impact of personal
characteristics on casualty rhetoric between chapters two and three. The table shows that
conservative ideology was negatively associated with casualty rhetoric in both chapters.
Regarding military service, combat veteran status was positively related to U.S. combat
casualty rhetoric, but this finding was mixed for civilian casualty rhetoric. Noncombat
veteran status did not have any influence on U.S. combat casualty rhetoric but was
positively related to civilian casualty rhetoric in some of the models in chapter three.
Unexpectedly, the Latino variable was negatively associated with U.S. combat casualty
rhetoric, and this finding held in some of the models of civilian casualty rhetoric.
Being a woman was positively associated with civilian casualty rhetoric and U.S. combat
casualty rhetoric, but this relationship was only statistically significant for civilian
casualty rhetoric.
Chapter four explored casualty rhetoric among U.S. representatives and senators
in TV media in the months leading up to the 2004 and 2006 national elections. The
chapter built on a body of literature examining the effects of U.S. combat casualties in
U.S. politics. This literature has been comprised largely of experimental studies and
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public opinion data, and has not accounted for how casualties are debated by elites in the
TV News. I argued that in order to fully appreciate casualty effects, it is important to
acquire an understanding of casualty rhetoric among elites in the public sphere.
The chapter was informed by studies demonstrating certain contextual
information that is relevant to individuals’ support for war and casualty sensitivity
(Boettcher and Cobb 2006, 2009; Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Gelpi et al. 2006,
2009). These studies, while largely experimental, suggest different types of casualty and
war contextualization that should be observable in U.S. politicians’ rhetoric. While
chapter two and three employed inductive coding strategies, chapter four used these
studies as a basis to deductively code particular types of contextual information
surrounding casualty rhetoric.
Chapter four found that many of the measures of support for war and frames used
in experimental studies generally did not appear in elite rhetoric. It also found that,
contrary to findings on oversampled presidential party criticism (Groeling and Baum
2008, 2009), Republicans were very unlikely to criticize the president or the Iraq War in
their discussions of U.S. combat casualties. It was therefore improbable for citizens
identifying with the Republican Party to come across negative constructions of U.S.
combat deaths in Iraq in TV news.
Together, chapters two, three, and four advance our understanding of how
politicians debate wartime deaths within Congress and in TV news media. They provide
tentative answers to the questions specified in the first chapter: What explains variation in
speaking about wartime deaths among U.S. politicians within Congress? How do
politicians debate wartime death within Congress? How do politicians debate these lost
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lives in TV news media? Why should it matter whether and how elected officials speak
about these wartimes losses? In the following section, I explore the relevance of these
findings and arguments for contemporary and future conflicts.

Casualty Rhetoric and the Future of U.S. War
As noted in the introductory chapter, warfare has been a perpetual characteristic of
human history. The use of force abroad also appears to be an enduring feature of U.S.
politics. It is unclear, however, whether the United States will wage major wars in the
future. Clausewitz of course famously conceptualized war as the continuation of politics
by other means, suggesting that war is closely connected to politics and politicians. This
may be particularly true for politicians from powerful states, perhaps tragically governed
by structural incentives of the international system (Mearsheimer 2001). War may not
easily fade away as long as U.S. politicians see bullets and bombs as either necessary or
expedient means to political ends abroad.
Recent arguments, however, suggest that the United States is unlikely to become
involved in large-scale wars for a considerable period of time. For example, John
Negroponte, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and Director of National Intelligence,
imagines it will be one or two generations until the United States engages in a war like
Iraq again. Negroponte (2012: 2) suggests that, “While the costs in terms of blood and
treasure are probably decisive factors in making this a likely eventuality, there are a
number of other important factors mitigating against large deployments for combat
abroad, many of which have to do with the questionable long-term effectiveness of
external military interventions.” He therefore deems the considerable human and
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financial costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as having lingering effects far into the
future, preventing major deployments of force overseas.
Others are not so certain about this conclusion. Sterling-Folker (2008: 322)
observes that using coercive force overseas is the United States’ “favored modus
operandi, even when the use of military force or personnel makes less than efficient sense
for its long-term, strategic goals and interests.” Citing Michael Ignatieff, she notes that
‘‘interventions are popular and they remain popular even if American soldiers die’’ (p.
322). Though war, particularly interstate war has been declining (e.g. Mueller 2007),
there are current and likely unknown future state and non-state threats to the United
States that could compel future politicians to resort to coercive force abroad. Retired U.S.
Army Lieutenant General and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry
(2013) recently argued that U.S. foreign policy is increasingly (and disproportionately)
dependent on using its military might overseas. He contends that one of several reasons
for this overreliance on armed forces was the switch from a conscript to an all-volunteer
military force. Eikenberry (2013: 2-3) maintains that this shift “opened the door to
military adventurism,” and that “overseas conflict-related military deployments since the
mid-1970s has been at unprecedented levels for the United States, and the rate has
actually risen over the last two decades. The increased use of coercive power by our
country in recent times is an empirical fact.” He elaborates:
Consider the two post-1973 All-Volunteer Force interventions unique in breadth and scope:
Afghanistan and Iraq II. Together they are: the longest in duration of any American war (the
Afghanistan conflict alone enjoys this distinction); the seventh most lethal American conflict
measured in fatalities; second in fatalities (after the Mexican- American War) of those conflicts
fought entirely with volunteer forces; and second only to World War II in expense (and perhaps
yet to become the most costly armed intervention in U.S. history). A reasonable argument can be
made that the absence of those domestic political constraints inherent in a draft force may have
freed otherwise cautious U.S. government decision makers to carry out large-scale extended
military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Eikenberry 2013: 3-4)
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Regardless of whether increased military adventurism is rooted in, or partially the result
of, the transition to an all-voluntary military force, it is clear that U.S. leaders are quite
willing to send soldiers abroad to die and kill for their political objectives.
The U.S. public often is just as willing to wage war as its leaders, even if
Americans maintain rather paradoxical anti-war attitudes. Lebow (2010: 7) notes that,
“American opinion has consistently been strongly anti-war, yet the majority supported
intervention in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Many proponents of these
interventions described themselves as strongly anti-war but considered war necessary on
the ground of national security.” Gelpi et al. (2009) similarly find that Americans desire
winning wars, and will back combat operations as long as they imagine that the United
States will be successful. Bacevich (2005:1) goes further in arguing that the U.S. public
does not just desire combat success but also that “Americans are enthralled with military
power . . . the nation’s arsenal of high-tech weaponry and the soldiers who employ that
arsenal have come to signify who we are what we stand for.” Certainly many members
of Congress (MCs) and the U.S. public are fascinated with military power and would
have scarce reservations shipping soldiers off to major combat operations. Undoubtedly
many factors structure willingness to support the use of force among the American
public. The literature thus suggests that many Americans would likely not stand in the
way of politicians eager to use force abroad.
If the United States becomes involved in large-scale wars in the future, this
dissertation provides some clues to which MCs will speak of the future losses of soldiers
and civilians. If casualty rhetoric is driven by strategic ownership incentives, opponents
of providing presidents authorization to wage war will criticize an ongoing war, and will
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likely speak of the human costs of war to pressure the president and congressional
colleagues to consider ending combat operations. It is unclear if Democrats would still
speak so frequently about human losses if a Democratic president waged war. Berinsky
(2009) provides some evidence suggesting that Democrats and Republicans reverse their
wartime rhetoric depending on the partisan affiliation of the president. Perhaps casualty
rhetoric is more the result of partisan opportunities to attack the opposition president’s
war and less a genuine division between Democrats and Republicans in their concern
about casualties. Future studies could examine previous wars to see if casualty rhetoric
follows this pattern more than party affiliation.
Since casualty rhetoric is also driven by personal characteristics, we would also
expect to see legislators’ ideology impacting future casualty rhetoric. Liberals would be
expected to speak much more about U.S. combat and foreign civilian deaths. However,
we might also see a reverse trend if a liberal president waged a major war. Female
legislators would be expected to speak more about civilian deaths, but not necessarily
more about U.S. combat deaths.
Regardless of whether or not Negroponte’s prediction that the United States will
not become engaged in another major military endeavor like Iraq or Afghanistan for one
or more generations proves correct, I argue that congressional casualty rhetoric is
normatively valuable, and relevant in other contexts. Even if future U.S. soldiers are
protected from the dangers of IEDs and insurgent bullets that claimed the lives of soldiers
in Iraq, innocent civilians will continue to be killed. Genocide and mass killings persist
throughout the world, killing countless innocents. Civilians lose their lives in civil wars
and other conflicts where the United States is not involved. Innocent noncombatants are
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killed by U.S. drone strikes. The normative logic of congressional civilian casualty
rhetoric put forth in chapter three is germane to these grim events.
I have argued that the normative value of civilian casualty rhetoric stems from an
understanding of inclusion and public reasoning as central to rhetorical ethics within
political institutions (Habermas 1990). I suggested that inclusion and public reasoning
are the two most central components to ethical deliberation in democracies (Bohman
1996; Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Schneiderhan and Khan 2008). Including the dead
in congressional debates does not undo the violence done to the departed or bring them
back, but it does provide the dead with quasi-agency to impact public debates on what
their deaths mean and how their deaths should affect decisions on the conduct of war.
The dead are able to, albeit restrictively, recover their voices through the rhetorical
moves of politicians, even in highly politically managed articulations of war support and
war criticism. The dead soldiers and civilians, emerging as agents within congressional
rhetoric, are able to make “demands on the living” (Sophocles 2002: 192). Their
demands consequently manifest as part of the public reasoning process.
Additionally, I claimed that MCs were partially responsible for the deaths of
innocent civilians in Iraq, and this responsibility generates an obligation to speak of these
deaths. Is there still an obligation to speak about civilian deaths around the world where
the United States is not involved? No, but there is value in speaking of civilian deaths
even in cases where the United States has no commitments. Take, for instance, the issue
of genocide in Darfur. In 2006, Congress passed H.R. 3127, the Darfur Genocide
Accountability Act. This legislation defined the violence in Darfur as genocide, and
implored the U.S. government to support the African Union peacekeeping forces and aid
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in the criminal prosecution of those responsible for war crimes. Such legislation has
practical value in helping to stop violence, and public rhetoric about the massive deaths
was valuable in promoting congressional legislation and public awareness. As Rep. Frank
Wolf (R-VA) argued, “The Janjaweed militia has continued to rape and kill, wiping out
generations of people in Darfur. It is unacceptable, and the world must act.”2 When the
United States is not involved, promoting preventive action and calling attention to mass
killings is not an ethical obligation, but it is valuable to those dying. Such rhetoric and
legislation is also less likely to be susceptible to partisan politics, though Democrats were
more likely than Republicans to support Darfur legislation (Uscinski et al. 2009).
The issue of drone strikes is perhaps more relevant in considering when
congressional casualty rhetoric serves an important purpose, since the United States is
directly responsible for the loss of innocent civilians killed by these strikes. In this case,
rhetorical responsiveness is ethically obligated by MCs. Since 2004, the United States has
employed predator drones in its fight against terrorism. While first acknowledged in
April 2012, the Obama administration has accelerated the drone program to conduct
targeted killings of suspected terrorists over the last few years (Washington Post, April
30, 2012). These strikes have occurred largely in Yemen and Pakistan. The International
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and the Global
Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law reports that between 474-881
Pakistani civilians have been killed by Drone strikes since 2004 (p. vi), but also notes the
“militants” killed by these strikes were not necessarily “legitimate targets” (p. 30).
Congress has held a number of oversight committee meetings, though the first major

2

Rep. Frank Wolf, Congressional Record, September 25, 2006, H6991.
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Congressional session on the drone program occurred in 2013 (LA Times, June 25, 2012;
PBS, April 25, 2013).
While it may be difficult for Congress to curb the drone program, MCs might
publicly criticize the president and the program in Congress and in TV news media. Two
of the most vocal critics of President George W. Bush and the Iraq War frequently
challenged the policy of drone strikes in 2012. Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) argued,
“Instead of military force, instead of unmanned, amoral drones that don't know the
difference between killing an insurgent and killing a child, how about we send American
compassion to Afghanistan? How about we send our very best experts in education,
health care, energy, agriculture, legal reform, government transparency . . .?” 3 Likewise,
Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) observed that:
American drones in Pakistan have killed as many as 3,378 people. Drones in Yemen have killed as
many as 1,952 people. Drones in Somalia have killed as many as 170 people. We've not declared
war on any of these nations, but our weapons have killed innocent civilians in all of them. Highly
reputable research shows that the number of high-level targets killed as a percentage of total
casualties is estimated at about 2 percent. According to The Washington Post, the Obama
administration is working on efforts to institutionalize the practice of targeted killings by
unmanned drones abroad. The volume of these killings challenges the morality and the legality of
the attacks. We are creating a precedent for other nations that are developing the same technology.
China has just unveiled a new drone. The drone program has thus far been conducted with no
oversight from Congress or any judicial body. Congress has a constitutional responsibility to
ensure that programs that are being conducted in the name of our Nation are legal, transparent,
and accountable (emphasis added).4

Rep. Kucinich makes a case for congressional responsibility to question the drone
program, and he presents the deaths of innocent civilians as a major factor in questioning
not only the legality of drone strikes but also the morality of these targeted killings. These
types of speeches are necessary to healthy democratic debate about the conduct of war in
a highly technical age. Referencing the death toll, a form of numerical casualty
recognition, is one way to integrate discussion about the loss of innocent lives into the
3
4

Rep. Lynn Woolsey, Congressional Record, February 2, 2012, H378.
Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Congressional Record, November 15, 2012, H6377.
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public reasoning process of elected officials, who have the potential and the platform to
consider these deaths.
Public speeches by MCs over the use of drone strikes and the innocent human
costs that result from them are a responsibility of members of Congress. While the
examples above illustrate forms of casualty rhetoric that denounce the Obama
administration’s use of drones, the claim for obligatory casualty rhetoric also holds for
supporters of the program. Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN), for instance, recently applauded the
drone program because it avoids the necessity of sending soldiers into dangerous combat
missions, in which they could die or be wounded:
The reason I took 5 minutes to speak today is . . . because I was shaving the other day before I
came into work and I heard the newsman talking about a young family and a young man that was
in the military. I came out while I was shaving and I looked at the television. It was a beautiful
family-young man and a woman and their child. And they announced that he had just been hit
with an IED and lost both arms and both legs, and I was thinking what a tragedy for this young
man and for his family and the horrible things they're going to have to endure throughout the rest
of their lives. I started thinking about all the technology we have. We have satellites that can
pinpoint a pack of cigarettes on the ground, and we have drones that can fly over enemy territory
and pick out a target and hit somebody with a Hellfire missile and blow them to smithereens. And
somebody from a thousand miles away sitting at a computer with a television screen can direct
that drone and that Hellfire missile. And I started wondering to myself: Why in the world don't we
use more of those instead of sending young American men and women into harm's way day in and
day out like we do? We have the technology to knock out anybody anyplace in the world that we
want to. . . . We have to go into certain spots and knock out bad guys. We've got to do that. But
. . . instead of sending our young men and women in there, why don't we send a drone over to a
site that we've discovered from a satellite and blow the hell out of those people? Don't send our
young men and women into that kind of a situation where they're going to lose their arms and their
legs when we've spent all the money on this technology to stop the enemy. . . . I don't want to turn
on the television next week or next month and see more young men and women who have suffered
this way. I've been out to Bethesda and Walter Reed and I've seen the damage that war does. And
so if we're going to go to war-and we have to go to war, only when we have to. But if we do, let's
use the technology we have and defeat the enemy and minimize the loss of life that our young men
and women are experiencing.5

Rep. Burton’s support of the drone program illustrates one of its chief benefits:
minimizing the human costs to U.S. soldiers. From the normative perspective of this
dissertation, Rep. Burton ideally would have acknowledged the deaths of innocent
civilians in his remarks; dead innocents deserve—perhaps demand—recognition by
5
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elected U.S. officials. However, the concern for the lives of U.S. soldiers is valid given
the context of substantial losses of U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last
decade.
Rep. Burton echoes arguments put forth during the Vietnam War. As the Vietnam
War continued and grew increasingly unpopular, many MCs and citizens pushed for the
unrestricted aerial bombing of North Vietnam, largely to save the lives of American
troops. For example, U.S. combat deaths were central to Sen. John Stennis’s (D-MS)
1966-1967 public arguments with J. William Fulbright (D-AR) about escalating the war
in Vietnam. Sen. Stennis and his supporters argued that massive bombing in North
Vietnam would obviate the need for U.S. ground soldiers and prevent U.S. deaths, though
this would come at the expense of Vietnamese lives. Critics of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam saw a massive bombing campaign as key to saving American lives by winning
the war more quickly and thus allowing the United States to withdrawal from Vietnam.
Constituent letters to senators included arguments such as “The American people—the
vast majority at any rate—want to see maximum force brought to bear to win the war at
minimum cost to our boys in the field” and “We ought to get out of South Vietnam, but if
we don’t we should blow North Vietnam off the face of the map with hydrogen bombs
after giving them thirty days advance notice to come to terms or else" (Fry 2010: 525).
While Rep. Burton’s argument neglects the cost to innocent civilians, one could
claim that Rep. Woolsey and Rep. Kucinich’s speeches could consider the reduced
possible harm to U.S. soldiers. Including the dead, and perhaps the future possible dead,
contributes to vigorous democratic debate about the costs and conduct of war.
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Conclusion
Jean-Paul Sartre (2001: 519) noted that, “death alienates us wholly in our own life to the
advantage of the Other. To be dead is to be prey for the living.” Many legislators never
spoke about the war dead; when killed U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians did emerge within
congressional debates, they did so as contested subjects, as effects of framing techniques
determining their relevance and meaning. This dissertation has attempted to shift our
appreciation of the dead from purely independent variables causing political effects to an
understanding of why and how the dead become part of political debates about war.
Soldiers and civilians are important for their effects on political outcomes, but they are
also important because they are humans who died for a discretionary war. These deaths
should disturb war critics and war supporters alike, and ought to pervade debates among
U.S. politicians.
Indeed, the ghosts of American wars should haunt the democratic decisionmaking process when it comes to the issue of sending soldiers abroad to kill and be
killed. Comparative literature specialist Jeffrey Weinstock (2004: 5) recently suggested
that “ghosts” haunt the present, and their presence “indicates that, beneath the surface of
received history, there lurks another narrative, an untold story that calls into question the
veracity of the authorized version of events.” Yet even ghosts need ghost stories to
materialize and have effects in the present. Though dead soldiers and civilians are unable
to speak during legislative and other debates, elected officials may speak about these
ghosts and interpret their deaths within the public sphere. The ghosts of Iraq—killed
soldiers and civilians—haunted congressional debates about Iraq, but only through the
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stories told by politicians. Enabling the dead to emerge in war rhetoric fosters a public
debate on the value of life and death, and how these relate to victory, defeat, and the
challenge of global threats. In The Prophet, Khalil Gibran (1923/2004: 81) wrote that “If
you would indeed behold the spirit of death, open your heart wide unto the body of life.”
Exercising and contesting power lies at the heart of politics, and the dead deserve a
proper place in these contestations. Considerations of the human costs of war in
democratic debates not only enhance our decisions about war, but facilitate reflection on
how we might protect and enhance the lives of those exposed to global violence on a
daily basis.
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